计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Researchers have used various measures as indications of "earnings quality" including persistence, accruals, smoothness, timeliness, loss avoidance, investor responsiveness, and external indicators such as restatements and SEC enforcement releases. For each measure, we discuss causes of variation in the measure as well as consequences. We reach no single conclusion on what earnings quality is because "quality" is contingent on the decision context. We also point out that the "quality" of earnings is a function of the firm's fundamental performance. The contribution of a firm's fundamental performance to its earnings quality is suggested as one area for future work.

/pdf/understanding-earnings-quality-a-review-of-the-proxies-their-1r9rjtuq8l.pdf

Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

羟氨苄青霉素引起大疱性类天疱疮样疹

This paper investigates information disclosures made by chairpersons of boards of directors in 120 failing UK companies. There are four main findings. Firstly, chairpersons excessively blame poor performance on exogenous factors rather than managerial decisions. Secondly, almost half of chairpersons do not candidly disclose problems that are apparent when they write their statements. Thirdly, prospective disclosures are more optimistic than disclosures about past performance despite significantly worse performance after chairpersons' statements. Finally, chairpersons' compensation is negatively associated with bad news disclosures. Overall, the results indicate that chairpersons in failing companies hide bad news and that they have incentives to do so.

Self-serving Disclosures by Chairpersons of Failing UK Companies

Prior studies examine how fraud firms manipulate accruals in order to overstate their earnings. We document that some fraud firms also manipulate operating cash flows in order to fraudulently overstate earnings. More importantly, we predict that these earnings-cash flow frauds (ECF) are harder to detect and have more severe consequences when compared to earnings frauds which rely only on accruals. Consistent with our predictions, we find ECF frauds take longer to detect, have larger estimated damages, elicit more negative market reactions, are more likely to result in CEO and executive turnover, and are more likely to result in securities lawsuits. We conclude that ECF frauds are harder to detect and have more severe consequences.

Cooking the Books Using Different Ingredients: An Examination of Earnings Frauds That Also Involve Misreported Cash Flows

Non-audit services and the demand for voluntary audits

Public Accounting Experience and the Remediation of Material Internal Control Weaknesses

Debt rollover, as an integral aspect of firms’ financing decisions, remains relatively underexplored because it is difficult to identify empirically. Debt reclassifications, which indicate intent by firms to roll over their short-term debt on a long-term basis, provide us a unique opportunity to study debt rollover. Reclassifications are surprisingly common among S&P 1500 firms. Over the 1993-2005 period, on average, 33% of the firms reclassify short-term debt as long-term debt each year. Among firms that reclassify short-term debt, the average percentage of reclassified debt to total debt is as high as 40%. We empirically examine the factors that determine the decision of firms to roll over existing or new short-term debt via reclassification. We find that younger and smaller firms, as well as firms with intermediate and no S&P credit ratings, are more likely to roll over debt via reclassifications. Firms are also more likely to roll over debt via reclassification when they have major investment projects, market conditions are not favorable for equity and long-term debt issuance, and refinancing risk is high. Firms that reclassify overcome the financing frictions and achieve significantly higher sales and asset growth, and invest more in both fixed assets and working capital. Consistent with the idea that firms face tighter financial constraints around periods of reclassification than expected future constraints, we find that the cash flow-sensitivity of investment increases and that of cash holdings decreases at the time of debt reclassification. JEL classification: G21, G31, G32

Clive S. Lennox

Papers

Self-serving Disclosures by Chairpersons of Failing UK Companies

Cooking the Books Using Different Ingredients: An Examination of Earnings Frauds That Also Involve Misreported Cash Flows

Non-audit services and the demand for voluntary audits

Public Accounting Experience and the Remediation of Material Internal Control Weaknesses

Determinants and Real Impact of Debt Rollover: Evidence from Debt Reclassifications