Preface Acknowledgements 1. Models of working memory: an introduction Priti Shah and Akira Miyake 2. Working memory: the multiple-component model Alan D. Baddeley and Robert H. Logie 3. An embedded-processes model of working memory Nelson Cowan 4. Individual differences in working memory capacity and what they tell us about controlled attention, general fluid intelligence and functions of the prefrontal cortex Randall W. Engle, Michael J. Kane and Stephen W. Tuholski 5. Modelling working memory in a unified architecture: an ACT-R perspective Marsha C. Lovett, Lynne M. Reder and Christian Lebiere 6. Insights into working memory from the perspective of the EPIC architecture for modelling skilled perceptual-motor and cognitive human performance David E. Kieras, David E. Meyer, Shane Mueller and Travis Seymour 7. The soar cognitive architecture and human working memory Richard M. Young and Richard L. Lewis 8. Long-term working memory as an alternative to capacity models of working memory in everyday skilled performance K. Anders Ericsson and Peter F. Delaney 9. Interacting cognitive subsystems: modelling working memory phenomena within a multiprocessor architecture Philip J. Barnard 10. Working memory in a multilevel hybrid connectionist control architecture (CAP2) Walter Schneider 11. A biologically based computational model of working memory Randall C. O' Reilly, Todd S. Braver and Jonathan D. Cohen 12. Models of working memory: eight questions and some general issues Walter Kintsch, Alice F. Healy, Mary Hegarty, Bruce F. Pennington and Timothy A. Salthouse 13. Toward unified theories of working memory: emerging general consensus, unresolved theoretical issues and future research directions Akika Miyake and Priti Shah Indexes.

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Models of Working Memory: Mechanisms of Active Maintenance and Executive Control

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X01000103

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning.

This paper aims to foster discussion of the means by which bilinguals control their two language systems. It proposes an inhibitory control (IC) model that embodies the principle that there are multiple levels of control. In the model a language task schema (modulated by a higher level of control) “reactively” inhibits potential competitors for production at the lemma level by virtue of their language tags. The IC model is used to expand the explanation of the effect of category blocking in translation proposed by Kroll and Stewart (1994), and predictions of the model are tested against other data. Its relationship to other proposals and models is considered and future directions proposed.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S1366728998000133

Mental Control of the Bilingual Lexico-Semantic System.

To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information.

/pdf/facing-up-to-the-problem-of-consciousness-2zoy8nlhb9.pdf

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

Many people have argued that the evolution of the human language faculty cannot be explained by Darwinian natural selection. Chomsky and Gould have suggested that language may have evolved as the by-product of selection for other abilities or as a consequence of as-yet unknown laws of growth and form. Others have argued that a biological specialization for grammar is incompatible with every tenet of Darwinian theory – that it shows no genetic variation, could not exist in any intermediate forms, confers no selective advantage, and would require more evolutionary time and genomic space than is available. We examine these arguments and show that they depend on inaccurate assumptions about biology or language or both. Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trait should be attributed to natural selection: complex design for some function, and the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Human language meets these criteria: Grammar is a complex mechanism tailored to the transmission of propositional structures through a serial interface. Autonomous and arbitrary grammatical phenomena have been offered as counterexamples to the position that language is an adaptation, but this reasoning is unsound: Communication protocols depend on arbitrary conventions that are adaptive as long as they are shared. Consequently, language acquisition in the child should systematically differ from language evolution in the species, and attempts to analogize them are misleading. Reviewing other arguments and data, we conclude that there is every reason to believe that a specialization for grammar evolved by a conventional neo-Darwinian process.

http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cult/pinker_bloom_1990_naturallanguage_naturalselection.pdf

Natural language and natural selection

http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/natashat/bilingualism/Meuter&Allport1999.pdf

Bilingual Language Switching in Naming: Asymmetrical Costs of Language Selection

The measurement of "switch costs" is held to be of interest because, as is widely believed, they may reflect the control processes that are engaged when subjects switch between two (or more) competing tasks. [In task-switching experiments, the reaction time (RT) switch cost is typically measured as the difference in RT between switch and non-switch (repeat) trials.] In this report we focus on the RT switch costs that remain even after the subject has had some time to prepare for the shift of task, when the switch cost may be approximately asymptotic (so-called residual switch costs). Three experiments are presented. All three experiments used Stroop colour/word, and neutral stimuli. Participants performed the two tasks of word-reading and colour-naming in a regular, double alternation, using the "alternating runs" paradigm (R. D. Rogers & S. Monsell, 1995). The experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that RT switch costs depend on a form of proactive interference (PI) arising from the performance of a prior, competing task. A. Allport, E. A. Styles and S. Hsieh (1994) suggested that these PI effects resulted from "task-set inertia", that is, the persisting activation-suppression of competing task-sets, or competing task-processing pathways. The results confirmed the existence of long-lasting PI from the competing task as a major contributor to switch costs. Non-switch trials, used as the baseline in the measurement of switch costs, were also shown to be strongly affected by similar PI effects. However, task-set inertia was not sufficient to account for these results. The results appeared inconsistent also with all other previous models of task switching. A new hypothesis to explain these between-task interference effects was developed, based on the stimulus-triggered retrieval of competing stimulus-response (S-R) associations, acquired (or strengthened) in earlier trials. Consistent with this retrieval hypothesis, switch costs were shown to depend primarily on the S-R characteristics of the preceding task (the task that was switched from) rather than the upcoming task. Further, the effects of the other, competing task were found to persist over many successive switching trials, affecting switch costs long after the stimulus overlap (and hence the principal S-R competition) between the current tasks had been removed. Switch costs were also found to be affected by recent, item-specific experience with a given stimulus, in either the same or the competing task. Finally, the results showed that switch costs were massively affected by the ratio of the number of prior trials, in response to the same stimuli, that had implemented either the currently intended or the competing S-R mappings. None of these effects are predicted by current models of residual switch costs, which appeal to the differences in control processes assumed to be engaged in switch versus non-switch trials.

Alan Allport

Papers

Bilingual Language Switching in Naming: Asymmetrical Costs of Language Selection

Task switching and the measurement of "switch costs".

Task-switching and long-term priming: Role of episodic stimulus-task bindings in task-shift costs.

Attention and control: have we been asking the wrong questions? A critical review of twenty-five years

Task-switching: Positive and negative priming of task-set.