Showing papers on "Truth condition published in 1990"

Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to Semantics

Abstract: This self-contained introduction to natural language semantics addresses the major theoretical questions in the field. The authors introduce the systematic study of linguistic meaning through a sequence of formal tools and their linguistic applications. Starting with propositional connectives and truth conditions, the book moves to quantification and binding, intensionality and tense, and so on. To set their approach in a broader perspective, the authors also explore the interaction of meaning with context and use (the semantics-pragmatics interface) and address some of the foundational questions, especially in connection with cognition in general. They also introduce a few of the most accessible and interesting ideas from recent research to give the reader a bit of the flavor of current work in semantics. The organization of this new edition is modular; after the introductory chapters, the remaining material can be covered in flexible order. The book presupposes no background in formal logic (an appendix introduces the basic notions of set theory) and only a minimal acquaintance with linguistics. This edition includes a substantial amount of completely new material and has been not only updated but redesigned throughout to enhance its user-friendliness.

Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox

Abstract: The challenge is a welcome one. Although I will argue that the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox is not a problem for naturalists only, I will propose a naturalist solution to it. (Should the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox prove to be soluble from a naturalist standpoint but intractable from other standpoints, that would, I suppose, constitute an argument for naturalism.) Then I will show that the paradox and its solution have an important consequence for the theories of meaning and truth. The Kripke-Wittgenstein arguments which pose the paradox also put in question Dummett's and Putnam's view of language understanding. From this view it follows that truth rules must be "verificationist rules" that assign assertability conditions to sentences, rather than "realist rules" that assign correspondence truth conditions. The proposed solution to the paradox suggests another view of language understanding, according to which a speaker can express, through his language practice, a grasp of correspondence truth rules. This will block one route of Putnam's famous retreat from realism:

Meaning, Truth and Realism in Bultmann and Lindbeck

Abstract: The philosopher Michael Dummett has argued that a commitment to realism in a given domain must display the following marks: a conception of reality as determinate and mind-independent, the correspondence theory of truth, and a truth conditions theory of meaning. In his own and others' philosophy we see a series of arguments at work in the theory of meaning, in epistemology and in the philosophy of science which converge upon a common rejection of such realism. It is not surprising that in such an intellectual climate we see a rise in non-realist theories of religion. Religious realities are here recognised as projected; theological truth is fixed by pragmatic criteria; and meaning is handled in terms of assertibility conditions. This rise of regulative religion has met with a variety of reactions ranging from a horror of being imprisoned by an alien philosophy to a delight that the true nature of religion has at last been brought into sharper focus.

Forward References in Natural Language

Abstract: This paper deals with forward references (also called kataphoric references) in natural language. In order to calculate truth conditions for sentences that involve kataphoric references, an extension of Discourse Representation Theory, PATIENT DRT, is proposed, inspired by socalled backpatching techniques for the parsing of programming languages. The main idea is that a kataphoric element introduces an incomplete discourse entity, to be completed by subsequent material under certain conditions. This approach is applicable to pronominal as well as complex Noun Phrases, and has no special difficulties with crossing co-references. The main virtue of this approach is that it allows parsing of kataphors from left to right, which makes it suitable for on-line language processing by computer and plausible as an element of a theory of human language processing as well. However, the approach suggests that a left-to-right treatment of kataphoric constructions is hard to reconcile with the requirements of compositionality.

Explanation in Psychology: Truth and Teleology

Abstract: A number of recent writers have argued that we should explain mental representation teleologically, in terms of the biological purposes of beliefs and other mental states. A rather older idea is that the truth condition of a belief is that condition which guarantees that actions based on that belief will succeed. What I want to show in this paper is that these two ideas complement each other. The teleological theory is inadequate unless it incorporates the thesis that truth is the guarantee of successful action. Conversely, the success-guaranteeing account of truth conditions is incomplete until it is placed in a teleological context.

A Skeptical Semantics for Truth Maintenance

Abstract: To generalize the 2-valued stable model semantics for truth maintenance, we introduce a 3-valued stable model semantics. Unlike the 2-valued semantics, this semantics can be given compositional properties. In particular we show that a canonical model (the skeptical model) can be derived as a composition of 3-valued interpretations. The skeptical model can also be characterized by a fixpoint construction. We show that using this construction, the skeptical model can be computed in O(n2).

Truth, Facts, and Possibilities in the Correspondence Theories of Wittgenstein, Moore, and Russell

Abstract: Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, Russell, in 1918–19, and Moore, in 1910–11, advocated a variant of a correspondence theory of truth that reveals basic problems faced by correspondence theories. To speak of a theory of truth is to speak of an ontological account or assay that specifies a ground of truth or truth maker. It isnot to speak of the mere introduction of a truth predicate into a schema in such a way as to avoidparadoxes or mimic the apparent univocal use of the phrase ‘is true’ in ordinary speech, while specifying a mechanism for handling molecular and quantified formulae. To offer a philosophical theory of truth is not merely to specify the truth condition for an atomic formula, ‘Fa’ for example, by a transcription such as ‘a has F’ or ‘a belongs to the class of things that are F’ or ‘π has f’, where ‘π’ and ‘f ’ are metalinguistic correlates of ‘a’ and ‘F’. This is not to deny that such concerns play a role in setting out a theory of truth; it is only to insist that to provide a philosophical account or analysis requires that one specify what a ground of truth is.