We develop a theory of moral behavior, individual and collective, based on a general model of identity in which people care about “who they are” and infer their own values from past choices. The model sheds light on many empirical puzzles inconsistent with earlier approaches. Identity investments respond nonmonotonically to acts or threats, and taboos on mere thoughts arise to protect beliefs about the “priceless” value of certain social assets. High endowments trigger escalating commitment and a treadmill effect, while competing identities can cause dysfunctional capital destruction. Social interactions induce both social and antisocial norms of contribution, sustained by respectively shunning free riders or do-gooders.

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Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets

A club is a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefit from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members' characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits. When production costs are shared and the good is purely private, a private good club is being analyzed (McGuire 1972; Wiseman 1957). If membership characteristics differ and motivate sharing, then membership fees will differ among members (DeSerpa 1977; Scotchmer 1994b; Scotchmer and Wooders 1987). Such fees are nonanonymous , inasmuch as a fee structure is related to the identity and attributes of a member. The focus of our analysis is the sharing of an excludable (rivalrous) public good, which we term a club good . Unless otherwise specified, crowding is assumed to be independent of the individual and hence anonymous. A number of aspects of the club definition deserve highlighting. Privately owned and operated clubs must be voluntary; members choose to belong because they anticipate a net benefit from membership. Thus, the utility jointly derived from membership and from the consumption of other goods must exceed the utility associated with nonmembership status. Furthermore, the net gain in utility from membership must exceed or equal membership fees or toll payments. This voluntarism serves as the first characteristic by which to distinguish between pure public goods and club goods. In the case of a pure public good, voluntarism may be absent, since the good might harm some recipients (e.g., defense to a pacifist, fluoridation to someone who opposes its use).

The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods: Homogeneous clubs and local public goods

Foreword Valerie Braithwaite Preface 1. Introduction 2. Tax law, the shadow economy and tax non-compliance 3. Social representations of taxes 4. Tax compliance decisions 5. Self-employment and taxpaying 6. Interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers 7. Cautious conclusions.

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The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour

Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/87986/1/idb-wp_520.pdf

Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior

This paper studies the problem of illegal behavior within a principal-agent framework. The agent performs an illegal activity which benefits the principal, and can exert an effort that negatively affects the likelihood of detection of the violation.Two opposite legal regimes are considered: in the first, only the risk neutral principal is strictly liable; in the second, only the risk averse agent is The monetary sanction and the probability of detection function are the same in both cases. Our models shows that shifting the liability upon the risk averse agent reduces the principal net benefit, thus favoring deterrence of wrongdoing; however, it can also either increase or reduce the agent effort in cheating. For a specific model we are able to characterize cases in which a reduction in cheating prevails, and shifting the liability upon the agent has clear-cut beneficial effects on compliance.

Risk Attitudes and the Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent

Comunicazione per il CONVEGNO DI STUDI "La riforma sociale (1894-1935) nel sistema politico, sociale e politico-economico italiano e internazionale, Torino, 30-31 marzo 2001, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi; Dipartimento di Studi politici, UniversitAÂAÂ  di Torino, Dipartimento Polis, UniversitAÂAÂ  del Piemonte Orientale.

Einaudi e i servizi pubblici, ovvero come contrastare i monopolisti predoni e la burocrazia corrotta

The paper suggests anexplanation for the geographical dimensionof tax evasion that focuses on thestructure of territorial government. Taxesadministered by the central government arenot differentiated by regions. Poor areasmay prefer a combination of lower taxes andlower levels of public services at both thecentral and the local level. This isespecially true when income and wealthlevels differ among the areas and thedemand for publicly provided goods iscorrelated to these levels. But the use ofnationally uniform tax schedules imposes awelfare burden on poorer areas. While thetax rates of local taxes can be adjusted tolocal preferences, tax evasion may betacitly accepted as a compensation for thewelfare loss deriving from too highcentrally set tax rates.

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Alberto Cassone

Papers

Risk Attitudes and the Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent

Einaudi e i servizi pubblici, ovvero come contrastare i monopolisti predoni e la burocrazia corrotta

Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?

Proprieta'ÃÂ intellettuale e mercati: Il ruolo della tecnologia e conseguenze microeconomiche

Il bilancio sociale delle universita'. Inventario dei problemi e analisi comparata delle esperienze italiane