We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

หนงสอ Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction เขยนโดย Colin F. Camerer มวตถประสงคเพอนำเสนอหลกฐานเชงประจกษจากผลการวจยจำนวนมากมายทยนยนอทธพลของปจจยทางจตวทยาทมผลตอการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม หนงสอ เลมนไดนำเสนอแนวคดทฤษฎทเพมความสามารถในการอธบายพฤตกรรมการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม (Game theory) ซง von Neumann; & Morgenstern ไดเสนอไวในป ค.ศ. 1944 โดยชใหเหนวา ปจจยทางจตวทยามอทธพลทำใหการตดสนใจทเกดขนจรงคลาดเคลอนจากการคาดการณของทฤษฎเกม

Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

Given a social network G and a positive integer k, the influence maximization problem asks for k nodes (in G) whose adoptions of a certain idea or product can trigger the largest expected number of follow-up adoptions by the remaining nodes This problem has been extensively studied in the literature, and the state-of-the-art technique runs in O((k+l) (n+m) log n e2) expected time and returns a (1-1 e-e)-approximate solution with at least 1 - 1/n l probability This paper presents an influence maximization algorithm that provides the same worst-case guarantees as the state of the art, but offers significantly improved empirical efficiency The core of our algorithm is a set of estimation techniques based on martingales, a classic statistical tool Those techniques not only provide accurate results with small computation overheads, but also enable our algorithm to support a larger class of information diffusion models than existing methods do We experimentally evaluate our algorithm against the states of the art under several popular diffusion models, using real social networks with up to 14 billion edges Our experimental results show that the proposed algorithm consistently outperforms the states of the art in terms of computation efficiency, and is often orders of magnitude faster

Influence Maximization in Near-Linear Time: A Martingale Approach

From social networks such as Facebook, the World Wide Web and the Internet, to the complex interactions between proteins in the cells of our bodies, we constantly face the challenge of understanding the structure and development of networks. The theory of random graphs provides a framework for this understanding, and in this book the authors give a gentle introduction to the basic tools for understanding and applying the theory. Part I includes sufficient material, including exercises, for a one semester course at the advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate level. The reader is then well prepared for the more advanced topics in Parts II and III. A final part provides a quick introduction to the background material needed. All those interested in discrete mathematics, computer science or applied probability and their applications will find this an ideal introduction to the subject.

/pdf/introduction-to-random-graphs-3cfvwg09nu.pdf

Introduction to random graphs

Diffusion is a fundamental graph process, underpinning such phenomena as epidemic disease contagion and the spread of innovation by word-of-mouth. We address the algorithmic problem of finding a set of k initial seed nodes in a network so that the expected size of the resulting cascade is maximized, under the standard independent cascade model of network diffusion. Runtime is a primary consideration for this problem due to the massive size of the relevant input networks.We provide a fast algorithm for the influence maximization problem, obtaining the near-optimal approximation factor of (1--1/e -- e), for any e > 0, in time O((m + n)e-3 log n). Our algorithm is runtime-optimal (up to a logarithmic factor) and substantially improves upon the previously best-known algorithms which run in time Ω(mnk · POLY(e-1)). Furthermore, our algorithm can be modified to allow early termination: if it is terminated after O(β(m + n) log n) steps for some β

https://epubs.siam.org/doi/pdf/10.1137/1.9781611973402.70

Maximizing social influence in nearly optimal time

In this letter we briefly survey our main result from [Babaioff el al. 2014]: a simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanism for a monopolist who wants to sell a variety of items to a single buyer with an additive valuation.

/pdf/a-simple-and-approximately-optimal-mechanism-for-an-additive-45dfny2yq8.pdf

A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer

Diffusion is a fundamental graph process, underpinning such phenomena as epidemic disease contagion and the spread of innovation by word-of-mouth. We address the algorithmic problem of finding a set of k initial seed nodes in a network so that the expected size of the resulting cascade is maximized, under the standard independent cascade model of network diffusion. Runtime is a primary consideration for this problem due to the massive size of the relevant input networks. 
We provide a fast algorithm for the influence maximization problem, obtaining the near-optimal approximation factor of (1 - 1/e - epsilon), for any epsilon > 0, in time O((m+n)k log(n) / epsilon^2). Our algorithm is runtime-optimal (up to a logarithmic factor) and substantially improves upon the previously best-known algorithms which run in time Omega(mnk POLY(1/epsilon)). Furthermore, our algorithm can be modified to allow early termination: if it is terminated after O(beta(m+n)k log(n)) steps for some beta < 1 (which can depend on n), then it returns a solution with approximation factor O(beta). Finally, we show that this runtime is optimal (up to logarithmic factors) for any beta and fixed seed size k.

Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time

We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the seller sequentially in an arbitrary order, each purchasing her favorite bundle from among the unsold items at the posted prices. These mechanisms are simple, transparent and trivially dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC).We show that when agent preferences are fractionally subadditive (which includes all submodular functions), there always exist prices that, in expectation, obtain at least half of the optimal welfare. Our result is constructive: given black-box access to a combinatorial auction algorithm A, sample access to the prior distribution, and appropriate query access to the sampled valuations, one can compute, in polytime, prices that guarantee at least half of the expected welfare of A. As a corollary, we obtain the first polytime (in n and m) constant-factor DSIC mechanism for Bayesian submodular combinatorial auctions, given access to demand query oracles. Our results also extend to valuations with complements, where the approximation factor degrades linearly with the level of complementarity.

https://epubs.siam.org/doi/pdf/10.1137/1.9781611973730.10

Combinatorial auctions via posted prices

We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue. 
We suggest using the a-priori better of two simple pricing methods: selling the items separately, each at its optimal price, and bundling together, in which the entire set of items is sold as one bundle at its optimal price. We show that for any distribution, this mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimal revenue. 
Beyond its simplicity, this is the first computationally tractable mechanism to obtain a constant-factor approximation for this multi-parameter problem. We additionally discuss extensions to multiple buyers and to valuations that are correlated across items.

Brendan Lucier

Papers

Maximizing social influence in nearly optimal time

A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer

Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time

Combinatorial auctions via posted prices

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer