Scholars for a long time theorized about the role of political leaders, but empirical research has been limited by the lack of systematic data about individual leaders. Archigos is a new dataset with information on leaders in 188 countries from 1875 to 2004. We provide an overview of the main features of this data. Archigos specifically identifies the effective leaders of each independent state; it codes when and how leaders came into power, their age, and their gender, as well as their personal fate one year after they lost office. We illustrate the utility of the Archigos dataset by demonstrating how leader attributes predict other features of interest in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Crisis interactions differ depending on whether leaders face each other for the first time or have had prior interactions. Irregular leader changes can help identify political change in autocracies not apparent from data that consider only the democratic nature of institutions. Finally, transitions to democracy in the third wave are more likely to fail in instances where autocratic rulers were punished after leaving office. Our examples illustrate new empirical findings that simply could not be explored in existing data sources. Although selective, our overview demonstrates how Archigos bears considerable promise in providing answers to new and old research questions and opens up new avenues for research on individual leaders as decisionmakers.

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Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders

Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1

국제정치이론 = Theory of international politics

This text is a Stata-specific treatment of generalized linear mixed models, also known as multilevel or hierarchical models. These models are "mixed" in the sense that they allow fixed and random effects and are "generalized" in the sense that they are appropriate not only for continuous Gaussian responses but also for binary, count, and other types of limited dependent variables.

Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata, 3rd Edition

Do foreign educated individuals play a role in promoting democracy in their home country? Despite the large amount of private and public resources spent on foreign education, there is no systematic evidence that foreign educated individuals foster democracy in their home countries. Using a unique panel dataset on foreign students starting from 1950, I show that indeed foreign-educated individuals promote democracy in their home country, but only if the foreign education is acquired in democratic countries. The results are robust to reverse causality, country-specific omitted variables, and inclusion of a variety of control variables. The results are stronger for small countries.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID954588_code347008.pdf?abstractid=954588&mirid=1&type=2

Democracy and Foreign Education

Despite the large amount of private and public resources spent on foreign edu? cation, there is no systematic evidence that foreign-educated individuals foster democracy in their home countries. Using a unique panel dataset on foreign stu? dents starting in the 1950s, I show that foreign-educated individuals promote democracy in their home country, but only if the foreign education is acquired in democratic countries. The results are robust to several estimation techniques, to different definitions of democracy, and to the inclusion of a variety of control variables, including democracy in trading partners, neighboring countries, level of income, and level and stock of education. (JEL D72,121, 015) Do foreign-educated individuals play a role in fostering democracy in their home countries? Despite the large amount of resources spent on financing foreign education, there is no systematic study on the effects of foreign education on democracy. This paper fills this gap using a dataset on foreign students that includes almost all host and sending countries and spans over 50 years. Numerous policy initiatives and large investment in the United States are based on the notion that foreign-educated students promote democracy in their countries of origin. Through the Fulbright Program, the US government has financed more than 158,000 foreigners studying in the United States.1 The US government not only finances the education of foreign students, but also annually issues more than 250,000 nonimmigrant visas for foreign students; more than five million individuals have received visas to study in the United States since 1971.2 US efforts to educate foreign students have produced impressive results; 46 current and 165 former heads of governments are products of US higher education. Foreign leaders educated in the United

/pdf/democracy-and-foreign-education-1d1mvryn80.pdf

Democratic governance depends not only on the building of democratic institutions but also on citizens’ knowledge about how these institutions should function in their everyday lives. I argue that US-hosted educational exchange programs are one mechanism whereby citizens of nondemocratic states might experience life firsthand in a democratic country. Their experiences may impact the political institutions and influence political behavior in their home countries. In order for this process to take place, I argue that at least three contextual conditions are important: (i) the depth and extent of social interactions that occur while abroad, (ii) the sharing of a sense of community or common identity between participants and their hosts, and (iii) the attainment of a politically influential position by the exchange participant when they return home. In this article, I test these hypotheses and find support for what advocates of soft power often contend: US-hosted exchange programs can play an important role in the diffusion of liberal values and practices across the borders of authoritarian states. The current war in Iraq has illustrated the difficulties of imposing democratic institutions in states where democratic norms are underdeveloped and citizens have little previous experience of the everyday functioning of democratic practices. One consequence has been calls for the United States to engage in a ‘‘war of ideas’’ with nonliberal forces that have impeded the spread and development of democratic norms and practices. But how might the United States actually ‘‘fight’’ such a war? Soft power advocates, US policy makers, and scholars have frequently claimed that US-hosted educational exchange programs might provide one strategy for the United States to effectively engage its ideational adversaries (e.g., Nye and Owens 1996; Nye 2004; Williams 2004; Rice 2006; US White House 2006; Phillips and Brooks 2008). While such claims are made, there has been little attempt to systematically evaluate them. Exceptions are a few studies that have argued that attendance by foreign military officers at US military schools has had a positive impact on the development of democratic institutions (Cope 1995; Gibler and Ruby 2002; Atkinson 2006; Miller 2006). The research presented in this article complements and expands the scope of these studies by empirically evaluating the impact of both military and civilian exchanges. When we think about what is meant by liberal practices, two observable phenomena come to mind: first, whether a state’s institutions are democratic or authoritarian, and second, whether leaders respect the life and fundamental liberties of their citizens. Building the political institutions of democracy is certainly

Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006

The research presented in this article examines one aspect of state socialization, the extent to which transnational military-to-military interactions have served as an effective mechanism of the democratic political socialization of states. Military organizations are very interesting when we consider avenues by which state socialization might occur because military organizations are an influential part of governments, and members share common beliefs and values as soldiers and officers that transcend borders. Thus, it would seem that a state's military structure is one likely channel whereby politically relevant individuals might learn new ideas and have the capability to reform existing institutional structures. The socialization process described in this study is three level: (1) individuals acquire new ideas; (2) coercion, incentives, and persuasion aid in institutionalizing these ideas in the underlying political structure of the state; and (3) once institutionalized, these new ideas/identity of the state influence the material and ideational structure of international society. Using Cox Proportional Hazard models and an original data set encompassing over 160 states during the years 1972–2000, the analyses find U.S. military-to-military contacts to be positively and systematically associated with liberalizing trends. This finding provides evidence that constructivist mechanisms do have observable effects, and that ideationally based processes play an important role in U.S. national security.

Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972–2000

Carol Atkinson received her PhD in Political Science from Duke University. She is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy and US military veteran. While in the military, she served as Chief of Nuclear Target Analysis for Contingencies at US Strategic Command, and was also an intelligence advisor on Strategic Air Command’s nuclear airborne command post. Atkinson is currently an assistant professor at Vanderbilt University.

Using nuclear weapons

This article examines the changing nature of warfare and the implications for democratic governance. The first section describes “hybrid warfare” – the central concept used by NATO to characterize modern war. It looks at the evolution of the concept, how it is defined, and some disputes over its ability to accurately capture the essence of modern war. In NATO, the concept of “hybrid warfare” is used to analyze and characterize Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea; however, the Russian military thinks a bit differently about modern warfare and does not use the term to characterize its own actions. Thus, in the second section, the article examines the difference in Russian military thinking from that of the West. One of the main differences is the role and nature of cyber operations. Cyber operations, especially influence campaigns that include propaganda, disinformation, and “winning hearts and minds,” are key ‘irregular’ components of hybrid warfare that seek decision through influencing the beliefs, values, and collective identity of the opponent’s population. Finally, in its third section, the article argues that the ability of any democratic country to counter hybrid threats, in large part, depends on the willingness of its citizens to support government policies that ultimately undermine the basic freedoms that define what it means to be a democratic country. The author suggests that democratic governance is being undermined by the policies that democratic countries, with the support of their citizens, institute in order to combat hybrid threats, particularly cyber threats.

/pdf/hybrid-warfare-and-societal-resilience-implications-for-1em8a65tn2.pdf

Hybrid Warfare and Societal Resilience: Implications for Democratic Governance

Democratic governments have argued that their ability to counter hybrid threats—threats that come from irregular agents such as violent extremists, criminal networks, and cyber attackers—depends on their ability to monitor all forms of online communication. This presents a conundrum for democratic citizens: either governments surveil their communications or they risk endangering the security of their societies. To assess the tradeoffs people make between freedom, privacy, and security, we analyze survey data from seven NATO countries in Europe to assess whether, to what extent, and why European citizens are willing to trade privacy for security. We find that women (rather than men) and the internationalists (rather than the nationalists) are the people who most sharply draw a distinction between targeted surveillance, which is acceptable to them, and blanket surveillance, which is not. We also find that favorable views of the United States and confidence in President Obama make European citizens more willing to support US surveillance programs targeting not only terrorist suspects but also ordinary people and their political leaders. Pro-US attitudes may ease US statecraft, but they do not necessarily foster a healthy balance between freedom and security in the age of asymmetric threats.

Carol Atkinson

Papers

Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006

Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization of States, 1972–2000

Using nuclear weapons

Hybrid Warfare and Societal Resilience: Implications for Democratic Governance

Hybrid Threats and the Erosion of Democracy from Within: US Surveillance and European Security