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Anjan V. Thakor
Researcher at Washington University in St. Louis
Publications - 305
Citations - 25221
Anjan V. Thakor is an academic researcher from Washington University in St. Louis. The author has contributed to research in topics: Capital requirement & Corporate governance. The author has an hindex of 75, co-authored 296 publications receiving 23522 citations. Previous affiliations of Anjan V. Thakor include University of Oxford & University of Michigan.
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Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition
TL;DR: This article showed that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added value for borrowers, while capital market competition reduces relationship lending and bank lending shrinks.
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Contemporary Banking Theory
TL;DR: A review of the contemporary theory of financial intermediation can be found in this paper, where the focus is on contributions in the past 15 years or so that have advanced our understanding of why financial intermediaries exist, the credit allocation and other services they provide in spot and forward credit markets, the contractual nature and allocational consequences of the claims they issue, and the optimal design of bank regulation.
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Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation
TL;DR: In this paper, an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions is presented, cast in a financial market framework, thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries.
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Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets
David Besanko,Anjan V. Thakor +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers, and examine the role of co-signers in each ca se.
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Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
TL;DR: The authors analyzed repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality and showed that long-term bank-borrower relationships are welfare enhancing even without learning or risk aversion.