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Bruce Shepherd
Researcher at University of British Columbia
Publications - 13
Citations - 670
Bruce Shepherd is an academic researcher from University of British Columbia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Approximation algorithm & Bounded function. The author has an hindex of 11, co-authored 13 publications receiving 635 citations. Previous affiliations of Bruce Shepherd include McGill University & Bell Labs.
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Near-optimal hardness results and approximation algorithms for edge-disjoint paths and related problems
TL;DR: It is shown that in directed networks, for any > 0, EDP is NP-hard to approximate within m 1=2 and simple approximation algorithms are designed that achieve essentially matching approximation guarantees for some generalizations of EDP.
Journal ArticleDOI
Near-optimal hardness results and approximation algorithms for edge-disjoint paths and related problems
TL;DR: It is shown that in directed networks, for any e>0, EDP is NP-hard to approximate within m1/2-e even in undirected networks, and design simple approximation algorithms that achieve essentially matching approximation guarantees for some generalizations of EDP.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Clustering and server selection using passive monitoring
TL;DR: A system called Webmapper is presented for clustering IP addresses and assigning each cluster to an optimal content server and it makes no a priori assumptions about network topology and server placement and it can react quickly to changing network conditions.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Tight bounds for online vector bin packing
TL;DR: It has been outstanding for almost 20 years to clarify the gap between the best lower bound Ω(1) on the competitive ratio versus the best upper bound of O(d), and this is settled by describing a Ω (d1-ε) lower bound.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Strategic Network Formation through Peering and Service Agreements
TL;DR: A game theoretic model of network formation where nodes act as the players of the game, and links represent potential contracts, and it is shown that if every payout is increased by a factor of 2, then there is a Nash equilibrium as good as the original centrally defined social optimum.