Showing papers by "Cass R. Sunstein published in 2009"
TL;DR: The 9/11 attacks had nothing to do with Osama Bin Laden and were actually a plot by influential Americans, a poll conducted in seven Muslim countries found.
Abstract: “THE truth is out there”: conspiracy theories are all around us. In August 2004, a poll by Zogby International showed that 49 percent of New York City residents, with a margin of error of 3.5 percent, believed that officials of the U.S. government “knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that they consciously failed to act.” In a Scripps-Howard Poll in 2006, some 36 percent of respondents assented to the claim that “federal officials either participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center or took no action to stop them.” Sixteen percent said that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that “the collapse of the twin towers in New York was aided by explosives secretly planted in the two buildings.” Conspiracy theories can easily be found all over the world. Among sober-minded Canadians, a September 2006 poll found that 22 percent believed that “the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 had nothing to do with Osama Bin Laden and were actually a plot by influential Americans.” In a poll conducted in seven Muslim countries, 78 percent of respondents said that they do not believe the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs. The most popular
546 citations
Book•
13 May 2009
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present three ways to prevent extremist activities: Extremism: Why and When, Movements, and Three Ways to Prevent Extremism, and Good Extremism.
Abstract: 1 Polarization 2 Extremism: Why and When 3 Movements 4 Three Ways to Prevent Extremism 5 Good Extremism Appendix: Findings of Group Polarization Acknowledgements
385 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others where there are common sources of information; highly unrepresentative group membership; statements that are made to obtain approval; and statements that were designed to manipulate.
Abstract: When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become more extreme. The resulting phenomenon -- group polarization -- has been observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, administrative tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the statements of others where there are 1) common sources of information; 2) highly unrepresentative group membership; 3) statements that are made to obtain approval; and 4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders. We discuss the implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media policy and cognitive diversity on administrative agencies and courts.
47 citations
Book•
19 Jan 2009
TL;DR: The aim of this book is to provide a history of American exceptionalism from Jefferson's Revenge to the present day, through the lens of 21st Century public opinion and judicial Humility.
Abstract: Preface ix Introduction: Jefferson's Revenge 1 Part I. Preliminaries 17 Chapter 1. There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is 19 Part II. Traditionalism 33 Chapter 2. Burkean Minimalism 35 Chapter 3. Rationalists vs. Burkeans 60 Chapter 4. Due Process Traditionalism 93 Part III. Populism 123 Chapter 5. Backlash's Travels 125 Chapter 6. Public Opinion and Social Consequences 140 Chapter 7. Public Opinion and Judicial Humility 165 Part IV. Cosmopolitanism 185 Chapter 8. What Other Nations Do 187 Afterword 210 Acknowledgments 217 Index 219
36 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest that in principle, a cap-and-trade system should allocate permits on a per capita basis, with the idea that each person should begin with the same entitlement, regardless of place of birth.
Abstract: Many people believe that the problem of climate change would be best handled by an international agreement that includes a system of "cap-andtrade. "Such a system would impose a global cap on greenhouse gas emissions and allocate tradable emissions permits. This proposal raises a crucial but insufficiently explored question: How should such permits be allocated? It is tempting to suggest that in principle, a cap-and-trade system should allocate permits on a per capita basis, with the idea that each person should begin with the same entitlement, regardless of place of birth. This idea, pressed by many analysts and by the developing world, can be defended on grounds of either welfare or fairness. But on both grounds, per capita allocations run into serious objections. If fairness is understood in terms of equally or proportionally sharing the burdens of a climate treaty, per capita allocations are not fair because they do not take into account all the effects of such a treaty. Any agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will give more benefits to some nations than to others, and will impose more costs on some nations than on others; in these circumstances, per capita emissions rights give the appearance but not the reality of fairness. For those who seek redistribution to those who need help, on grounds of either welfare or fairness, per capita allocations of emissions rights are at best a mixed blessing. Some rich nations are highly populated, and some poor nations have small populations; there is essentially no relationship between size of population and
23 citations
01 Jan 2009
TL;DR: The notion of moral dumbfounding and moral numbness play a significant role in law and politics as discussed by the authors, and it is difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions, and the absence of coherence appears to be replicated in several areas of law.
Abstract: Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain distinctive is the frequent foundation of moral judgments in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System 1, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System 2, may or may not provide an override. An understanding of indignation helps to explain many phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage heuristic, the severity shift, the puzzling centrality of harm, moral framing, and the act–omission distinction. The operation of System 1 also helps to explain moral dumbfounding, understood as intense moral opprobrium that people are unable to justify, and moral numbness, understood as moral indifference that people know on reflection to be unwarranted. Both moral dumbfounding and moral numbness play a significant role in law and politics. Because of the nature of indignation, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions, and the absence of coherence appears to be replicated in several areas of law. Legal and political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, to check intuitions that misfire, and to pay close attention to System 2; but even in deliberative institutions, System 1 can make some compelling demands. A general implication is that judges may not be aware of the actual causes of their moral judgments and of the legal conclusions that rely on them.
12 citations
01 Jan 2009
9 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The notion of moral dumbfounding and moral numbness play a significant role in law and politics as mentioned in this paper, and it is difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions, and the absence of coherence appears to be replicated in several areas of law.
Abstract: Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain distinctive is the frequent foundation of moral judgments in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System 1, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System 2, may or may not provide an override. An understanding of indignation helps to explain many phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage heuristic, the severity shift, the puzzling centrality of harm, moral framing, and the act–omission distinction. The operation of System 1 also helps to explain moral dumbfounding, understood as intense moral opprobrium that people are unable to justify, and moral numbness, understood as moral indifference that people know on reflection to be unwarranted. Both moral dumbfounding and moral numbness play a significant role in law and politics. Because of the nature of indignation, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions, and the absence of coherence appears to be replicated in several areas of law. Legal and political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, to check intuitions that misfire, and to pay close attention to System 2; but even in deliberative institutions, System 1 can make some compelling demands. A general implication is that judges may not be aware of the actual causes of their moral judgments and of the legal conclusions that rely on them.
1 citations
Journal Article•