Series Editor's Preface. Introduction by John Breuilly. Acknowledgements. 1. Definitions. State and nation. The nation. 2. Culture in Agrarian Society. Power and culture in the agro-literature society. The varieties of agrarian rulers. 3. Industrial Society. The society of perpetual growth. Social genetics. The age of universal high culture. 4. The Transition to an Age of Nationalism. A note on the weakness of nationalism. Wild and garden culture. 5. What is a Nation. The course of true nationalism never did run smooth. 6. Social Entropy and Equality in Industrial Society. Obstacles to entropy. Fissures and barriers. A diversity of focus. 7. A Typology of Nationalisms. The varieties of nationalist experience. Diaspora nationalism. 8. The Future of Nationalism. Industrial culture - one or many?. 9. Nationalism and Ideology. Who is for Nuremberg?. One nation, one state. 10. Conclusion. What is not being said. Summary. Select bibliography. Bilbliography of Ernest Gellner's writing: Ian Jarvie. Index

Nations and Nationalism

Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy

政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

The morality of freedom

The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …

The Law of Peoples

Nationalists hold that the state derives its territorial rights from the prior claim of a cultural nation to territory. This article develops an alternative account: the legitimate state theory. This view holds that a state has rights to territory if it meets the following four conditions: (a) it effectively implements a system of law regulating property in that territory; (b) its subjects have a legitimate claim to occupy the territory; (c) the state’s system of law “rules in the name of the people,” by protecting basic rights and providing for political participation; and (d) the state is not a usurper.

https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/Stilz_Ethics_0.pdf

Nations, States, and Territory*

Preface vii PART ONE: Equal Freedom and the State Chapter 1: Introduction 3 Chapter 2: Authority 27 Chapter 3: Democracy 57 Chapter 4: Political Obligation and Justice 85 PART TWO: Solidarity and Allegiance Chapter 5: Freedom and Culture in Rousseau 113 Chapter 6: Nationalism or Patriotism? 137 Chapter 7: Democracy as Collective Action 173 Chapter 8: Conclusion 209 Bibliography 213 Index 221

Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State

ARE the citizens of a state liable for what it does in their name? It is a key principle of international law that states—as unitary legal persons—can be held responsible for their acts. When a state breaches an international obligation, it has a duty to make reparation for any injury it causes, either by making restitution, paying compensation, or providing some alternative form of satisfaction, such as an official apology. Moreover, the International Court of Justice has consistently asserted that it may order state payment of reparations when a breach of international law has occurred. Reparations have often been levied in the aftermath of aggressive war: France was required to pay reparations in 1871; Germany was required to pay reparations after World War I; Germany’s Eastern, Soviet-occupied zone paid reparations to the USSR after World War II; and today Iraq continues to pay reparations to Kuwait for the First Gulf War. In 2001 the International Law Commission produced draft articles codifying these principles of state responsibility.jopp_360 190..208 Current international law thus attributes holistic responsibility to states for their acts. On this model, the state as an organized agent is held responsible independently of its members. Of course, for the state to discharge its responsibility, liability for reparations will normally have to be distributed to members, but this distribution is performed in an independent second step. The key feature of the corporate model is that since responsibility accrues to the collective, citizens may face demands to do their part in discharging responsibility merely because they belong to the body politic. My focus in this article is primarily on this second step, the distribution of state responsibility to citizens. When is the state as a corporate agent morally entitled to pass on responsibility to its members? When reparations are levied on the state, the tax burden eventually falls on individuals, and indeed on some who may have opposed the state’s acts. Consider the case of a German in the Soviet-occupied zone after 1945, forced to contribute to reparations for Nazi

/pdf/collective-responsibility-and-the-state-4lwlpls613.pdf

Collective Responsibility and the State

What gives a particular state the right to exercise jurisdiction and enforcement power over a particular territory? Why does the state of Denmark have rights over the territory of Denmark, and not over the territory of Sweden, and vice versa? This paper first considers a popular argument that purports to ground state territorial rights in citizens’ rights of land ownership. On this view, the state has jurisdiction over territory insofar as its people owns the territory, and delegates jurisdictional powers over their land to the state. It is argued that we should reject this approach, because it is unable to explain: (a) how the state can establish a continuous territory; (b) why later generations consent to the state’s jurisdiction; and (c) why non-consenting property owners cannot secede. Rather than considering state jurisdiction to be derived from the people’s prior property rights, this paper claims that we should consider state jurisdictional rights over territory to be primitive. It defends an alternative Kantian account of territorial rights. On this view, a state’s claim to jurisdiction over territory is justified if that state imposes a system of property law that meets certain basic conditions of legitimacy. This Kantian approach, it is argued, allows us to make better sense of state territorial rights.

/pdf/why-do-states-have-territorial-rights-kw8xk7icyz.pdf

Why do states have territorial rights

In 1864, the United States Army removed ten thousand Navajo Indians from their homeland in Arizona to a reservation in New Mexico. Two hundred people died on the trek, which the Navajos still refer to as their “Long Walk.” Prior to the Long Walk, the Navajos had been a raiding society, stealing livestock from white settlements. To stop the raiding, the United States moved them to an isolated location. But the removal was not a success: the Navajos were unused to farming and their crops failed; they were required to live in adobe villages rather than their traditional hogans; and they had to share their reservation with the Apaches, tribal enemies. During their time at the reservation, the Navajos became dispirited and suffered from hunger, drought, and disease. Many tribe members died, and more ran away. Finally, in 1868, the United States allowed the survivors to return to their lands in Arizona, unlike most other tribes it relocated during the War for the West. The moral issues raised by the Navajo case are typical of territorial removals, including the expulsions of Germans and Poles following

Anna Stilz

Papers

Nations, States, and Territory*

Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State

Collective Responsibility and the State

Why do states have territorial rights

Occupancy Rights and the Wrong of Removal