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JournalISSN: 1367-0751

Logic Journal of The Igpl \/ Bulletin of The Igpl 

Oxford University Press
About: Logic Journal of The Igpl \/ Bulletin of The Igpl is an academic journal published by Oxford University Press. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Computer science & Normal modal logic. It has an ISSN identifier of 1367-0751. Over the lifetime, 399 publications have been published receiving 4031 citations. The journal is also known as: Logic journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics.


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TL;DR: The state of the art in developing logical theories of rational agency is surveyed, followed by a discussion on the dimensions along which such theories can vary, and a briefly survey the logical tools available in order to construct such theories.
Abstract: Rational agents are important objects of study in several research communities, including economics, philosophy, cognitive science, and most recently computer science and artificial intelligence. Crudely, a rational agent is an entity that is capable of acting on its environment, and which chooses to act in such a way as to further its own best interests. There has recently been much interest in the use of mathematical logic for developing formal theories of such agents. Such theories view agents as practical reasoning systems, deciding moment by moment which action to perform next, given the beliefs they have about the world and their desires with respect to how they would like the world to be. In this article, we survey the state of the art in developing logical theories of rational agency. Following a discussion on the dimensions along which such theories can vary, we briefly survey the logical tools available in order to construct such theories. We then review and critically assess three of the best known theories of rational agency: Cohen and Levesque’s intention logic, Rao and Georgeff’s bdi logics, and the KARO framework of Meyer et al. We then discuss the various roles that such logics can play in helping us to engineer rational agents, and conclude with a discussion of open problems.

143 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown how 0-order logics can be given a spatial interpretation: constants denote regions and logical operators correspond to operations on regions which are important for characterising spatial situations.
Abstract: Spatial reasoning is essential for many AI applications. In most existing systems the representation is primarily numerical, so the information that can be handled is limited to precise quantitative data. However, for many purposes the ability to manipulate high-level qualitative spatial information in a exible way would be extremely useful. Such capabilities can be proveded by logical calculi; and indeed 1st-order theories of certain spatial relations have been given 20]. But computing inferences in 1st-order logic is generally intractable unless special (domain dependent) methods are known. 0-order modal logics provide an alternative representation which is more expressive than classical 0-order logic and yet often more amenable to automated deduction than 1st-order formalisms. These calculi are usually interpreted as propositional logics: non-logical constants are taken as denoting propositions. However, they can also be given a nominal interpretation in which the constants stand for some kind of object. I show how 0-order logics can be given a spatial interpretation: constants denote regions and logical operators correspond to operations on regions which are important for characterising spatial situations. Representing certain spatial concepts requires the introduction of modal operators, interpreted as functions generating regions related in speciic ways to those denoted by their arguments. A signiicant example is the convex-hull operator whose value is the smallest convex region containing its argument. I investigate how this this operator can be captured in a multi-modal logic.

142 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper proposes a temporal extension of Defeasible Logic suitable to express this model and to capture abrogation and annulment, and shows that the proposed framework overcomes the difficulties discussed in regard to belief and base revision, and is sufficiently flexible to represent many of the subtleties characterizing legal abrogations andannulments.
Abstract: In this paper we investigate how to represent and reason about legal abrogations and annulments in Defeasible Logic. We examine some options that embed in this setting, and in similar rule-based systems, ideas from belief and base revision. In both cases, our conclusion is negative, which suggests to adopt a different logical model. This model expresses temporal aspects of legal rules, and distinguishes between two main timelines, one internal to a given temporal version of the legal system, and another relative to how the legal system evolves over time. Accordingly, we propose a temporal extension of Defeasible Logic suitable to express this model and to capture abrogation and annulment. We show that the proposed framework overcomes the difficulties discussed in regard to belief and base revision, and is sufficiently flexible to represent many of the subtleties characterizing legal abrogations and annulments.

112 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A definition of reputation is presented that is structurally similar to the definition of trust but moves the basic concept of belief to a collective dimension of group belief.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present a logical framework in which the concepts of trust and reputation can be formally characterized and their properties studied. We start from the definition of trust proposed by Castelfranchi & Falcone (C&F). We formalize this definition in a logic of time, action, beliefs and choices. Then, we provide a refinement of C&F’s definition by distinguishing two general types of trust: occurrent trust and dispositional trust. In the second part of the paper we present a definition of reputation that is structurally similar to the definition of trust but moves the basic concept of belief to a collective dimension of group belief.

100 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202330
202286
20176
201629
201516
201418