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Aesun Park
Researcher at Kookmin University
Publications - 15
Citations - 92
Aesun Park is an academic researcher from Kookmin University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Side channel attack & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 14 publications receiving 51 citations.
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Chosen ciphertext Simple Power Analysis on software 8-bit implementation of ring-LWE encryption
Aesun Park,Dong-Guk Han +1 more
TL;DR: The first Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack on the ring-LWE encryption scheme is proposed, which exploits the chosen ciphertext and the vulnerability associated with the modular addition, which is applicable when a ring- lwe encryption scheme operates on 8-bit microcontroller devices.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Side-Channel Attacks on Post-Quantum Signature Schemes based on Multivariate Quadratic Equations:
TL;DR: This is the first result on the security of multivariate quadratic equations-based signature schemes using only CPA, and can be applied to Rainbow-like multi-layered schemes and UOV-like single layer schemes submitted to NIST for Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization.
Journal ArticleDOI
Side-Channel Attacks on Post-Quantum Signature Schemes based on Multivariate Quadratic Equations: - Rainbow and UOV -
TL;DR: This is the first result on the security of multivariate quadratic equations-based signature schemes using only CPA, and can be applied to Rainbow-like multi-layered schemes and UOV-like single layer schemes submitted to NIST for Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization.
Journal ArticleDOI
Chosen-Ciphertext Clustering Attack on CRYSTALS-KYBER Using the Side-Channel Leakage of Barrett Reduction
TL;DR: This study proposes a chosen-ciphertext side-channel attack against a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), the third-round candidate of the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) standardization project.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Novel Side-Channel Attacks on Quasi-Cyclic Code-Based Cryptography
TL;DR: A multiple-trace attack which enables to completely recover accurate secret indices and a singletrace attack which can even work when using ephemeral keys or applying Rossi et al.