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Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

This important text and reference for researchers and students in machine learning, game theory, statistics and information theory offers a comprehensive treatment of the problem of predicting individual sequences. Unlike standard statistical approaches to forecasting, prediction of individual sequences does not impose any probabilistic assumption on the data-generating mechanism. Yet, prediction algorithms can be constructed that work well for all possible sequences, in the sense that their performance is always nearly as good as the best forecasting strategy in a given reference class. The central theme is the model of prediction using expert advice, a general framework within which many related problems can be cast and discussed. Repeated game playing, adaptive data compression, sequential investment in the stock market, sequential pattern analysis, and several other problems are viewed as instances of the experts' framework and analyzed from a common nonstochastic standpoint that often reveals new and intriguing connections.

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Prediction, learning, and games

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This graduate-level textbook introduces fundamental concepts and methods in machine learning. It describes several important modern algorithms, provides the theoretical underpinnings of these algorithms, and illustrates key aspects for their application. The authors aim to present novel theoretical tools and concepts while giving concise proofs even for relatively advanced topics. Foundations of Machine Learning fills the need for a general textbook that also offers theoretical details and an emphasis on proofs. Certain topics that are often treated with insufficient attention are discussed in more detail here; for example, entire chapters are devoted to regression, multi-class classification, and ranking. The first three chapters lay the theoretical foundation for what follows, but each remaining chapter is mostly self-contained. The appendix offers a concise probability review, a short introduction to convex optimization, tools for concentration bounds, and several basic properties of matrices and norms used in the book. The book is intended for graduate students and researchers in machine learning, statistics, and related areas; it can be used either as a textbook or as a reference text for a research seminar.

Foundations of Machine Learning

A multi-armed bandit problem - or, simply, a bandit problem - is a sequential allocation problem defined by a set of actions. At each time step, a unit resource is allocated to an action and some observable payoff is obtained. The goal is to maximize the total payoff obtained in a sequence of allocations. The name bandit refers to the colloquial term for a slot machine (a "one-armed bandit" in American slang). In a casino, a sequential allocation problem is obtained when the player is facing many slot machines at once (a "multi-armed bandit"), and must repeatedly choose where to insert the next coin. Multi-armed bandit problems are the most basic examples of sequential decision problems with an exploration-exploitation trade-off. This is the balance between staying with the option that gave highest payoffs in the past and exploring new options that might give higher payoffs in the future. Although the study of bandit problems dates back to the 1930s, exploration-exploitation trade-offs arise in several modern applications, such as ad placement, website optimization, and packet routing. Mathematically, a multi-armed bandit is defined by the payoff process associated with each option. In this book, the focus is on two extreme cases in which the analysis of regret is particularly simple and elegant: independent and identically distributed payoffs and adversarial payoffs. Besides the basic setting of finitely many actions, it also analyzes some of the most important variants and extensions, such as the contextual bandit model. This monograph is an ideal reference for students and researchers with an interest in bandit problems.

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problems

We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility (NTU) case. Moreover, we show that any variation (in a certain class) of our bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the TU setup must yield the consistent value in the general NTU setup.

Bargaining and value1

A general formalism on stochastic choice is presented. Tje Rationalizability and Recoverability (Identification) problems are discussed. For the identification issue parametric examples are analyzed by means of techniques of mathematical tomography (Random transforms).

Notes on stochastic choice

The authors present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that have as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility case. Moreover, the authors show that any variation (in a certain class) of their bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the transferable utility setup must yield the consistent value in the general nontransferable utility setup. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Bargaining and value

The question in the title is examined from the standpoint of economic thinking. Three ideas are sustained: (1) if made an objective of economic policy, the necessity of work could be minimized in the distant future; (2) this is not what is desirable or will tend to happen. Even in extreme scenarios of robot adoption considerable demand for human labor should persist in tasks related to the expansion of the knowledge frontier and in those where the humanity of the executor is of the essence for the definition of the task (performing, sports, care, companionship, and so on); (3) redistributive taxation may well be in order. Guaranteed income schemes, and the link with entitlement through work, are discussed.

Andreu Mas-Colell

Papers

Bargaining and value1

Notes on stochastic choice

Bargaining and value

Is the Era of Work Coming to an End? Erasmus Lecture delivered at the Budapest meeting of the Academia Europaea, 5 September 2017

A geometric Approach to a Class of Fixed Point Theorem