Strategic intelligence failures cannot be prevented by organizational solutions to problems of analysis and communication. Analytic certainty is precluded by ambiguity of evidence, ambivalence of judgment, and atrophy of institutional reforms designed to avert failures. Many sources of error are unresolvable paradoxes and dilemmas rather than curable pathologies. Major failures in attack warning, operational evaluation, and intelligence for strategic planning are due primarily to leaders’ psychological attributes rather than to analysts’ failures to detect relevant data. Since analysis and decision are interactive rather than sequential processes, and authorities often hear but dismiss correct estimates, intelligence failure is inseparable from policy failure. Solutions most often proposed—worst-case analysis, multiple advocacy, devil's advocacy, organizational consolidation, sanctions and incentives for analysts, and cognitive rehabilitation—are either impractical because of constraints on the leaders’ time, or they are mixed blessings because they create new problems in the course of solving old ones.

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Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable

Editor's Foreword, Jon Woronoff Preface Acknowledgments Acronyms and Abbreviations Chronology Introduction THE DICTIONARY Appendixes I. Directors of National Intelligence II. Directors of Central Intelligence III. Directors of Central Intelligence Agency Bibliography About the Author

Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence

In America today there are government or corporation officials who .have eavesdropped on telephone calls (Wise, 1976; &dquo;AT & T monitored millions of calls,&dquo; 1975; Shapley, 1977), kept secrets about political assassinations (U.S. Senate, 1975), used computer programs to conceal embezzlement (Allen, 1977), or provided conflicting facts about the safety of nuclear power (Ebbins and Kasper, 1974; Congressional Digest, 1977). The public has learned repeatedly how little the ordinary citizen knows about what government agencies do and how much government agencies know about what ordinary citizens do. Yet sociology has done little to help people understand these social problems of getting, keeping, and using information. Sociologists have left the study of

Information Control A Conceptual Framework for Sociological Analysis

(1987). The politics of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 5-46.

The politics of intelligence

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Chester L. Cooper

Papers

The CIA and Decision-Making

The Complexities of Negotiation