Showing papers on "Upper ontology published in 1990"
TL;DR: In this paper, Simons surveys and critiques previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a new account that encompasses both temporal and modal considerations, showing that the formal theory of part and whole is essential to ontology.
Abstract: Although the relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is, this is the first full-length study of this key concept. Showing that mereology, or the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology, Simons surveys and critiques previous theories--especially the standard extensional view--and proposes a new account that encompasses both temporal and modal considerations. Simons's revised theory not only allows him to offer fresh solutions to long-standing problems, but also has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of a host of classical philosophical concepts.
346 citations
34 citations
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that, while having a great deal to offer to NLP semantics, linguistic semantics lacks such a theory, and model-theoretical semantics, which is based on a formal theory, fails to reach any significant goals with regard to natural language semantics.
Abstract: The main claim of the paper is that no significant progress in NLP semantics is possible without a comprehensive formal theory. It is demonstrated that, while having a great deal to offer to NLP semantics, linguistic semantics lacks such a theory. It is also argued that model-theoretical semantics, which is based on a formal theory, fails to reach any significant goals with regard to natural language semantics. It does, however, put forward the important idea of anchoring natural meaning representations in the real world. Such a direct anchoring, without the burden and constraints of truth values, is achieved by the ontologically-, sublanguage-, and semantic-network-based approach to NLPS, an approach in which theoretical needs and practical feasibility merge.
4 citations
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: If it is true that the objects of science in its various subdivisions can after investigation be reduced to the objects in the constructivistic system that contains as basic concepts “Erlebs”, to which all other objects can be reduced, Carnap has proven that science is basically one and corresponds to the principles of empiricism.
Abstract: In The Logical Structure of the World, Carnap explained that his aim was to build an epistemic-logical system of objects or concepts. This undertaking was meant as a counterpart of the deduction of statements from axioms, which had received in the past far more attention than the methodology of the systematic construction of concepts. His aim was “to advance to an intersubjective, objective world, which can be conceptually comprehended and which is identical for all observers”.1 He wanted to prove something about human knowledge and more in particular about science and its method. If it is true that the objects of science in its various subdivisions can after investigation be reduced to the objects of the constructivistic system that contains as basic concepts “Erlebs”, to which all other objects can be reduced, he has proven that science is basically one and corresponds to the principles of empiricism.