The second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of oneparty autocracies. One-party regimes have become the most common type of authoritarian rule and have proved to be more stable and to grow faster than other types of authoritarianism. We review the literature on one-party rule and, using data from 1950–2006, suggest four avenues for future research: focusing on autocrats’ ability to simultaneously minimize threats from the elites and from the masses; focusing on the conditions that foster the establishment and the collapse of oneparty regimes and on transitions from one type of authoritarianism to another; focusing on the relationship between authoritarian elections and democratization; and focusing on the global and international forces that influence the spread of one-party rule.

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Political Order and One-Party Rule

The ideas in Graham Allison's Essence of Decision (1971) have had an enormous impact on the study and teaching of bureaucracy and foreign policy making. While Allison's work has received considerable critical attention, there has been surprisingly little examination of the content and internal logic of his models. We subject each of Allison's three models to a systematic critical analysis. Our conclusion is that the models require substantial reformulation.

Rethinking Allison's Models

The Liberal Tradition in America

The bureaucratic politics model has achieved great popularity in the study of decision making. Yet too often the term “bureaucratic politics” is used by scholars and practitioners without clearly stating its policy application. The decision-making behavior that occurred during the Johnson and Nixon administrations for SALT I serves to illustrate many of the limits of the model. First, the decision-making structure posited by the bureaucratic politics model is not nearly as prevalent within the executive branch as is commonly assumed. Second, even where the bureaucratic politics structure is present, the decision-making process is not always one of bargaining, compromise, and consensus. Finally, the decision context and the decision participants are ignored in the model. To provide a clearer understanding of policy-making behavior, a more systematic decision-making framework is offered, which should contribute to the development of better model- and theory-building.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100019663

Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective

This paper examines the interface between Henry Kissinger's operational code and his bargaining behavior during the Vietnam conflict. Kissinger's position at the pinnacle of the American foreign af...

The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War

This article is an effort to establish a comparative theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in communist political systems. Although the literature on civil-military relations in polyarchic and praetorian polities is theoretically as well as empirically rich, theories of civil-military relations in the field of comparative communism are still at the preliminary stage of development. It is argued that civil-military relations, like all the fundamental dynamics of communist political systems, derive from the structural relationship between a hegemonic Leninist party and the other institutions of the polity. Although the party directs and supervises all other institutions, its political supremacy is necessarily limited by the division of labor among various institutions. The relative autonomy of the military and its relations with the party vary from one country to another and can be described as coalitional, symbiotic, or fused. These relations are dynamic, changing over time in each country in response to contextual circumstances. The role of the military in politics is complex and variegated: on ideological issues, there is usually little conflict between party and army; on issues of “normal politics,” the military acts as a functionally specific elite engaged in bargaining to defend its perceived institutional interests; and in crisis politics, the military is a political resource that various party factions seek to enlist against their opponents.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400189609

The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems

Fundamental to modern politics is the fact that politics of security and diplomacy are central to society. Historically, foreign and security politics have been the main priorities of the political center, conducted primarily on that level. Since 1945, these political centers have gained predominance in die U.S. In the absence of well-integrated political elites, a highly centralized political party or parties, and powerful and permanent bureaucracies and civil service, the presidential political center has become the pivotal political center with almost exclusive control over foreign affairs and national security. The locus and degree of power widiin the American political and constitutional context, rather than elite orientations and practices, are identified to explain who dominates American foreign policy.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100016506

The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Revisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations

Recent literature demonstrates that modern military regimes are actually military-civilian coalitions. The old dichotomy of civil/military is no longer a useful explanation for the politics and the dynamics of military regimes. Role expansion, new professionalism, and mission orientation have changed military missions, doctrines, and self-perception. The author proposes and develops a comparative analysis and a typology of contemporary military regimes: corporative; market-bureaucratic; socialist-oligarchic; personal tyrannies; and army-party. Case studies include Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. His conclusion, based on the literature, is that military regimes have not succeeded (at least not better than civilian regimes) in reforming, modernizing, and developing their respective societies despite organizational, structural, and personal commitments to development and reform.

The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements

Crisis Management: Kissinger's Middle East Negotiations (October 1973-June 1974)

(1978). Military incompetence and failure: A historical, comparative and analytical evaluation. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 121-138.

Amos Perlmutter

Papers

The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems

The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Revisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations

The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements

Crisis Management: Kissinger's Middle East Negotiations (October 1973-June 1974)

Military incompetence and failure: A historical, comparative and analytical evaluation