Games and Economic Behavior 

TL;DR: In this article, the authors designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting and found that observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust extended to an anonymous counterpart.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting and define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define and discuss several notions of potential functions for games in strategic form, and characterize games that have a potential function, and present a variety of applications.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an experiment to test whether fairness alone can explain proposers' willingness to make nontrivial offers in simple bargaining games, and they examine two treatments: game (ultimatum or dictator) and pay (pay or no pay).

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a formal theory of reciprocity, which takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention.