http://control.disp.uniroma2.it/galeani/CO/materiale/automatica2000.pdf

Survey Constrained model predictive control: Stability and optimality

http://web.aeromech.usyd.edu.au/AMME4500/mpc_survey.pdf

A survey of industrial model predictive control technology

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

https://www.control.isy.liu.se/student/graduate/hybrid_course/oh_BemMor.pdf

Control of systems integrating logic, dynamics, and constraints

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive presentation and interpretation of the Ensemble Kalman Filter (EnKF) and its numerical implementation. The EnKF has a large user group, and numerous publications have discussed applications and theoretical aspects of it. This paper reviews the important results from these studies and also presents new ideas and alternative interpretations which further explain the success of the EnKF. In addition to providing the theoretical framework needed for using the EnKF, there is also a focus on the algorithmic formulation and optimal numerical implementation. A program listing is given for some of the key subroutines. The paper also touches upon specific issues such as the use of nonlinear measurements, in situ profiles of temperature and salinity, and data which are available with high frequency in time. An ensemble based optimal interpolation (EnOI) scheme is presented as a cost-effective approach which may serve as an alternative to the EnKF in some applications. A fairly extensive discussion is devoted to the use of time correlated model errors and the estimation of model bias.

The Ensemble Kalman Filter: Theoretical formulation and practical implementation

Applying the unscented Kalman filter for nonlinear state estimation

This paper outlines how it is possible to decompose a complex non-linear modelling problem into a set of simpler linear modelling problems. Local ARMAX models valid within certain operating regimes are interpolated to construct a global NARMAX (non-linear NARMAX) model. Knowledge of the system behaviour in terms of operating regimes is the primary basis for building such models, hence it should not be considered as a pure black-box approach, but as an approach that utilizes a limited amount of a priori system knowledge. It is shown that a large class of non-linear systems can be modelled in this way, and indicated how to decompose the systems range of operation into operating regimes. Standard system identification algorithms can be used to identify the NARMAX model, and several aspects of the system identification problem are discussed and illustrated by a simulation example.

Bjarne A. Foss

Papers

Applying the unscented Kalman filter for nonlinear state estimation

Constructing NARMAX models using ARMAX models

State and output feedback nonlinear model predictive control: An overview

Identification of non-linear system structure and parameters using regime decomposition

Operating regime based process modeling and identification