Showing papers on "Social ownership published in 1986"
TL;DR: The authors of as discussed by the authors make a distinction between ownership and control when they suggest that firms could be "socially owned" yet "worker controlled" (pp. 119-20).
Abstract: The authors make a distinction between ownership and control when they suggest that firms could be "socially owned" yet "worker controlled" (pp. 119-20). I find this distinction puzzling. By "control," the authors mean "ultimate enterprise authority" over "a range of important decisions, including membership, payment structure, and investment strategy" (p. 119, n. 1). 1 If workers have control in this sense, it is hard to see what substantive content is left for "social ownership." I tend to agree with Robert Dahl that "insofar as an economic unit is governed by its workers, it cannot be governed by others."2 Either the social ownership becomes largely symbolic, or it tends to undermine workers' control. Consider, in particular, their idea of introducing "a socially owned sector that guaranteed to those who sought it the availability of democratic work" (p. 124) or, again, the proposal that "the state could simply allocate certain amounts of capital to a socially owned sector and institute worker control in those enterprises" (p. 126). What would happen if the democratic firms went bankrupt? Would the state then provide the workers with capital to start up all over again? Or would it exercise its rights of ownership to prevent the firms from following potentially disastrous policies? And would not this detract from worker control? Is the proposal equivalent to the creation of a legally enforceable right to democratic work? If so, how would the authors counter the well-known objections to right-to-
6 citations
TL;DR: The Swedish wage earner fund scheme as discussed by the authors enables employees to own about 10% of Swedish business by 1990, and they could control far more if they had the power to buy shares on the stock market.
Abstract: At the end of 1983, after a long and bitter political struggle, the Swedes adopted a system of wage earner funds. The five regionally-based funds are directed by boards dominated by employees. Using funds transferred to them by government, they invest in Swedish companies, primarily by buying shares on the stock market. The fund scheme will enable employees collectively to own about 10 per cent of Swedish business by 1990. They could control far more. Only experience can determine the impact of this new form of social ownership. But possibly the Swedes have found a socially and democratically appealing means of retaining the advantages of a market system while integrating social and economic forces.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify and analyse the relevant context of workers' management, the type of environment by which any scheme of democratization of decision-making in industrial organizations stands or falls.
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to identify and analyse the relevant context of workers' management, the type of environment by which any scheme of democratization of decision-making in industrial organizations stands or falls. This context consists of political and economic democracy. Meeting workers' interests is one of the main goals of industrial democracy, but the concept of interest is also what makes industrial democracy closely related to the democratic political system which uses articulation of collective interests as a strategy for social regulation. I will also analyse social ownership as, in theory, the most democratic scheme of ownership distribution, and the problem of its dual role as a program for social transformation.The mines of Asturia were controlled by a council composed of a director representing the State, certain technicians, a deputy director and secretary chosen by the Asturias mines councillor, and three workers. The director could not act without the workers' agreement, and this adm...