In his discussion of the four causes, Aristotle claims that ‘the hypotheses are material causes of the conclusion’ (Physics 2.3, Metaphysics Δ 2). This claim has puzzled commentators since antiquity. It is usually taken to mean that the premises of any deduction are material causes of the conclusion. By contrast, I argue that the claim does not apply to deductions in general but only to scientific demonstrations. In Aristotle’s view, the theorems of a given science are composites composed of the indemonstrable premises from which they are demonstrated. Accordingly, these premises are elements, and hence material causes, of the theorems. Given this, Aristotle’s claim can be shown to be well-motivated and illuminating. 1. Hypotheses are material causes of the conclusion In Physics 2.3 and its doublet in Metaphysics Δ 2, Aristotle distinguishes the so-called four causes. The first of them is characterized as ‘that from which as a constituent something comes to be’. Since antiquity, this type of cause is known as the ‘material cause’. Aristotle illustrates it by a series of examples as follows: 1 τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, Phys. 2.3 194b24 (= Metaph. Δ 2 1013a24–5). 2 The ancient commentators refer to it as ὑλικὸν αἴτιον (Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 349.2, 351.5, 353.20, Philop. in Phys. 243.21, 243.30, 246.25–247.11, 249.6, Simpl. in Phys. 314.27, 319.20, 320.13, Asclep. in Metaph. 305.22–4, 306.9–14). Moravcsik argues that this type of cause should rather be called ‘constitutive

Aristotle on Principles as Elements

The object of research is to clarify the connections between non-anthropogenic mind and culture as sign systems. Investigation of such an object discloses the perspectives on construction of the generalized model of mind and can help to build the bridge between traditional and digital humanities. The subject of traditional humanities is natural human activity; the subject of digital humanities is computer-based forms of activity and communication. Finding signs created not only by human but also by natural circumstances helps to define the sign system that unites the natural (non-anthropogenic) and artificial kinds of mind. Methodology of research includes the principles of semiotics previously developed by Charles Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure and expanded by Yuri Lotman and Boris Uspensky. Semiotic interpretation of mind as the object of culture allows the building of a generalized model of mind as one of textual constructions, presenting the history of mankind as the replacement of natural events by secondary models. The author concludes that the revealing of a generalized model of mind opens new opportunities for the construction of the intelligent activity strictly interpreted as special sign systems. Semiotic studies interpret culture as a rationality making machine, and activity of mind is caused by the work of such a machine. Because of that, if traditional meaning sign systems were estimated as human-made kinds of complex of primary signs, then modern statements help to see the absence of an irresistible limit to interpret such complex as a nature-made but non-anthropogenic phenomenon.

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Non-anthropogenic mind and complexes of cultural codes

What lies behind Aristotle’s declarations that an attribute or feature that is demonstrated to belong to a scientific subject is proper to that subject? The answer is found in APo. 2.8-10, if we understand these chapters as bearing not only on Aristotle theory of definition but also as clarifying the logical structure of demonstration in general. If we identify the basic subjects with what has no different cause, and demonstrable attributes (the kath’ hauta sumbebēkota) with what do have ‘a different cause’, the definitions of demonstrable attributes necessarily have the minor terms of the appropriate demonstrations in their definitions, for which reason the subjects and demonstrable attributes are coextensive.

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Kath’ hauta predicates and the ‘commensurate universals’

In the Platonic exegesis, the topic of 'hypothesis and dialectic' has been covered by the works of many scholars, although, compared to some other topics, it has not been overinterpreted. To the best of my knowledge, however, there is only one book that deals extensively and systematically with it - Richard Robinson's Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953). This one book of Robinson has remained, according to many Plato scholars, unsurpassed as to the punctiliousness with which its author describes the formal structure of Plato's hypothetical methodology; that is why most of those who have dealt with this topic tended to take Robinson's book as the ultimate authority on the matter. Yet there is an aspect of this topic that Robinson (and, as far as I know, all the other scholars that wrote on it) explored less: the relation between Plato's hypothetical methodology and the Platonic metaphysics. This relation is the actual subject of my research. Now my research has two main claims (which are actually exegetical claims). (1) Whether with disappointment or with relief (to use Ryle's 1966, 17 phrase), we have to recognize that Plato's dialogues unfold a philosophical search rather than a metaphysical system. My attempt to determine what Plato's hypothetical dialectic is, follows in a way the logical route of his philosophical search. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.).

Plato's hypothetical dialectic

In the first book of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle distinguishes two types of preliminary knowledge that can be involved in scientific understanding: knowing that something is and knowing what something is, which he treats as equivalent to knowing what something signifies. What do these two types of preliminary knowledge amount to? How are they reciprocally related? On what grounds may they be regarded as trustworthy? It turns out that knowing that something is probably covers three types of knowledge: knowing that something is the case, knowing that something exists, and knowing that something is so-and-so. Given this wide spectrum covered by knowing that something is, the problem arises of understanding what logical space is left for knowing what something is. Unless knowing what something is a particular case of knowing that something is, the most plausible guess is that knowledge of what something is, is knowledge whose linguistic formulation involves the ‘definitional’ reading of sentences, namely the reading of a sentence whereby its predicate-expression is taken to offer a complete description of the nature of the kind signified by its subject-expression. The trustworthiness of our grasp of definitions is due to a special faculty postulated by Aristotle, namely the intellect, which has the power to ‘look into’ the nature of the kinds it is concerned with.

Aristotle on Scientific Principles (Posterior Analytics 1. 1‒2)

In An. Post. I, 2, 72 a 8ff., Aristotle gives a description of the kinds of premisses that can occur in a demonstration. It is the purpose of this paper to explore some difficulties that arise in the interpretation of this passage and of the related passage at An. Post. I, 10, 76b 33 ff.

Blake Landor

Papers

Definitions and Hypotheses in Posterior Analytics 72 a 19-25 and 76 b 35-77 a 4