The author systematically examines one of the important issues of information — establishing the market price. He introduces the concept of «search» — where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers. The article deals with various aspects of finding the necessary information.

Economics of Information

1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

Taking Rights Seriously

This paper reports analyses of data obtained using a field‐based questionnaire in which 253 auditors from one Big 5 firm recalled and described 515 specific experiences they had with clients who they believe were attempting to manage earnings This approach enables us to analyze separately managers' decisions about how to attempt earnings management and auditors' decisions about whether to prevent earnings management by requiring adjustment of the financial statements Our results indicate that managers are more likely to attempt earnings management, and auditors are less likely to adjust earnings management attempts, which are structured (not structured) with respect to precise (imprecise) standards We also find that managers are more likely to make attempts that increase current‐year income, but auditors are more likely to require that those attempts be adjusted, that managers are more likely to make attempts that decrease current‐year income with unstructured transactions and/or when standards are imp

http://lib.cufe.edu.cn/upload_files/other/4_20140519092031_19.pdf

Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' Earnings Management Decisions

The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy

We report survey evidence about 515 experiences that auditors have had with clients who they identified as attempting to manage earnings. This approach enables us to analyze separately managers' decisions about how to attempt earnings management ("EM") and auditors' decisions about whether or not to waive adjustment of managers' earnings-management attempts ("EMAs"). We provide evidence that the likelihood that managers make EMAs (and auditors waive adjustment of EMAs) that involve transaction structuring varies with the precision of the related accounting standards. Managers tend to make EMAs that increase current-year income, but auditors are less likely to waive EMAs that increase current-year income. Managers are more likely to make EMAs that decrease current-year income with unstructured transactions and/or when standards are imprecise (presumably because the resulting "cookie jar reserves" are easier to harvest in future years if structuring is not necessary or the relevant standards are flexible). Auditors are more likely to waive EMAs that they identify as immaterial or that are attempted by large clients. These variables combine to affect the areas in which EMAs are attempted and waived to become EM in the audited financial statements.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID294688_code011226100.pdf?abstractid=294688

Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' Earnings-Management Decisions

This is a reprint of Anthony Ogus' classic study of regulation,first published in the 1990s. It examines how, since the last decades of the twentieth century there have been fundamental changes in the relationship between the state and industry. With the aid of economic theory Anthony Ogus critically examines the ways in which public law has been adapted to the task of regulating industrial activity and provides a systematic overview of the theory and forms of social and economic regulation. In particular, he explores the reasons why governments regulate, for which, broadly speaking, two theoretical frameworks exist. First 'public interest' theories determine that regulation should aim to improve social and economic welfare. Second, 'economic' theories suggest that regulation should aim to satisfy the demands of private interests. The book also looks at the evolution of the forms of regulation in Britain, extending to the policies of privatization and deregulation which were so characteristic of the period. The author skilfully evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of regulation, particularly in the light of the two theoretical frameworks, but also by involving an analysis of how firms respond to the various kinds of incentives and controls offered by government. A significant feature of the book is its analysis of the choices made by governments between the different forms of regulation and the influence exerted by interest groups (including bureaucrats) and EC law.

Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory

Rethinking Self-Regulation

Three main tasks can be identified for comparative law. The first is to investigate differences between legal systems and, in particular, to distinguish between “real” differences, where the outcomes of the application of principles diverge between legal systems, and “superficial” differences, where similar outcomes are masked by the conceptual structures of the relevant systems. The second is to trace developments in the relationships between legal systems and thus to explore tendencies of convergence or divergence (in terms of “real” differences), noting that in some areas convergence may be required under international legal instruments. The third task is to explain and to evaluate such developments: why do systems converge or diverge? Is convergence desirable or undesirable?

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0020589300063259

Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis To Comparative Law

Why do governments intervene in the affairs of business? Is the use of the criminal sanction an appropriate means of persuading industry to comply with governmental controls? This book first considers these questions at a general level and then examines them with a particular regard to government controls of the environment.

Anthony Ogus

Papers

Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory

Rethinking Self-Regulation

Rethinking Self-Regulation

Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis To Comparative Law

Policing Pollution: A Study of Regulation and Enforcement