http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/201/4359/899.2.full.pdf

Phenomenology of perception.

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The concept of mind

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

The politics of life itself Biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century

A study of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790). Our topics will include Kant’s motivations for a critique of judgment; principles of ‘reflective’ and ‘determining’ judgment; theory of aesthetic judgment, including epistemology and metaphysics of the beautiful and sublime; theory of genius; teleology in the critical philosophy—including harmony of the cognitive faculties, organisms, scope and limits of mechanical explanation, physicoand ethico-theology; the relation of ethics, aesthetics and teleology. A basic familiarity with Kant’s theoretical philosophy is presupposed.

Critique of Judgment

1. Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal, Embodied Empiricism THE BODY AS OBJECT 2. Hal Cook, Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory: Medicine and Science in the Seventeenth Century 3. Cynthia Klestinec, Practical Experience In Anatomy 4. Alan Salter, Early Modern Empiricism and the Discourse of the Senses 5. Victor Boantza, Alkahest and Fire: Debating Matter, Chymistry, and Natural History at the Early Parisian Academy of Sciences 6. Peter Anstey, John Locke and Helmontian Medicine THE BODY AS INSTRUMENT 7. Ofer Gal & Raz Chen-Morris, Empiricism Without The Senses: How the Instrument Replaced the Eye 8. Guido Giglioni, Mastering the Appetites of Matter. Francis Bacon's Sylva Sylvarum 9. Justin E.H. Smith, 'A Corporall Philosophy': Language And 'Body-Making' In The Work Of John Bulwer (1606-1656) 10. Richard Yeo, Memory and Empirical Information: Samuel Hartlib, John Beale and Robert Boyle 11. Snait Gissis, Lamarck on Feelings: From Worms to Humans EMBODIED MINDS 12. John Sutton, Carelessness and Inattention: Mind-Wandering and the Physiology of Fantasy From Locke to Hume 13. Lisa Shapiro, Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke 14. Anik Waldow, Empiricism and its Roots in the Ancient Medical Tradition 15. Tobias Cheung, Embodied Stimuli: Bonnet's Statue of a Sensitive Agent 16. Charles T. Wolfe, Empiricist Heresies In Early Modern Medical Thought

/pdf/the-body-as-object-and-instrument-of-knowledge-embodied-3rpshs51z3.pdf

The body as object and instrument of knowledge : embodied empiricism in early modern science

Our aim in this paper is to show the importance of the notion of economie animale in Montpellier vitalism as a hybrid concept which brings together the structural and functional dimensions of the living body – dimensions which hitherto had primarily been studied according to a mechanistic model, or were discussed within the framework of Stahlian animism. The celebrated image of the bee-swarm expresses this structural-functional understanding of living bodies quite well: “One sees them press against each other, mutually supporting each other, forming a kind of whole, in which each living part, in its own way, by means of the correspondence and directions of its motions, enables this kind of life to be sustained in the body” (Menuret 1765c, Enc. XI, 319a). What is important here is that every component part is always a living part, i.e., every structural unit is always functional. Interestingly, while the twin notions of “animal economy” and organisation are presented as improvements over a mechanistic perspective, they are nonetheless compatible with an expanded sense of mechanism, and by extension, with materialism as reflected notably in the writings of Menuret and Bordeu. We thus propose both a revision and reconstruction of the historical status of the “animal economy,” and a reflection on its conceptual status.
 In judging of the beauty of animal bodies, we always carry in our eye the oeconomy of a certain species.(David Hume [1739] 2000, 3.2.2, 311)

The animal economy as object and program in Montpellier vitalism.

