Lionel A. Mandell, Richard G. Wunderink, Antonio Anzueto, John G. Bartlett, G. Douglas Campbell, Nathan C. Dean, Scott F. Dowell, Thomas M. File, Jr. Daniel M. Musher, Michael S. Niederman, Antonio Torres, and Cynthia G. Whitney McMaster University Medical School, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada; Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois; University of Texas Health Science Center and South Texas Veterans Health Care System, San Antonio, and Michael E. DeBakey Veterans Affairs Medical Center and Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas; Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland; Division of Pulmonary, Critical Care, and Sleep Medicine, University of Mississippi School of Medicine, Jackson; Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, LDS Hospital, and University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia; Northeastern Ohio Universities College of Medicine, Rootstown, and Summa Health System, Akron, Ohio; State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, and Department of Medicine, Winthrop University Hospital, Mineola, New York; and Cap de Servei de Pneumologia i Allergia Respiratoria, Institut Clinic del Torax, Hospital Clinic de Barcelona, Facultat de Medicina, Universitat de Barcelona, Institut d’Investigacions Biomediques August Pi i Sunyer, CIBER CB06/06/0028, Barcelona, Spain.

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Infectious Diseases Society of America/American Thoracic Society Consensus Guidelines on the Management of Community-Acquired Pneumonia in Adults

Development of strategies for mitigating the severity of a new influenza pandemic is now a top global public health priority. Influenza prevention and containment strategies can be considered under the broad categories of antiviral, vaccine and non-pharmaceutical (case isolation, household quarantine, school or workplace closure, restrictions on travel) measures. Mathematical models are powerful tools for exploring this complex landscape of intervention strategies and quantifying the potential costs and benefits of different options. Here we use a large-scale epidemic simulation to examine intervention options should initial containment of a novel influenza outbreak fail, using Great Britain and the United States as examples. We find that border restrictions and/or internal travel restrictions are unlikely to delay spread by more than 2-3 weeks unless more than 99% effective. School closure during the peak of a pandemic can reduce peak attack rates by up to 40%, but has little impact on overall attack rates, whereas case isolation or household quarantine could have a significant impact, if feasible. Treatment of clinical cases can reduce transmission, but only if antivirals are given within a day of symptoms starting. Given enough drugs for 50% of the population, household-based prophylaxis coupled with reactive school closure could reduce clinical attack rates by 40-50%. More widespread prophylaxis would be even more logistically challenging but might reduce attack rates by over 75%. Vaccine stockpiled in advance of a pandemic could significantly reduce attack rates even if of low efficacy. Estimates of policy effectiveness will change if the characteristics of a future pandemic strain differ substantially from those seen in past pandemics.

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Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic

Avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses cause severe disease in humans, but the basis for their virulence remains unclear. In vitro and animal studies indicate that high and disseminated viral replication is important for disease pathogenesis. Laboratory experiments suggest that virus-induced cytokine dysregulation may contribute to disease severity. To assess the relevance of these findings for human disease, we performed virological and immunological studies in 18 individuals with H5N1 and 8 individuals infected with human influenza virus subtypes. Influenza H5N1 infection in humans is characterized by high pharyngeal virus loads and frequent detection of viral RNA in rectum and blood. Viral RNA in blood was present only in fatal H5N1 cases and was associated with higher pharyngeal viral loads. We observed low peripheral blood T-lymphocyte counts and high chemokine and cytokine levels in H5N1-infected individuals, particularly in those who died, and these correlated with pharyngeal viral loads. Genetic characterization of H5N1 viruses revealed mutations in the viral polymerase complex associated with mammalian adaptation and virulence. Our observations indicate that high viral load, and the resulting intense inflammatory responses, are central to influenza H5N1 pathogenesis. The focus of clinical management should be on preventing this intense cytokine response, by early diagnosis and effective antiviral treatment.

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Fatal outcome of human influenza A (H5N1) is associated with high viral load and hypercytokinemia

This report updates the 2009 recommendations by CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of influenza vaccine for the prevention and control of influenza (CDC. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2009;58[No. RR-8] and CDC. Use of influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine---recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP], 2009. MMWR 2009;58:[No. RR-10]). The 2010 influenza recommendations include new and updated information. Highlights of the 2010 recommendations include 1) a recommendation that annual vaccination be administered to all persons aged >or=6 months for the 2010-11 influenza season; 2) a recommendation that children aged 6 months--8 years whose vaccination status is unknown or who have never received seasonal influenza vaccine before (or who received seasonal vaccine for the first time in 2009-10 but received only 1 dose in their first year of vaccination) as well as children who did not receive at least 1 dose of an influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine regardless of previous influenza vaccine history should receive 2 doses of a 2010-11 seasonal influenza vaccine (minimum interval: 4 weeks) during the 2010--11 season; 3) a recommendation that vaccines containing the 2010-11 trivalent vaccine virus strains A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)-like (the same strain as was used for 2009 H1N1 monovalent vaccines), A/Perth/16/2009 (H3N2)-like, and B/Brisbane/60/2008-like antigens be used; 4) information about Fluzone High-Dose, a newly approved vaccine for persons aged >or=65 years; and 5) information about other standard-dose newly approved influenza vaccines and previously approved vaccines with expanded age indications. Vaccination efforts should begin as soon as the 2010-11 seasonal influenza vaccine is available and continue through the influenza season. These recommendations also include a summary of safety data for U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines. These recommendations and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu); any updates or supplements that might be required during the 2010-11 influenza season also will be available at this website. Recommendations for influenza diagnosis and antiviral use will be published before the start of the 2010-11 influenza season. Vaccination and health-care providers should be alert to announcements of recommendation updates and should check the CDC influenza website periodically for additional information.

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Prevention and control of seasonal influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2009.

Influenza viruses cause annual epidemics and occasional pandemics that have claimed the lives of millions. The emergence of new strains will continue to pose challenges to public health and the scientific communities. A prime example is the recent emergence of swine-origin H1N1 viruses that have transmitted to and spread among humans, resulting in outbreaks internationally. Efforts to control these outbreaks and real-time monitoring of the evolution of this virus should provide us with invaluable information to direct infectious disease control programmes and to improve understanding of the factors that determine viral pathogenicity and/or transmissibility.

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Emergence and pandemic potential of swine-origin H1N1 influenza virus.

The writing committee consisted of the following: John H. Beigel, M.D., National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md.; Jeremy Farrar, D.Phil., Hospital for Tropical Diseases, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; Aye Maung Han, M.B., B.S., Department of Child Health, Institute of Medicine, Yangon, Myanmar; Frederick G. Hayden, M.D. (rapporteur), University of Virginia, Charlottesville; Randy Hyer, M.D., World Health Organization, Geneva; Menno D. de Jong, M.D., Ph.D., Hospital for Tropical Diseases, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; Sorasak Lochindarat, M.D., Queen Sirikit National Institute of Child Health, Bangkok, Thailand; Nguyen Thi Kim Tien, M.D., Ph.D., Pasteur Institute, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; Nguyen Tran Hien, M.D., Ph.D., National Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology, Hanoi; Tran Tinh Hien, M.D., Ph.D., Hospital for Tropical Diseases, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; Angus Nicoll, M.Sc., Health Protection Agency, London; Sok Touch, M.D., Ministry of Health, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; and Kwok-Yung Yuen, M.D., University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China. Address reprint requests to Dr. Hayden at the Department of Internal Medicine, P.O. Box 800473, University of Virginia Health Sciences Center, Charlottesville, VA 22908, or at fgh@virginia.edu.

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Avian influenza A (H5N1) infection in humans

The World Health Organization’s recommended pandemic influenza interventions, based on limited data, vary by transmission pattern, pandemic phase, and illness severity and extent. In the pandemic alert period, recommendations include isolation of patients and quarantine of contacts, accompanied by antiviral therapy. During the pandemic period, the focus shifts to delaying spread and reducing effects through population-based measures. Ill persons should remain home when they first became symptomatic, but forced isolation and quarantine are ineffective and impractical. If the pandemic is severe, social distancing measures such as school closures should be considered. Nonessential domestic travel to affected areas should be deferred. Hand and respiratory hygiene should be routine; mask use should be based on setting and risk, and contaminated household surfaces should be disinfected. Additional research and field assessments during pandemics are essential to update recommendations. Legal authority and procedures for implementing interventions should be understood in advance and should respect cultural differences and human rights.

Nonpharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza, national and community measures

Since global availability of vaccine and antiviral agents against influenza caused by novel human subtypes is insufficient, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommends nonpharmaceutical public health interventions to contain infection, delay spread, and reduce the impact of pandemic disease. Virus transmission characteristics will not be completely known in advance, but difficulties in influenza control typically include peak infectivity early in illness, a short interval between cases, and to a lesser extent, transmission from persons with incubating or asymptomatic infection. Screening and quarantining entering travelers at international borders did not substantially delay virus introduction in past pandemics, except in some island countries, and will likely be even less effective in the modern era. Instead, WHO recommends providing information to international travelers and possibly screening travelers departing countries with transmissible human infection. The principal focus of interventions against pandemic influenza spread should be at national and community levels rather than international borders.

Angus Nicoll

Papers

Avian influenza A (H5N1) infection in humans

Nonpharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza, national and community measures

Nonpharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza, international measures