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Mindset The New Psychology Of Success

We introduce the Berlin Numeracy Test, a new psychometrically sound instrument that quickly assesses statistical numeracy and risk literacy. We present 21 studies (n=5336) showing robust psychometric discriminability across 15 countries (e.g., Germany, Pakistan, Japan, USA) and diverse samples (e.g., medical professionals, general populations, Mechanical Turk web panels). Analyses demonstrate desirable patterns of convergent validity (e.g., numeracy, general cognitive abilities), discriminant validity (e.g., personality, motivation), and criterion validity (e.g., numerical and nonnumerical questions about risk). The Berlin Numeracy Test was found to be the strongest predictor of comprehension of everyday risks (e.g., evaluating claims about products and treatments; interpreting forecasts), doubling the predictive power of other numeracy instruments and accounting for unique variance beyond other cognitive tests (e.g., cognitive reflection, working memory, intelligence). The Berlin Numeracy Test typically takes about three minutes to complete and is available in multiple languages and formats, including a computer adaptive test that automatically scores and reports data to researchers (www.riskliteracy.org). The online forum also provides interactive content for public outreach and education, and offers a recommendation system for test format selection. Discussion centers on construct validity of numeracy for risk literacy, underlying cognitive mechanisms, and applications in adaptive decision support.

/pdf/measuring-risk-literacy-the-berlin-numeracy-test-f89dsieofl.pdf

Measuring risk literacy: The Berlin numeracy test

Since its establishment, psychology has struggled to find valid methods for studying thoughts and subjective experiences. Thirty years ago, Ericsson and Simon (1980) proposed that participants can give concurrent verbal expression to their thoughts (think aloud) while completing tasks without changing objectively measurable performance (accuracy). In contrast, directed requests for concurrent verbal reports, such as explanations or directions to describe particular kinds of information, were predicted to change thought processes as a consequence of the need to generate this information, thus altering performance. By comparing performance of concurrent verbal reporting conditions with their matching silent control condition, Ericsson and Simon found several studies demonstrating that directed verbalization was associated with changes in performance. In contrast, the lack of effects of thinking aloud was merely suggested by a handful of experimental studies. In this article, Ericsson and Simon's model is tested by a meta-analysis of 94 studies comparing performance while giving concurrent verbalizations to a matching condition without verbalization. Findings based on nearly 3,500 participants show that the "think-aloud" effect size is indistinguishable from zero (r = -.03) and that this procedure remains nonreactive even after statistically controlling additional factors such as task type (primarily visual or nonvisual). In contrast, procedures that entail describing or explaining thoughts and actions are significantly reactive, leading to higher performance than silent control conditions. All verbal reporting procedures tend to increase times to complete tasks. These results suggest that think-aloud should be distinguished from other methods in future studies. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Do Procedures for Verbal Reporting of Thinking Have to Be Reactive? A Meta-Analysis and Recommendations for Best Reporting Methods

While smartphones and related mobile technologies are recognized as flexible and powerful tools that, when used prudently, can augment human cognition, there is also a growing perception that habitual involvement with these devices may have a negative and lasting impact on users’ ability to think, remember, pay attention, and regulate emotion. The present review considers an intensifying, though still limited, area of research exploring the potential cognitive impacts of smartphone-related habits, and seeks to determine in which domains of functioning there is accruing evidence of a significant relationship between smartphone technology and cognitive performance, and in which domains the scientific literature is not yet mature enough to endorse any firm conclusions. We focus our review primarily on three facets of cognition that are clearly implicated in public discourse regarding the impacts of mobile technology – attention, memory, and delay of gratification – and then consider evidence regarding the broader relationships between smartphone habits and everyday cognitive functioning. Along the way, we highlight compelling findings, discuss limitations with respect to empirical methodology and interpretation, and offer suggestions for how the field might progress toward a more coherent and robust area of scientific inquiry.​

/pdf/smartphones-and-cognition-a-review-of-research-exploring-the-1dcnqqvpmq.pdf

Smartphones and Cognition: A Review of Research Exploring the Links between Mobile Technology Habits and Cognitive Functioning.