Introduction- Part I Revisiting vitalist themes in 19th-century science- 1 Guido Giglioni (Warburg Institute) Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and the Place of Irritability in the History of Life and Death- 2 Joan Steigerwald (York) Rethinking Organic Vitality in Germany at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century- 3 Juan Rigoli (Geneva) The 'Novel of Medicine'- 4 Sean Dyde (Cambridge) Life and Mind in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Somaticist 'Mind' and Body after the Death of Phrenology- Part II Twentieth century debates on vitalism in science and philosophy- 5 Brian Garrett (McMaster) Vitalism versus Emergent Materialism- 6 Christophe Malaterre (Paris) Life as an Emergent Phenomenon: From an Alternative to Vitalism to an Alternative to Reductionism- 7 Sebastian Normandin (Montreal) Wilhelm Reich: Vitalism and Its Discontents- 8 Chiara Elettra Ferrario (Wellington) and Luigi Corsi (Pisa) Kurt Goldstein: Vitalism and the Organismic Approach- 9 Giuseppe Bianco (Paris/Warwick) The Origins of Canguilhem's "Vitalism": Against the Anthropology of Irritation- Part III Vitalism and contemporary biological developments- 10 J Scott Turner (Syracuse) Homeostasis and the forgotten vitalist roots of adaptation- 11 Carlos Sonnenschein, David Lee, Jonathan Nguyen and Ana Soto (Tufts) Unanticipated trends stemming from the history of cell culture: Vitalism in 2012?- 12 John Dupre and Maureen O'Malley (Exeter) Varieties of living things: Life at the intersection of lineage and metabolism- 13 William Bechtel (UCSD) Dynamic Mechanistic Explanation: Addressing the Vitalists' Objections to Mechanistic Science

/pdf/vitalism-and-the-scientific-image-in-post-enlightenment-life-3a3ilrvzvn.pdf

Vitalism and the scientific image in post-enlightenment life science, 1800-2010

The category of ‘organism’ has an ambiguous status: is it scientific or is it philosophical? Or, if one looks at it from within the relatively recent field or sub-field of philosophy of biology, is it a central, or at least legitimate category therein, or should it be dispensed with? In any case, it has long served as a kind of scientific “bolstering” for a philosophical train of argument which seeks to refute the “mechanistic” or “reductionist” trend, which has been perceived as dominant since the 17th century, whether in the case of Stahlian animism, Leibnizian monadology, the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch, or, lastly, of the “phenomenology of organic life” in the 20th century, with authors such as Kurt Goldstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Georges Canguilhem. In this paper I try to reconstruct some of the main interpretive ‘stages’ or ‘layers’ of the concept of organism in order to critically evaluate it. How might ‘organism’ be a useful concept if one rules out the excesses of ‘organismic’ biology and metaphysics? Varieties of instrumentalism and what I call the ‘projective’ concept of organism are appealing, but perhaps ultimately unsatisfying.

/pdf/do-organisms-have-an-ontological-status-53ukotierv.pdf

Do organisms have an ontological status

Newton’s impact on Enlightenment natural philosophy has been studied at great length, in its experimental, methodological and ideological ramifications. One aspect that has received fairly little attention is the role Newtonian “analogies” played in the formulation of new conceptual schemes in physiology, medicine, and life science as a whole. So-called ‘medical Newtonians’ like Pitcairne and Keill have been studied; but they were engaged in a more literal project of directly transposing, or seeking to transpose, Newtonian laws into quantitative models of the body. I am interested here in something different: neither the metaphysical reading of Newton, nor direct empirical transpositions, but rather, a more heuristic, empiricist construction of Newtonian analogies. Figures such as Haller, Barthez, and Blumenbach constructed analogies between the method of celestial mechanics and the method of physiology. In celestial mechanics, they held, an unknown entity such as gravity is posited and used to mathematically link sets of determinate physical phenomena (e.g., the phases of the moon and tides). This process allows one to remain agnostic about the ontological status of the unknown entity, as long as the two linked sets of phenomena are represented adequately. Haller et. al. held that the Newtonian physician and physiologist can similarly posit an unknown called ‘life’ and use it to link various other phenomena, from digestion to sensation and the functioning of the glands. These phenomena consequently appear as interconnected, goal-oriented processes which do not exist either in an inanimate mechanism or in a corpse. In keeping with the empiricist roots of the analogy, however, no ontological claims are made about the nature of this vital principle, and no attempts are made to directly causally connect such a principle and observable phenomena. The role of the “Newtonian analogy” thus brings together diverse schools of thought, and cuts across a surprising variety of programs, models and practices in natural philosophy.

/pdf/on-the-role-of-newtonian-analogies-in-eighteenth-century-2sf2sjvz35.pdf

Charles T. Wolfe

Papers

The body as object and instrument of knowledge : embodied empiricism in early modern science

The animal economy as object and program in Montpellier vitalism.

Vitalism and the scientific image in post-enlightenment life science, 1800-2010

Do organisms have an ontological status

On the role of Newtonian analogies in eighteenth-century life science:Vitalism and provisionally inexplicable explicative devices