C
Clyde Carryl
Researcher at Florida Atlantic University
Publications - 7
Citations - 30
Clyde Carryl is an academic researcher from Florida Atlantic University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Physical access & Otway–Rees protocol. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 7 publications receiving 23 citations.
Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
The PEV security challenges to the smart grid: Analysis of threats and mitigation strategies
TL;DR: This paper analyzes PEV-induced threats to the security of the Smart Grid and proposes effective mitigation strategies which could be employed to nullify their effectiveness in disrupting the services offered by the Smart grid.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Activity Analysis and Detection of Repetitive Motion in Autistic Patients
TL;DR: A uniquely designed alarm system that can help with autistic children's difficulties on a real-time basis and can be extended or applied to other situations of even non-autistic children that suffer some health disturbances or particular situations that need a specific assistance.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Universal Physical Access Control System
Bassem Alhalabi,Clyde Carryl +1 more
TL;DR: This article proposes the Universal Physical Access Control System (UPACS) which provides a universal framework for controlling access to physical resources and shows how it can be used to control access to any type of resource, including homes, vehicles and public infrastructure.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Formal verification of the universal physical access control system (UPACS)
TL;DR: This work modeled the protocol in the typed Pi Calculus and used the formal protocol verification tool Proverif to examine the protocol's security properties, verifying that the protocol satisfies all of its intended reachability, observational equivalence and correspondence properties.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Implementation of the universal physical access control system (UPACS)
Clyde Carryl,Bassem Alhalabi +1 more
TL;DR: This work created a reference implementation of the UPACS protocol and performed a security analysis designed to determine the protocol's resilience to several known forms of security attack.