Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

Phd by thesis

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems.

ing WS1S Systems to Verify Parameterized Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 Kai Baukus, Saddek Bensalem, Yassine Lakhnech and Karsten Stahl FMona: A Tool for Expressing Validation Techniques over Infinite State Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 J.-P. Bodeveix and M. Filali Transitive Closures of Regular Relations for Verifying Infinite-State Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 Bengt Jonsson and Marcus Nilsson Diagnostic and Test Generation Using Static Analysis to Improve Automatic Test Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 Marius Bozga, Jean-Claude Fernandez and Lucian Ghirvu Efficient Diagnostic Generation for Boolean Equation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Radu Mateescu Efficient Model-Checking Compositional State Space Generation with Partial Order Reductions for Asynchronous Communicating Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Jean-Pierre Krimm and Laurent Mounier Checking for CFFD-Preorder with Tester Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Juhana Helovuo and Antti Valmari Fair Bisimulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Thomas A. Henzinger and Sriram K. Rajamani Integrating Low Level Symmetries into Reachability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Karsten Schmidt Model-Checking Tools Model Checking Support for the ASM High-Level Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Giuseppe Del Castillo and Kirsten Winter Table of

Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems. Proc. TACAS 2009

http://user.it.uu.se/~jarst116/slides/week4.pdf

Graph-Based Algorithms for Boolean Function Manipulation

In open systems verification, to formally check for reliability, one needs an appropriate formalism to model the interaction between agents and express the correctness of the system no matter how the environment behaves. An important contribution in this context is given by modal logics for strategic ability, in the setting of multi-agent games, such as ATL, ATL\star, and the like. Recently, Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman introduced Strategy Logic, which we denote here by CHP-SL, with the aim of getting a powerful framework for reasoning explicitly about strategies. CHP-SL is obtained by using first-order quantifications over strategies and has been investigated in the very specific setting of two-agents turned-based games, where a non-elementary model-checking algorithm has been provided. While CHP-SL is a very expressive logic, we claim that it does not fully capture the strategic aspects of multi-agent systems. In this paper, we introduce and study a more general strategy logic, denoted SL, for reasoning about strategies in multi-agent concurrent games. We prove that SL includes CHP-SL, while maintaining a decidable model-checking problem. In particular, the algorithm we propose is computationally not harder than the best one known for CHP-SL. Moreover, we prove that such a problem for SL is NonElementarySpace-hard. This negative result has spurred us to investigate here syntactic fragments of SL, strictly subsuming ATL\star, with the hope of obtaining an elementary model-checking problem. Among the others, we study the sublogics SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G]. They encompass formulas in a special prenex normal form having, respectively, nested temporal goals, Boolean combinations of goals and, a single goal at a time. About these logics, we prove that the model-checking problem for SL[1G] is 2ExpTime-complete, thus not harder than the one for ATL\star.

Reasoning About Strategies: On the Model-Checking Problem

In open systems verification, to formally check for reliability, one needs an appropriate formalism to model the interaction between agents and express the correctness of the system no matter how the environment behaves. An important contribution in this context is given by modal logics for strategic ability, in the setting of multiagent games, such as Atl, Atla, and the like. Recently, Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman introduced Strategy Logic, which we denote here by CHP-Sl, with the aim of getting a powerful framework for reasoning explicitly about strategies. CHP-Sl is obtained by using first-order quantifications over strategies and has been investigated in the very specific setting of two-agents turned-based games, where a nonelementary model-checking algorithm has been provided. While CHP-Sl is a very expressive logic, we claim that it does not fully capture the strategic aspects of multiagent systems.In this article, we introduce and study a more general strategy logic, denoted Sl, for reasoning about strategies in multiagent concurrent games. As a key aspect, strategies in Sl are not intrinsically glued to a specific agent, but an explicit binding operator allows an agent to bind to a strategy variable. This allows agents to share strategies or reuse one previously adopted. We prove that Sl strictly includes CHP-Sl, while maintaining a decidable model-checking problem. In particular, the algorithm we propose is computationally not harder than the best one known for CHP-Sl. Moreover, we prove that such a problem for Sl is NonElementary. This negative result has spurred us to investigate syntactic fragments of Sl, strictly subsuming Atla, with the hope of obtaining an elementary model-checking problem. Among others, we introduce and study the sublogics Sl[ng], Sl[bg], and Sl[1g]. They encompass formulas in a special prenex normal form having, respectively, nested temporal goals, Boolean combinations of goals, and, a single goal at a time. Intuitively, for a goal, we mean a sequence of bindings, one for each agent, followed by an Ltl formula. We prove that the model-checking problem for Sl[1g] is 2ExpTime-complete, thus not harder than the one for Atla. In contrast, Sl[ng] turns out to be NonElementary-hard, strengthening the corresponding result for Sl. Regarding Sl[bg], we show that it includes CHP-Sl and its model-checking is decidable with a 2ExpTimelower-bound.It is worth enlightening that to achieve the positive results about Sl[1g], we introduce a fundamental property of the semantics of this logic, called behavioral, which allows to strongly simplify the reasoning about strategies. Indeed, in a nonbehavioral logic such as Sl[bg] and the subsuming ones, to satisfy a formula, one has to take into account that a move of an agent, at a given moment of a play, may depend on the moves taken by any agent in another counterfactual play.

