Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes

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The Art of Describing. Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century

This article reviews the hypothesis that mind wandering can be integrated into executive models of attention. Evidence suggests that mind wandering shares many similarities with traditional notions of executive control. When mind wandering occurs, the executive components of attention appear to shift away from the primary task, leading to failures in task performance and superficial representations of the external environment. One challenge for incorporating mind wandering into standard executive models is that it often occurs in the absence of explicit intention--a hallmark of controlled processing. However, mind wandering, like other goal-related processes, can be engaged without explicit awareness; thus, mind wandering can be seen as a goal-driven process, albeit one that is not directed toward the primary task.

The restless mind

The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition: Book Review

1. Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal, Embodied Empiricism THE BODY AS OBJECT 2. Hal Cook, Victories for Empiricism, Failures for Theory: Medicine and Science in the Seventeenth Century 3. Cynthia Klestinec, Practical Experience In Anatomy 4. Alan Salter, Early Modern Empiricism and the Discourse of the Senses 5. Victor Boantza, Alkahest and Fire: Debating Matter, Chymistry, and Natural History at the Early Parisian Academy of Sciences 6. Peter Anstey, John Locke and Helmontian Medicine THE BODY AS INSTRUMENT 7. Ofer Gal & Raz Chen-Morris, Empiricism Without The Senses: How the Instrument Replaced the Eye 8. Guido Giglioni, Mastering the Appetites of Matter. Francis Bacon's Sylva Sylvarum 9. Justin E.H. Smith, 'A Corporall Philosophy': Language And 'Body-Making' In The Work Of John Bulwer (1606-1656) 10. Richard Yeo, Memory and Empirical Information: Samuel Hartlib, John Beale and Robert Boyle 11. Snait Gissis, Lamarck on Feelings: From Worms to Humans EMBODIED MINDS 12. John Sutton, Carelessness and Inattention: Mind-Wandering and the Physiology of Fantasy From Locke to Hume 13. Lisa Shapiro, Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke 14. Anik Waldow, Empiricism and its Roots in the Ancient Medical Tradition 15. Tobias Cheung, Embodied Stimuli: Bonnet's Statue of a Sensitive Agent 16. Charles T. Wolfe, Empiricist Heresies In Early Modern Medical Thought

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The body as object and instrument of knowledge : embodied empiricism in early modern science

The mathematical nature of modern science is an outcome of a contingent historical process, whose most critical stages occurred in the seventeenth century. ‘The mathematization of nature’ (Koyre 1957, From the closed world to the infinite universe, 5) is commonly hailed as the great achievement of the ‘scientific revolution’, but for the agents affecting this development it was not a clear insight into the structure of the universe or into the proper way of studying it. Rather, it was a deliberate project of great intellectual promise, but fraught with excruciating technical challenges and unsettling epistemological conundrums. These required a radical change in the relations between mathematics, order and physical phenomena and the development of new practices of tracing and analyzing motion. This essay presents a series of discrete moments in this process. For mediaeval and Renaissance philosophers, mathematicians and painters, physical motion was the paradigm of change, hence of disorder, and ipso facto available to mathematical analysis only as idealized abstraction. Kepler and Galileo boldly reverted the traditional presumptions: for them, mathematical harmonies were embedded in creation; motion was the carrier of order; and the objects of mathematics were mathematical curves drawn by nature itself. Mathematics could thus be assigned an explanatory role in natural philosophy, capturing a new metaphysical entity: pure motion. Successive generations of natural philosophers from Descartes to Huygens and Hooke gradually relegated the need to legitimize the application of mathematics to natural phenomena and the blurring of natural and artificial this application relied on. Newton finally erased the distinction between nature’s and artificial mathematics altogether, equating all of geometry with mechanical practice.

Nature’s drawing: problems and resolutions in the mathematization of motion

The optical instruments developed through the seventeenth century allowed peering into the very far and the very small; a spectacle never before experienced. The telescope, and later the microscope, was now expected to answer fundamental questions and resolve cosmological riddles by direct observation into the foundations of nature. But this ability came at an unexpected price and with unexpected results. For Kepler and Galileo, the new instruments did not offer extension and improvement to the senses; they replaced them altogether. To rely on their authority was to admit that the human eye is nothing but an instrument, and a flawed one at that. Rather than the intellect’s window to the world, the human senses became a part of this world, a source of obscure and unreliable data, demanding uncertain deciphering. Accurate scientific observation meant that we are always wrong.

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Empiricism Without the Senses: How the Instrument Replaced the Eye

Seventeenth-century optics naturalizes the eye while estranging the mind from objects. A mere screen, on which rests a blurry array of light stains, the eye no longer furnishes the observer with genuine re-presentations of visible objects. The intellect is thus compelled to decipher flat images of no inherent epistemic value, accidental effects of a purely causal process, as vague, reversed reflections of wholly independent objects. Reflecting on and trespassing the boundaries between natural and artificial, orderly and disorderly, this optical paradox is a Baroque phenomenon; and it is the origin of Descartes’ celebrated doubt---whether we know anything at all.

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Baroque Optics and the Disappearance of the Observer: From Kepler’s Optics to Descartes’ Doubt

The following paper, together with its sequel (\"The use and non-use of mathematics\"), is a study in the mathematization of nature. It looks into the history of one of the most emblematic achievements of this fundamental aspect of the making of modem science the Inverse Square Law of universal gravitation before its celebrated application by Newton to celestial mechanics. What did it take, we ask, to tum a particular mathematical ratio into a candidate for a law of nature?

Ofer Gal

Papers

The body as object and instrument of knowledge : embodied empiricism in early modern science

Nature’s drawing: problems and resolutions in the mathematization of motion

Empiricism Without the Senses: How the Instrument Replaced the Eye

Baroque Optics and the Disappearance of the Observer: From Kepler’s Optics to Descartes’ Doubt

The Archaeology of the Inverse Square Law: (1) Metaphysical Images and Mathematical Practices: