Showing papers on "Skeptical theism published in 2015"
TL;DR: This paper argued that the common sense problem of evil does not avoid CORNEA and that CORNEAs can prevent anyone from having any justification for the belief that there is gratuitous evil.
Abstract: The inductive argument from evil contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. According to traditional formulations, the argument for this premise involves an inference—a ”noseeum” inference—from the proposition that we don’t see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil. One brand of skeptical theism involves using a principle—CORNEA—to block the inference. Recently, however, the common sense problem of evil threatens the relevance of these skeptical theists’ project. Proponents of the common sense problem of evil hold that there need not be any inference to justify the belief that there is gratuitous evil. Rather, someone can have non-inferential prima facie justification, or at least a pro tanto reason, for her belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this paper, I argue that the common sense problem of evil doesn’t avoid CORNEA and that CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, helps prevent anyone from having any justification for the belief that there is gratuitous evil.
16 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on the literature on skeptical theism to develop an argument against Christian theism based on the widespread existence of suffering that appears to its sufferer to be gratuitous and is combined with the sense that God has abandoned one or never existed in the first place.
Abstract: I draw on the literature on skeptical theism to develop an argument against Christian theism based on the widespread existence of suffering that appears to its sufferer to be gratuitous and is combined with the sense that God has abandoned one or never existed in the first place While the core idea of the argument (that the existence of a certain sort of suffering casts doubt on the existence of God) is hardly novel, key elements of the argument are importantly different from other influential arguments against Christian theism After explaining that argument, I make the case that the argument is untouched by traditional skeptical theism I then consider (DePoe’s, in: Skeptical theism: new essays, 2014) positive skeptical theism, arguing that while DePoe’s view might provide a response to my argument, it entangles the theist in worries about divine deception Because traditional skeptical theism and DePoe’s positive skeptical theism constitute the most promising extant strategies for answering my argument, the argument constitutes a serious challenge for the Christian theist My overall aim, then, is to draw on various strands of the skeptical theism literature to present a challenge for all Christian theists, not just those in the skeptical theist camp, while at the same time revealing some important limitations of skeptical theism
9 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined several responses to the Pandora's box objection to skeptical theism, including a popular response devised by Beaudoin and Bergmann, and found that all of them still stand.
Abstract: Skeptical theism is a leading response to the evidential argument from evil against the existence of God. Skeptical theists attempt to block the inference from the existence of inscrutable evils (evil for which we can think of no God-justifying reason) to gratuitous evils (evils for which there is no God justifying reason) by insisting that given our cognitive limitations, it wouldn’t be surprising if there were God-justifying reasons we can’t think of. A well-known objection to skeptical theism is that it opens up a skeptical Pandora’s box, generating implausibly wide-ranging forms of skepticism, including skepticism about the external world and past. This paper looks at several responses to this Pandora’s box objection, including a popular response devised by Beaudoin and Bergmann. I find that all of the examined responses fail. It appears the Pandora’s box objection to skeptical theism still stands.
8 citations
01 Jan 2015
TL;DR: Matheson and Matheson as mentioned in this paper describe a "phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism" as a "phenomenal conservatism and skeptical theism".
Abstract: Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism Jonathan D. Matheson
7 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that the explanatory version of the evidential argument from evil is immune to the concerns raised by skeptical theists. But they also argued that this is not the case in the case of explanatory versions of the problem of evil.
Abstract: Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called “skeptical theists”. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory version that is “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”. I argue that he has done no such thing.
4 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the skeptical theist's skepticism on this point is inconsistent with affirming the truth of a given theodicy, and they define the notion of skeptical theistic skepticism as a form of theism.
Abstract: Inductive arguments from evil claim that evil presents evidence against the existence of God. Skeptical theists hold that some such arguments from evil evince undue confidence in our familiarity with the sphere of possible goods and the entailments that obtain between that sphere and God’s permission of evil(s). I argue that the skeptical theist’s skepticism on this point is inconsistent with affirming the truth of a given theodicy. Since the skeptical theist’s skepticism is best understood dialogically, I’ll begin by sketching the kind of argument against which the skeptical theist’s skepticism is pitched. I will then define ‘skeptical theistic skepticism’, offer a precise definition of ‘theodicy’, and proceed with my argument.
