A
Andreu Mas-Colell
Researcher at Pompeu Fabra University
Publications - 138
Citations - 11285
Andreu Mas-Colell is an academic researcher from Pompeu Fabra University. The author has contributed to research in topics: General equilibrium theory & Correlated equilibrium. The author has an hindex of 53, co-authored 138 publications receiving 10864 citations. Previous affiliations of Andreu Mas-Colell include Barcelona Graduate School of Economics & University of California, Berkeley.
Papers
More filters
Posted Content
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the relationship between non-cooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games and show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value.
Journal ArticleDOI
An observation on gross substitutability and the weak axiom of revealed preference
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that if there are three commodities or less, an excess demand function that fulfills the property of Gross Substitutability satisfies also the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference.
Posted Content
Uncoupled dynamics cannot lead to Nash equilibrium
Sergiu Hart,Andreu Mas-Colell +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that there are no uncoupled dynamics that are guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibria, even when the Nash equilibrium is unique and when the payoffs of the other players are independent.
Journal ArticleDOI
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the relationship between non-cooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games and show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent field converge globally to the unique consistent value.