Neuroimaging creativity: A psychometric view

It is well documented that interacting with a mobile phone is associated with poorer performance on concurrently performed tasks because limited attentional resources must be shared between tasks. However, mobile phones generate auditory or tactile notifications to alert users of incoming calls and messages. Although these notifications are generally short in duration, they can prompt task-irrelevant thoughts, or mind wandering, which has been shown to damage task performance. We found that cellular phone notifications alone significantly disrupted performance on an attention-demanding task, even when participants did not directly interact with a mobile device during the task. The magnitude of observed distraction effects was comparable in magnitude to those seen when users actively used a mobile phone, either for voice calls or text messaging.

The attentional cost of receiving a cell phone notification.

Knowing what we don't yet know is critical for learning. Nonetheless, people typically overestimate their prowess—but is this true of everyone? Three studies examined who shows overconfidence and why. Study 1 demonstrated that participants with an entity (fixed) theory of intelligence, those known to avoid negative information, showed significantly more overconfidence than those with more incremental (malleable) theories. In Study 2, participants who were taught an entity theory of intelligence allocated less attention to difficult problems than those taught an incremental theory. Participants in this entity condition also displayed more overconfidence than those in the incremental condition, and this difference in overconfidence was mediated by the observed bias in attention to difficult problems. Finally, in Study 3, directing participants' attention to difficult aspects of the task reduced the overconfidence of those with more entity views of intelligence. Implications for reducing biased self-assessments that can interfere with learning were discussed.

/pdf/understanding-overconfidence-theories-of-intelligence-27qo4lz9eu.pdf

Understanding Overconfidence: Theories of Intelligence, Preferential Attention, and Distorted Self-Assessment.

Self-report measurements are ubiquitous in psychology, but they carry the potential of altering processes they are meant to measure. We assessed whether a common metamemory measure, judgments of learning, can change the ongoing process of memorizing and subsequent memory performance. Judgments of learning are a form of metamemory monitoring described as conscious reflection on one's own memory performance or encoding activities for the purpose of exerting strategic control over one's study and retrieval activities (T. O. Nelson & Narens, 1990). Much of the work examining the conscious monitoring of encoding relies heavily on a paradigm in which participants are asked to estimate the probability that they will recall a given item in a judgment of learning. In 5 experiments, we find effects of measuring judgments of learning on how people allocate their study time to difficult versus easy items, and on what they will recall. These results suggest that judgments of learning are partially constructed in response to the measurement question. The tendency of judgments of learning to alter performance places them in the company of other reactive verbal reporting methods, counseling researchers to consider incorporating control groups, creating alternative scales, and exploring other verbal reporting methods. Less directive methods of accessing participants' metacognition and other judgments should be considered as an alternative to response scales.

When asking the question changes the ultimate answer: Metamemory judgments change memory.

https://labs.wsu.edu/joyceehrlinger/wp-content/uploads/sites/252/2016/01/EhrlingerMitchumDweck2016.pdf

Understanding overconfidence: Theories of intelligence, preferential attention, and distorted self-assessment

Two experiments tested whether differences in problem-solving strategies influence the ability of people to monitor their problem-solving effectiveness as measured by confidence judgments. On multiple choice problems, people tend to use either a constructive matching strategy, whereby they attempt to solve a problem before looking at the response options, or a response elimination strategy, whereby they work backward from response options trying to find one that fits as a solution. Constructive matching gives rise to different cues that may enhance confidence monitoring. Experiment 1 showed that spontaneous constructive matching in nonverbal spatial reasoning problems was associated with better confidence calibration and resolution than response elimination. We manipulated strategy in Experiment 2 by requiring constructive matching and found improved monitoring. Implications for research on monitoring, overconfidence, and the association between skill and monitoring are discussed.

Ainsley Mitchum

Papers

The attentional cost of receiving a cell phone notification.

Understanding Overconfidence: Theories of Intelligence, Preferential Attention, and Distorted Self-Assessment.

When asking the question changes the ultimate answer: Metamemory judgments change memory.

Understanding overconfidence: Theories of intelligence, preferential attention, and distorted self-assessment

Solve the problem first: constructive solution strategies can influence the accuracy of retrospective confidence judgments.