3 citations
TL;DR: Theists are, according to Lovering, in an "unenviable position" as discussed by the authors, where debates on evil and God's existence depend conceptually upon claims about what God would or would not do.
Abstract: Theists are, according to Lovering, in an “unenviable position” Lovering (2009, 104) Noting that debates on evil and God’s existence depend conceptually upon claims about what God would or would not do, he lays out three frameworks within which such claims could operate, all of which raise significant problems for theism While his contention that these arguments depend on such claims is correct, the dire consequences for theism do not follow After briefly discussing his three alternatives, I will argue that while some of his supporting arguments are successful, his overall conclusion is not Although both Broad Skeptical Theism and Broad Epistemic Theism are untenable, the latter has more resources than he suggests for dealing with the evidential argument from evil More significantly, Narrow Skeptical Theism need not be ad hoc as Lovering contends, but is a position which we ought to accept provided it is not itself used as a pseudo-theodicy The upshot of these observations is that theistic arguments may reasonably be grounded in considerations about what God would do
3 citations
TL;DR: The existence of various sufferings has long been thought to pose a problem for the existence of a personal God: the Problem of Evil (POE). In as mentioned in this paper, the authors propose an original version of POE, in which the geographic distribution of sufferings and of opportunities for flourishing or suffering is better explained if the universe, at bottom, is indifferent to the human condition than if, as theists propose, there is a personal god from whom the universe originates.
Abstract: The existence of various sufferings has long been thought to pose a problem for the existence of a personal God: the Problem of Evil (POE). In this paper, we propose an original version of POE, in which the geographic distribution of sufferings and of opportunities for flourishing or suffering is better explained if the universe, at bottom, is indifferent to the human condition than if, as theists propose, there is a personal God from whom the universe originates: the Problem of Geography (POG). POG moves beyond previous versions of POE because traditional responses to POE (skeptical theism and various theodicies) are less effective as responses to POG than they are to other versions of POE.
3 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on an implicit principle Johnson used in his refutation to update probabilities after receiving new evidence, and they argue that this principle is false and that Johnson's refutation, as it currently stands, is undermined.
Abstract: In a recent article, David Kyle Johnson has claimed to have provided a ‘refutation’ of skeptical theism. Johnson’s refutation raises several interesting issues. But in this note, I focus on only one—an implicit principle Johnson uses in his refutation to update probabilities after receiving new evidence. I argue that this principle is false. Consequently, Johnson’s refutation, as it currently stands, is undermined.
2 citations
12 Jan 2015
TL;DR: In this article, a line of argument in favor of a religious belief in the existence of God is developed, in such a way that it is possible to hold that: i) it is a rational belief and ii) it does not depend on contingent evidence.
Abstract: The purpose of the article is to develop a line of argument in favor of a religious belief in the existence of God, in such a way that it is possible to hold that: i) it is a rational belief and ii) it is non-dependent on contingent evidence. Provided this is correct, a consequence would be that the position called new atheism is not a rational position, and that it corresponds to an evidentialist reductionism (i.e., that only evidence is the reason to believe, in this particular case, in the existence of God). In order to achieve this purpose, first, it is discussed in what sense what Priest (1998) understands as a rational contradictory belief is not applicable to a case of religious belief. Afterwards, the new atheism is analyzed (Fumerton, 2013), as well as the main argument held by this position in favor of the irrationality of the religious belief, i.e. the evidence against the rationality of the belief in the existence of God, the evidentialist argument from evil. This path corresponds to an evidentialist reductionism and it dismisses the reasons of faith as a proper way to argue in favor of the existence of God. Therefore, it is argued that such a position is mistaken: the reasons of faith are valid, rational reasons in favor of the belief of the existence of God. Lastly, the scope of the skeptical theism and the main argument why its dismissal seems plausible are considered.
01 Dec 2015