Showing papers on "Stackelberg competition published in 1975"

Directions in Large-Scale Systems. Many-Person Optimization and Decentralized Control. Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Wakefield, Massachusetts on 1-3 September 1975,

Abstract: : Contents: Information Flow in Decentralized Systems; Decentralized Control and Large Scale Systems; Comparison of Information Structures in Decentralized Dynamic Systems; On Fluctuations in Microscopic States of a Large System; Flow Systems; Some Remarks on the Concept of State; On Multicriteria Optimization; Dynamic Games with Coalitions and Diplomacies; Three Methods for Determining Pareto-Optimal Solutions of Multiple-Objective Problems; Stackelberg Strategies for Multilevel Systems; Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations; Some Thoughts About Simple Advertising Models as Differential Games and the Structure of Coalitions; Equilibrium Patterns for Bargaining under Stirke:A Differential Game Model; Permanent Differential Games: Quasi Stationary and Relaxed Steady-State Operations; Modelling and Control of the U.K. Economy; Decentralized Management and Optimization of Development; Organization and Control; Decentralized Stabilization and Regulation in Large Multivariable Systems; The Role of Poles and Zeros in Multivariable Feedback Theory; The Linguistic Approach and Its Application to Decision Analysis; Fuzzy Core and Equilibria of Games Defined in Strategic Form; Stabilization and Optimal Control of Nonlinear Systems Homogeneous-in-the-Input; Stability of Large Scale Interconnected Systems; Large-Scale Systems: Optimality vs. Reliability.

Equilibrium Concepts for Arms Race Problems.

Abstract: : In this paper we have presented various possible behaviors of two nations in an armaments race. The conceptual aspects and the properties of the Cournot and Stackelberg solutions in terms of the information about the armaments behavior of the other nation have been discussed. The static solution is simplest since it requires a myopic behavior on the part of each nation; i.e. each nation adjusts its armaments level according to the current armament level of the other nation and with no consideration to any future goals. The dynamic solutions on the other hand where future goals are incorporated in the decision making at any instant of time requires more assumptions about the behavior of the other nation. Two cases have been discussed in conjunction with the Cournot solution. In the first, each nation predicts the future armament variations of the other nation, while in the second, each nation predicts the future armaments expenditure policy of the other nation as a function of the armaments levels of both nations. From a practical point of view, such solutions would be useful in a situation where a noncooperative equilibrium is to be negotiated (e.g. Middle East conflict) and each nation is asked (or forced) to commit itself to a certain armaments level or expenditure policy over a certain period of time in the future. The nations are in dynamic Cournot equilibrium if the predictions match the optimum quantities. The dynamic Stackelberg solution on the other hand has been discussed for a situation where armaments decisions are obtained as a function of armaments levels at stages in time by a leader nation first and then by the follower nation.