Showing papers by "Andreu Mas-Colell published in 1996"
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TL;DR: In this paper, a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form, is presented and analyzed, which leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in a general nontransferable utility case.
Abstract: We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility (NTU) case. Moreover, we show that any variation (in a certain class) of our bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the TU setup must yield the consistent value in the general NTU setup.
360 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the convergence to an equilibrium of a class of dynamic adjustment procedures, which includes gradient systems and best reply dynamics as special cases, when there are two players and strategy sets are one dimensional is studied.
54 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that under a weak regularity, a two-period incomplete market economy with a finite number of assets and general state spaces has an equilibrium, and the proof proceeds by establishing the existence of self-fulfilling spot price expectations possessing a strong continuity with respect to asset trades.
24 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the value principle does not hold for the Harsanyi NTU-value: there is a unique competitive equilibrium, which however does not belong to the (nonempty) set of value allocations.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a finite horizon economy with incomplete markets and, at each period, a non-atomic continuum of states of nature, and combine backward recursion methods with a reformulation of the problem in terms of first-order conditions to establish the existence of a Radner equilibrium.
23 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game is proposed, where players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period).
Abstract: We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive procedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. To compute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff function and the history of play. We also offer a variation where every player knows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).
12 citations
01 Jan 1996
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form, is presented and analyzed, which leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in a general nontransferable utility case.
Abstract: We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility (NTU) case. Moreover, we show that any variation (in a certain class) of our bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the TU setup must yield the consistent value in the general NTU setup.
1 citations
01 Jan 1996
TL;DR: The paper by G. Debreu as mentioned in this paper, "Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria", appeared in Econometrica in 1970 and has had a great impact on the style and the substance of economic theorizing.
Abstract: The paper by G. Debreu, ‘Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria’, appeared in Econometrica in 1970. As is commonly known, the paper has had since then a great impact on the style and the substance of economic theorizing. If I had been more energetic I would have verified this impact in the Index of Citations. Yet, whatever the latter says, it is bound to be a considerable underestimate of the impact. Often, the sign of the success of a paper is its being referred to only implicitly, without authors even being aware of the fact. In our case, for example, any user of the term ‘generic’ is indebted to Debreu’s paper. At any rate, the research directly inspired by the paper is enormous. By now it includes, at least, two full-length systematic books (Balasko, 1988, and Mas-Colell, 1985).