Presentacio sobre l'Oficina de Proteccio de Dades Personals de la UAB i la politica Open Science. Va formar part de la conferencia "Les politiques d'Open Data / Open Acces: Implicacions a la recerca" orientada a investigadors i gestors de projectes europeus que va tenir lloc el 20 de setembre de 2018 a la Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

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General data protection regulation

This article presents an examination of the diversity principle in communications policy. Given the Federal Communication Commission's recent emphasis on diversity as a policy objective, diversity assessments must return to the forefront of communications policy analysis. To provide an analytical framework for such research, the diversity principle is broken into three distinct components (source, content, and exposure diversity), and multiple subcomponents. In the spirit of the FCC's empirical commitment to the diversity principle, this analysis focuses on diversity as a measurable concept, with potentially interacting dimensions and numerous means of assessment.

Deconstructing the diversity principle

In 2008, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated a docket to determine whether existing television sponsorship regulations needed to be revised to address embedded advertising. This article first discusses current embedded advertising practices on television and the alleged problems with those practices. It then explains the current legal framework applicable to the practices. Next, the article analyzes the major reform positions that were articulated in comments to the FCC. This analysis includes a discussion of the First Amendment protections for advertising and for the creative works in which the integrated marketing is embedded, because many times the advertising is difficult to separate from its entertainment platform. The article concludes with recommendations for next steps by the FCC and industry.

Embedded Advertising on Television: Disclosure, Deception, and Free Speech Rights:

En tanto basados en la captura metrica de caracteristicas anatomico-fisicas o comportamentales singularizantes y gestionados en forma que permiten un acceso casi inmediato a tal informacion, los sistemas de reconocimiento biometrico se nos presentan como una tecnologia perfecta. Pero existe un rango amplisimo de tecnologias biometricas, con muy diferentes niveles de calidad y eficiencia, y se emplean en un amplio abanico de escenarios y contextos a lo largo y ancho del Planeta. Tambien son diferentes las condiciones de procesamiento y almacenamiento de los datos, los niveles de interoperatividad o los riesgos para los derechos fundamentales de los titulares de los datos. Algunas afirmaciones que asocian, sin mas, Biometria y vigilancia perfecta se sostienen a veces sobre interpretaciones parciales de la verdad historica o cientifica, bien directamente sobre falacias y mitos y es importante analizar la realidad de los datos que manejan. 
El objetivo de la presente investigacion es abordar la metodologia, potencialidad y limitaciones de los sistemas de reconocimiento biometrico para, desde ese anclaje, dar respuesta a dos cuestiones: 
Primera, ?hasta que punto y como ofrecen las tecnologias de reconocimiento biometrico la posibilidad de identificar a un ser humano con unico en el mundo? 
Segunda, ?que razones estan permitiendo y cuales deberian impedir construir infraestructuras de reconocimiento biometrico que aseguren la identificacion en todo momento? 
La primera de las preguntas acepta la hipotesis cientifica de la que parten los sistemas de reconocimiento biometrico: la posibilidad de expresar metricamente (cifrar, cuantificar) la singularidad de algunas caracteristicas de las personas. Pero se adentra en validar hasta que punto el actual contexto cientifico y tecnologico es capaz de ofrecer y como sistemas de reconocimiento agiles y fiables basados en dicha hipotesis.

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Reconocimiento e identificación de las personas mediante biometrías estáticas y dinámicas

This dissertation argues for institutionally focused judicial oversight of the law of democracy in order to minimize partisan manipulation of the democratic process. Elected representatives have incentives to distort for partisan gain campaign finance, political party funding, electoral boundaries, and the other rules shaping democratic political competition. While representatives are elected to act in the best interests of voters, they can entrench themselves and reduce their electoral accountability by altering the rules that structure elections and democratic politics. In other words, political representation is beset by a principal-agent problem. I trace the implications of the principal-agent problem for judicial review of the comparative law of democracy. I argue that leading accounts of judicial review of the law of democracy have failed to account for the presence of electoral management bodies (EMBs), such as election commissions and redistricting commissions, and the role played by majoritarian constitutional structures. If the goal is to reduce partisan self-dealing then judicial oversight must be institutionally sensitive, because the risk of partisan self-dealing varies depending on the type and characteristics of the institution whose actions are under review. I argue that courts should show different degrees of deference based on the risk that the institution is likely to have distorted the democratic process. EMBs are likely to be independent and impartial and the risk of partisan self-dealing by these institutions is therefore iii reduced. To the extent that they are independent and impartial, then these institutions are entitled to deference. Courts must be aware, however, of the variation in institutional design of EMBs, which range from independent and impartial to partisan and captured. Where the EMB has been captured by partisan interests, then deference is not warranted. Where it is the decisions of legislatures and not EMBs that are under review, then courts should engage in vigilant oversight because of the incentives elected representatives possess to manipulate the democratic process. I develop doctrine to aid courts in limiting partisan self-dealing and assessing the proper degree of deference to grant, including a test to assess the independence and impartiality of EMBs. Where legislative action is under scrutiny, I argue that motive-based judicial review is a way forward for courts to prevent partisan self-dealing. The majoritarian democracies of Canada, Australia, India, and the United States are considered in depth in order to make these claims.

Partisan Manipulation of the Democratic Process and the Comparative Law of Democracy

Introduction ..................................................................................... 299 I. The Court's Developing Jurisprudence ....................................... 303 A. Traditional Doctrine: Means Scrutiny Under the Three-Tiered Approach ........................................................ 303 1. Equal Protection Jurisprudence and the Origins of the Three-Tiered Approach ............................ 303 2. Tiers and Free Speech Jurisprudence .............................. 304 3. Tiers and Privacy Jurisprudence ...................................... 305 B. Historical and Practical Limits of the Three-Tiered Approach ........................................................ 306 C. Purpose Scrutiny: Recent Developments in Constitutional Law ................................................................ 312 1. Purpose Scrutiny in Equal Protection Jurisprudence ................................................................. 312 2. Purpose Scrutiny in Free Speech Jurisprudence .............. 316 3. Purpose Scrutiny in Other Areas ..................................... 317 4. Recent Academic Commentary on Purpose A nalysis .......................................................................... 318

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Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis

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Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial Power"

In addition to regulating different substantive areas, administrative agencies differ in the enforcement systems they use to implement regulatory regimes. Professor Bhagwat identifies a crucial distinction between ex ante enforcement regimes, which authorize agencies to review approve or disapprove of regulated conduct before it occurs, and ex post regimes, which limit agencies to prosecuting and penalizing regulatory violations after they have occurred. The nature of an agency's enforcement power can have an enormous impact on the practical scope of its substantive lawmaking power and its discretionary authority. Ex ante authority appears in a variety of guises, including licensing schemes, preclearance or preapproval requirements, certification requirements. Their common feature is that ex ante enforcement regimes place the burden of inertia, delay, and inaction on regulated entities, by prohibiting them from engaging in desired activity until after agency approval is obtained, or agency disapproval is successfully challenged in the courts (ex post regimes, by contrast, leave the burden of inertia on agencies). The practical consequence of this is that ex ante enforcement powers greatly increase the substantive lawmaking power, as well as the discretionary authority of both agencies as a whole and individual agency personnel, by shielding regulatory decisions from both internal agency and judicial supervision. Because of this, Professor Bhagwat argues, Congress should be extremely cautious about granting agencies ex ante authority, especially in substantive areas where agency discretion can threaten important social interests. On the other hand, there are also potential benefits from ex ante regulatory authority, primarily in terms of preventing irremediable social harms, and reducing investigatory and remedial burdens on agencies. In light of these considerations, the balance of the article identifies specific factors relevant to evaluating the wisdom of granting ex ante enforcement authority to an agency, and then applies to resulting framework to evaluate a number of existing regulatory regimes.

Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion

B HAGWAT . DOC 4/11/2007 3:46:01 PM THE TEST THAT ATE EVERYTHING: INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE Ashutosh Bhagwat* There is little doubt that over the past thirty years, the most im- portant doctrinal development in the jurisprudence of constitutional rights has been the formulation, and proliferation, of “tiers of scru- tiny,” which courts employ to reconcile individual liberties with socie- tal needs. The First Amendment “intermediate scrutiny” tier was born as a product of the merger of several distinct and narrow branches of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and, over the years, has attained central importance in the overall structure of free speech law. Indeed, so important and ubiquitous has intermediate scrutiny become that Justice Scalia has described it as a “default standard,” and it has been the standard of review in countless significant Su- preme Court and courts of appeals cases over the past quarter cen- tury. Despite this importance, however, scholarly analysis of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny has been curiously muted. This article seeks to fill this major gap in modern First Amend- ment scholarship by offering a comprehensive assessment of the in- termediate scrutiny test. After providing a historical description of the development of intermediate scrutiny since the mid-1980s, this article argues that despite uncertainties that still exist in the Supreme Court, it is clear that a distinct body of intermediate scrutiny free speech juris- prudence has emerged at the appellate level. Then, this article turns to an examination of how the intermediate scrutiny test has in fact been applied in the courts of appeals since its emergence. Because an ex- amination of the case law reveals that the intermediate scrutiny test does not function very well in practice, this article concludes that the proper doctrinal solution is disaggregation. Disaggregation, the dis- mantling of the intermediate scrutiny test into its constituent parts, will † Cf. J EFFREY S TEINGARTEN , T HE M AN W HO A TE E VERYTHING (Knopf 1997). * Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law (bhagwata@uchastings.edu). Thanks to Vik Amar, David Faigman, Jonathan Masur, Caroline Shapiro, Geoffrey Stone, Eugene Volokh, Adam Winkler, and participants at faculty workshops at the University of Leiden and at Hastings College of the Law for extremely helpful comments. Thanks also to Nicole Reynolds for excellent research assistance.

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The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence

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Ashutosh Avinash Bhagwat

Papers

Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis

Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial Power"

Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion

The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence

Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion