Showing papers on "Spillover effect published in 1986"

Foreign investment and productive efficiency: the case of mexico*

Abstract: This paper examines whether the relative performance of firms within Mexican manufacturing industries varies systematically with the presence of foreign subsidiaries. It also analyzes how foreign entry influences the technological structure in host country industries. The findings suggest that (1) foreign presence in an industry is positively correlated with structural efficiency and (2) foreign entry is related to structural changes only in the "modern" part of the industries. The most important source of spillover efficiency is found to be in the competitive pressure induced by the foreign firms. I. INTRODUCTION A WIDELY held view among economists studying foreign investment is that one of the important contributions to the host country is likely to stem from external effects or spillovers. The spillovers can be of different kinds. The foreign firms may influence the productivity and growth of the domestically owned firm; they may change the nature and evolution of concentration; they may alter financing, marketing, and technological and managerial practices in the industries that they enter, et cetera. Because of great methodological difficulties in investigating these effects empirically in addition to lack of data, few empirical investigations appear in the literature. Three available econometric studies deal with the influence of foreign investment on the technical efficiency of host country firms. One focuses on Australia (Caves [1974]), one on Canada (Globerman [1979]), and one on Mexico (Blomstrom and Persson [1983]). All three find some support for the spillover benefit hypothesis, but none of the studies analyzes the nature of spillover efficiency in depth. The present paper is an attempt to identify through what mechanisms the spillover efficiency of foreign investment takes place by analyzing the effects of foreign investment on the productive efficiency of the industrial structure in Mexico. We will examine whether the relative performance of firms within an industry varies systematically with the presence of foreign subsidiaries. We will also analyze the impact of foreign investment on structural change, that is how foreign entry influences the technological structure in host country industries.

Research and Development and Intraindustry Spillovers: an Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality

Abstract: In this paper we estimate a model of production and investment based on the theory of dynamic duality and are particularly Interested in the effects of R&D spillovers and in calculating the social and private rates of return We identify and estimate three effects associated with the intraindustry R&D spillover First, costs decline as knowledge expands for the externality-receiving firms Second, production structures are affected, as factor demands change in response to the spillover Third, the rates of capital accumulation are affected by the R&D spillover These cost-reducing, factor-biasing and capital adjustment effects of the spillover are estimated for four industries The existence of R&D spillovers implies that the social and private rates of return to R&D capital differ We estimate that the social return exceeds the private return in each industry However, there is significant variation across industries in the differential between the social and private rates of return

Spillover of sorbed species

Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on spillover of sorbed species. The exchange of species from one position to another, either on the surface or through the bulk, has been well established. More unique is the mobilization of a sorbed species from one phase onto another phase where it does not directly adsorb. This has been defined as “spillover. Spillover may result in a spectrum of changes in the nonmetallic phase onto which it occurs. In the weakest sense, the spiltover species is transported across the surface of this phase as a two-dimensional gas. It may exchange with similar surface species.The spiltover species may react with the surface, which can result in the creation of surface defects and/or active sites. Further, the bulk of the solid may be transformed into a different structure. In each of these cases, the second phase is no longer an inert. It is not serving to promote the inherent activity on the first phase. The second phase is participating directly in the transport, exchange, and reaction with the spiltover species. In some cases it is able to become catalytically active on its own and thereby to participate directly in subsequent catalysis. The chapter discusses the types of phenomena associated with spillover, the spillover of species other than hydrogen, the aspect of spillover with the most significant catalytic implications, the implication of spillover to catalysis and other heterogeneous processes, the mechanism of spillover, and the nature of the surface and spiltover species.

AUTONOMY AND THE CHOICE OF POLICY IN ASYMMETRICALLY DEPENDENT ECONOMIES An investigation of the gains from international policy co-ordination

Abstract: shocks and an international debt crisis, have made policy makers all too aware of the links between their economies, and that mutual dependence through trade and capital movements also makes their policy choices interdependent. The problem is serious enough; the average OECD country now exports about 30% of its GNP, so that the "spillover" effects of policy changes from one country to another can be very powerful. Even the US is 20% dependent on foreign activity. How should policy be designed in these circumstances, and could the international coordination of policy lead to better results? The fact that foreign reactions often interfere with domestic policies has persuaded many politicians to call for coordinated economic policies. Competitive devaluations used to be the standard example, but nowadays few countries can divorce their monetary policies from foreign monetary conditions. Thus not all countries can reduce inflation simultaneously by tight money, high interest rates, or currency appreciation. But if all countries do tighten their policies simultaneously, the losses of output and employment are likely to be larger than any of them planned because of the adverse spillovers between economies. Similarly budget reductions abroad may frustrate domestic reflation plans, while foreign budget deficits can crowd out domestic investment. Given the degree of their interdependence, the European economies have an obvious incentive to export their inflation and unemployment-yet if they all do that, no country will benefit. Similarly, if they all expand together the inflation gains may well be larger, and the employment gains smaller, than expected because of the spillovers. The problem here is clear enough; uncoordinated policies may actually limit our ability to control individual economies. It therefore seems odd that, after a decade of annual economic summit meetings, there is so little evidence on how interdependence should affect policy design. Similarly, although economic theory has shown that coordinated policies can bring gains, there is no evidence on either whether these gains will be significant over a period of time, nor on how they would be distributed between

The Impact of Interdependence on Economic Policy Design: The Case of the US, EEC and Japan

Abstract: The world's industrialised economies have become increasingly interdependent over the past 30 years. The policy implications of this mutual dependence obviously depend on the spillover effects between economies: but work on this topic has used simplified models of hypothetical economies, and has therefore failed to clarify the implications of interdependence for policy choices. This paper applies different strategies to linked models of the United States, EEC and Japanese economies to evaluate the importance of spillover effects in policy design. The results indicate that interdependence has strong but asymmetric effects due to differing degrees of market flexibility. The United States performance dominates, while Japanese policies have little impact on the rest of the world. Matching policies produces poor results.

When International Policy Coordination Matters: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract: The interdependence of national economies implies externalities in policy making, and these externalities lead to inefficient outcomes when policy-making is decentralised and independent. These externalities have been well documented from a theoretical point of view. This paper reports our attempts to discover if and when policy coordination matters. We use the Liverpool World Model, which exhibits strong spillover effects for monetary policy and would therefore, we thought, yield very different results from those of earlier researchers. However, strong spillover effects do not guarantee that cooperative and non cooperative policies will yield very different outcomes: other aspects of the policy game's structure can be equally important. Indeed, we found many plausible situations in which the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are effectively indistinguishable, given realistic assumptions concerning the precision with which central banks seem to be able to control their money supplies. We also discovered situations in which coordination does make a significant difference, however.

Market and spillover forces in wage award determination in Australia

Abstract: (1986). Market and spillover forces in wage award determination in Australia. Applied Economics: Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 191-203.

A Review of Methods in the Control of Continuous Systems

Abstract: As pointed out in Chapter 2, control of continuous systems represents a specific situation which requires a specific approach. Mainly, if the differential operator of the control problem has become nonselfadjoint, one is faced with the following difficulty: the possible occurrence of spillover. Spillover is the incidence of instability by virtue of higher, unstable modes, which have not been considered in the design of the control.