Andres Almazan

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a stylized model that examines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive compensation and find that institutions' influence on managers' pay-for-performance sensitivity and level of compensation is enhanced when institutions have lower implied costs of monitoring, but that these effects are attenuated when the firm-specific cost of monitoring is high.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the form, adoption rates, and economic rationale for various mutual fund investment restrictions, and reveal systematic patterns in investment constraints, consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium in the fund industry.

TL;DR: This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement and offers predictions about the correlation between entrenchment, severance pay, and incentive compensation.

TL;DR: This paper examined the form, adoption rates, and economic rationale for the investment restrictions found in the contracts between mutual fund investors and managers and found systematic patterns in the use of policy constraints that are consistent with an optimal contracting view of the fund industry.

TL;DR: This article investigated the relation between firms' locations and their corporate finance decisions and found that firms located within industry clusters make more acquisitions, and have lower debt ratios and larger cash balances than their industry peers located outside clusters.