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Arieh Gavious
Researcher at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Publications - 67
Citations - 1874
Arieh Gavious is an academic researcher from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. The author has contributed to research in topics: Common value auction & Revenue equivalence. The author has an hindex of 20, co-authored 65 publications receiving 1712 citations. Previous affiliations of Arieh Gavious include Ono Academic College & Tel Aviv University.
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Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, ‘angels,’ and venture capitalists
Ramy Elitzur,Arieh Gavious +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relationship between an entrepreneur, an angel, and a VC from the seed investment made by the angel to the exit stage and analyzed the moral hazard problems of the entrepreneur and the VC.
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Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects
TL;DR: A new method for calculating explicitly optimal strategies, open-loop equilibria, and closed-loop Equilibria of such nonsmooth problems of asymmetric reference-price effects with loss-aversive consumers is introduced.
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Bid costs and endogenous bid caps
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a setting where several privately informed agents bid for a price and all bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids, and moreover, bids may be capped.
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Bid costs and endogenous bid caps
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a setting where several privately informed agents bid for a price and all bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids, and moreover, bids may be capped.
Journal ArticleDOI
All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers
TL;DR: In this paper, the perturbation analysis was used to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers and showed that under weak risk aversion, buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case.