How to Do Things With Words

1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

Taking Rights Seriously

What is modal logic

Anarchy, state, and utopia

Scholars of culture, humanities and social sciences have increasingly come to an appreciation of the importance of the legal domain in social life, while critically engaged socio-legal scholars around the world have taken up the task of understanding "Law's Empire" in all of its cultural, political, and economic dimensions. The questions arising from these intersections, and addressing imperialisms past and present forms the subject matter of a special symposium issue of Social Identities under the editorship of Griffith University's Rob McQueen, and UBC's Wes Pue and with contributions from McQueen, Ian Duncanson, Renisa Mawani, David Williams, Emma Cunliffe, Chidi Oguamanam, W. Wesley Pue, Fatou Camara, and Dianne Kirkby. This paper introduces the volume, forthcoming in late 2007. The central problematique of this issue has previously been explored through the 2005 Law's Empire conference, an informal but vibrant postcolonial legal studies network.

Law's Empire

In this paper we present a Gentzen system for reasoning with contrary-to-duty obligations. The intuition behind the system is that a contrary-to-duty is a special kind of normative exception. The logical machinery to formalise this idea is taken from substructural logics and it is based on the definition of a new non-classical connective capturing the notion of reparational obligation. Then the system is tested against well-known contrary-to-duty paradoxes.

https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9307/main.pdf

Logic of Violations: A Gentzen System for Reasoning with Contrary-to-Duty Obligations

We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combination of temporalised agency and temporalised normative positions. We argue about the defeasible nature of these notions and then we show how to represent and reason with them in the setting of Defeasible Logic.

Temporalised normative positions in defeasible logic

In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue, in particular, that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks.

/pdf/bio-logical-agents-norms-beliefs-intentions-in-defeasible-2mikp3j08j.pdf

BIO logical agents: Norms, beliefs, intentions in defeasible logic

In this paper we investigate how to represent and reason about legal abrogations and annulments in Defeasible Logic. We examine some options that embed in this setting, and in similar rule-based systems, ideas from belief and base revision. In both cases, our conclusion is negative, which suggests to adopt a different logical model. This model expresses temporal aspects of legal rules, and distinguishes between two main timelines, one internal to a given temporal version of the legal system, and another relative to how the legal system evolves over time. Accordingly, we propose a temporal extension of Defeasible Logic suitable to express this model and to capture abrogation and annulment. We show that the proposed framework overcomes the difficulties discussed in regard to belief and base revision, and is sufficiently flexible to represent many of the subtleties characterizing legal abrogations and annulments.

Changing legal systems: legal abrogations and annulments in Defeasible Logic

In this survey paper we summarize the requirements for rule interchange languages for applications in the legal domain and use these requirements to evaluate RuleML, SBVR, SWRL and RIF. We also present the Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF), a new rule interchange format developed specifically for applications in the legal domain.

/pdf/rules-and-norms-requirements-for-rule-interchange-languages-zqkwqipgh2.pdf

Antonino Rotolo

Papers

Logic of Violations: A Gentzen System for Reasoning with Contrary-to-Duty Obligations

Temporalised normative positions in defeasible logic

BIO logical agents: Norms, beliefs, intentions in defeasible logic

Changing legal systems: legal abrogations and annulments in Defeasible Logic

Rules and Norms: Requirements for Rule Interchange Languages in the Legal Domain