The End of History and the Last Man

Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

It made it possible to improve people's lives. Now it prevents all forms of discrimination in the world. It helps to improve our world.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …

The Law of Peoples

European integration has grown increasingly differentiated. EU member countries now integrate at different speeds and frequently resort to opt-out clauses, while occasionally voicing deep disconten...

Why no twin-track Europe? Unity, discontent, and differentiation in European integration

Human rights law posits a close, almost self-evident, relation between human rights and peace. Peace researchers, however, see this relation as an unsettled empirical question. In this essay, we consider the peace researchers’ (implicit) critique of human rights law. We argue that seeing the relation between human rights and peace as an empirical question rests on a largely unexamined conceptual separation of justice and peace. Re-investigating this conceptual relation reveals two positions that have different implications for human rights and peace: (1) a ‘negative’ understanding of peace as stability, and (2) a ‘positive’ understanding of peace as a working social contract. On the negative understanding, human rights may or may not be instrumentally effective in maintaining stability, which is rightly seen as an empirical question. On the positive understanding of peace, on the other hand, human rights are potentially conceptually related to peace, and the relation cannot be reduced to an empirical question. We argue that (2) is a better understanding of peace – at least the kind of peace envisioned in human rights philosophy – and provides a potential bridge between human rights scholarship and peace research.

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The challenge of human rights for peace research

I consider the problem of political pluralism for (Rawlsian) political liberalism: that not everybody agrees on fundamental political principles. I critically examine three defenses of liberal prin...

Arguing with the enemy: A dialectical approach to justifying political liberalism

The renaissance of classical realism in International Relations (IR) has highlighted the close historical and conceptual connection between realism and liberalism. In this essay, I consider an unde...

Andreas H. Hvidsten

Papers

Why no twin-track Europe? Unity, discontent, and differentiation in European integration

The challenge of human rights for peace research

Arguing with the enemy: A dialectical approach to justifying political liberalism

Karl Mannheim and the liberal telos of realism

Hvorfor tro på formelle modeller? - Om forholdet mellom teoretisk modellering og empirisk analyse