Fast and frugal heuristics - simple rules for making decisions with realistic mental resources - are presented here. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? What heuristics are in the mind's adaptive toolbox, and what building blocks compose them? Can judgments based simply on a single reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? This book explores these questions by developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analysis. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can yield adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop-out rates, and playing the stock market.

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart

http://cbl.eng.cam.ac.uk/pub/Public/Wolpert/Publications/WolMiaKaw98.pdf

Internal models in the cerebellum

Multiple paired forward and inverse models for motor control

Prologue PART 1: The Need for a Theory of Cognitive Evolution Mental Architecture as an Emergent Phenomenon Culture as Evidence for Cognitive Structure The Organization of This Book PART 2:

Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition

problems in addition to the signs of the Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome. Many of the patients were closely examined over long periods and the authors make the point that repeated examinations for as long as ten years in some instances allowed them to describe the natural history of the syndrome. and this they do in their third chapter. Again the description of the pathological findings is precise and comprehensive and the authors stress the periventricular distribution of the lesions and their bilateral symmetry. The authors consider specifically the neuropathological substrate on which are based the defective memory, ocular motor signs, the ataxia, the global confusional state and the occasional disturbance of olfactory and gustatory function. They argue a unity between Wernicke's disease and Korsakoff's psychosis and discuss the relationship between these two and alcoholic cerebellar degeneration, central pontine myelinolysis and other myelinolytic syndromes and interestingly discuss the problem of \"alcoholic dementia\" concluding that the nosological status ofalcoholic dementia is by

https://jnnp.bmj.com/content/jnnp/52/10/1218.2.full.pdf

Neuropsychology Mental Structure

THE monkey's status as a thinker has never been high; yet laboratory investigations testify, nevertheless, to the ability of many species of monkey to learn complex tasks, if not to reason. On this latter point, however, hard evidence is significantly lacking. One reason for this is that it is difficult to devise tests which are both meaningful to non-verbal subjects yet satisfy the stringent requirements of a formal reasoning test such as one adapted from Burt1 which first gives the subject the following information: “Edith is fairer than Suzanne”, “Edith is darker than Lili”, and then requires solution of the question, “which is the darkest, Edith, Suzanne or Lili?”. Bryant and Trabasso2 have devised a simplified method of giving such tests to very young children, and we have adapted this into a non-verbal one for use with monkeys.

Are monkeys logical

In this article, we summarize reI cent research on the abilities of ani mals and children to learn and con struct sequences. Much of this research was influenced by Lash ley's classic critique of the limita tions of traditional chaining theory as an explanation of rapidly exe cuted skilled movements, such as language and rapid typing.1 We present evidence that traditional chaining models also fail in the case of sequences that are neither skilled nor rapid. Traditional models are too strong to account for sequences pro duced by pigeons and too weak to account for sequences produced by monkeys. We also show how devel opmental factors contribute signifi cantly to an understanding of serial knowledge. The new line of inquiry we sum marize here falls between two well

Memory and Representation of Serial Order by Children, Monkeys, and Pigeons

Five squirrel monkeys showed a significant Symbolic Distance Effect (SDE) when tested on procedures designed to incorporate reaction time (RT) measures within the five-term series (“transitive infe...

Monkeys are rational

Are children any more logical than monkeys on the five-term series problem?

SENSORY rearrangement techniques have been used to study the way in which primates reach accurately for objects. When an object is viewed through wedge prisms, for example, reaching is disrupted but rapidly corrected when the subject is given immediate feedback concerning the position of his pointing limb relative to the target1. Such adaptation to distorted input is conventionally regarded as a process of minimising the discrepancy between two or more sensory channels (for example, vision and proprioception), with the neglected or non-dominant channel conforming to the position information provided by the other. The role of learning in this process is unclear. When the prisms are removed, the effects of such adaptation disappear rapidly (unlike most learning phenomena), and after an interval of 24 h during which the subject reaches ‘normally’, most investigators assume2 that all traces of adaptation have been eliminated from the nervous system. This view has been challenged recently by results we obtained with squirrel monkeys3, which retained their adaptation over periods often considerably longer than the 48 h spent in their home cages. We also found that they could adapt to two prisms displacing in equal and opposite directions, and eventually conserve both adaptations together with their normal reaching behaviour. Their progressive elimination of error (due to prismatic distortion) as a function of the number of occasions on which they were exposed to prism conditions suggests, furthermore, powerful motor learning mechanisms at work in the adaptation process. We now report similar findings with human subjects.

Brendan McGonigle

Papers

Are monkeys logical

Memory and Representation of Serial Order by Children, Monkeys, and Pigeons

Monkeys are rational

Are children any more logical than monkeys on the five-term series problem?

Long-term retention of single and multistate prismatic adaptation by humans