/pdf/reasoning-about-strategies-on-the-model-checking-problem-46kcquhd1x.pdf

Strategy Logic (Sl, for short) has been recently introduced by Mogavero, Murano, and Vardi as a formalism for reasoning explicitly about strategies, as first-order objects, in multi-agent concurrent games. This logic turns out to be very powerful, strictly subsuming all major previously studied modal logics for strategic reasoning, including Atl, Atl*, and the like. The price that one has to pay for the expressiveness of Sl is the lack of important model-theoretic properties and an increased complexity of decision problems. In particular, Sl does not have the bounded-tree model property and the related satisfiability problem is highly undecidable while for Atl* it is 2ExpTime-complete. An obvious question that arises is then what makes Atl* decidable. Understanding this should enable us to identify decidable fragments of Sl. We focus, in this work, on the limitation of Atl* to allow only one temporal goal for each strategic assertion and study the fragment of Sl with the same restriction. Specifically, we introduce and study the syntactic fragment One-Goal Strategy Logic (Sl[1g], for short), which consists of formulas in prenex normal form having a single temporal goal at a time for every strategy quantification of agents. We show that Sl[1g] is strictly more expressive than Atl*. Our main result is that Sl[1g] has the bounded tree-model property and its satisfiability problem is 2ExpTime-complete, as it is for Atl*.

/pdf/what-makes-atl-decidable-a-decidable-fragment-of-strategy-28aif4ek0n.pdf

What makes ATL* decidable? a decidable fragment of strategy logic

We introduce MCMAS-SLK, a BDD-based model checker for the verification of systems against specifications expressed in a novel, epistemic variant of strategy logic. We give syntax and semantics of the specification language and introduce a labelling algorithm for epistemic and strategy logic modalities. We provide details of the checker which can also be used for synthesising agents' strategies so that a specification is satisfied by the system. We evaluate the efficiency of the implementation by discussing the results obtained for the dining cryptographers protocol and a variant of the cake-cutting problem.

MCMAS-SLK: A Model Checker for the Verification of Strategy Logic Specifications

The fully enriched μ-calculus is the extension of the propositional μ-calculus with inverse programs, graded modalities, and nominals. While satisfiability in several expressive fragments of the fully enriched μ-calculus is known to be decidable and ExpTime-complete, it has recently been proved that the full calculus is undecidable. In this paper, we study the fragments of the fully enriched μ-calculus that are obtained by dropping at least one of the additional constructs. We show that, in all fragments obtained in this way, satisfiability is decidable and ExpTime-complete. Thus, we identify a family of decidable logics that are maximal (and incomparable) in expressive power. Our results are obtained by introducing two new automata models, showing that their emptiness problems are ExpTime-complete, and then reducing satisfiability in the relevant logics to these problems. The automata models we introduce are two-way graded alternating parity automata over infinite trees (2GAPTs) and fully enriched automata (FEAs) over infinite forests. The former are a common generalization of two incomparable automata models from the literature. The latter extend alternating automata in a similar way as the fully enriched μ-calculus extends the standard μ-calculus.

Aniello Murano

Papers

Reasoning About Strategies: On the Model-Checking Problem

Reasoning About Strategies: On the Model-Checking Problem

What makes ATL* decidable? a decidable fragment of strategy logic

MCMAS-SLK: A Model Checker for the Verification of Strategy Logic Specifications

The Complexity of Enriched Mu-Calculi