Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

This paper solves explicitly a simple equilibrium model with liquidity risk. In our liquidityadjusted capital asset pricing model, a security s required return depends on its expected liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. In addition, a persistent negative shock to a security s liquidity results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a unified framework for understanding the various channels through which liquidity risk may affect asset prices. Our empirical results shed light on the total and relative economic significance of these channels and provide evidence of flight to liquidity. r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Market Liquidity: Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk

This paper empirically examines how capital affects a bank’s performance (survival and market share), and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the U.S. over the past quarter century. We have two main results. First, capital helps small banks to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and normal times). Second, capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Additional tests explore channels through which capital generates the documented effects. Numerous robustness checks and additional tests are performed.

How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises

Although the modern theory of financial intermediation portrays liquidity creation as an essential role of banks, comprehensive measures of bank liquidity creation do not exist. We construct four measures and apply them to data on virtually all U.S. banks from 1993 to 2003. We find that bank liquidity creation increased every year and exceeded $2.8 trillion in 2003. Large banks, multibank holding company members, retail banks, and recently merged banks created the most liquidity. Bank liquidity creation is positively correlated with bank value. Testing recent theories of the relationship between capital and liquidity creation, we find that the relationship is positive for large banks and negative for small banks. (JEL G21, G28, G32)

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Bank Liquidity Creation

How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises

Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide (mis-)valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring duringboomingmarketsarefundamentallydifferentfromthoseoccurringduringdepressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higherannouncementreturnsbutlowerlong-runabnormalstockandoperatingperformance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding. (JEL G34) A sizeable stream of theoretical and empirical research on mergers and acquisitions (MA announcement-day returnsaresignificantlypositivefortargetshareholdersbutmaybesignificantly positive or negative for bidder shareholders depending on the mode of acquisition, method of payment, and type of target; and postacquisition returns to acquiringshareholdersarehigherforcashoffersandtenderoffersthanforstock offers and mergers. 1 More recent research explores the possible link between

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Market Valuation and Acquisition Quality: Empirical Evidence

How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices ("familiarity effect"), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an "influence effect" as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

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Christa H. S. Bouwman

Papers

How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises

Bank Liquidity Creation

How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises

Market Valuation and Acquisition Quality: Empirical Evidence

Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors