计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

http://lib.cufe.edu.cn/upload_files/other/4_20140522023331_3.pdf

Auditor size and audit quality

Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

. This study investigates firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission for alleged violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. We investigate: (i) the extent to which the alleged earnings manipulations can be explained by extant earnings management hypotheses; (ii) the relation between earnings manipulations and weaknesses in firms' internal governance structures; and (iii) the capital market consequences experienced by firms when the alleged earnings manipulations are made public. We find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low cost. We show that this motivation remains significant after controlling for contracting motives proposed in the academic literature. We also find that firms manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by management; (ii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who simultaneously serves as Chairman of the Board; (iii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who is also the firm's founder, (iv) less likely to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside blockholder. Finally, we document that firms manipulating earnings experience significant increases in their costs of capital when the manipulations are made public.

Resume. Les auteurs analysent les entreprises assujetties aux mesures d'execution prises par la Securities and Exchange Commission dans les cas de presomption de transgression des principes comptables generalement reconnus. Ils s'interessent aux aspects suivants de la question: i) la mesure dans laquelle les presomptions de manipulations des benefices peuvent etre expliquees par les hypotheses existantes de gestion des benefices; ii) la relation entre les manipulations de benefices et les faiblesses des structures de regie interne des entreprises; et iii) la reaction du marche financier a l'endroit des entreprises au sujet desquelles les presomptions de manipulation des benefices sont rendues publiques. Les auteurs constatent qu'un incitatif majeur a la manipulation des benefices est le desir d'obtenir du financement externe a moindre cout. Ils demontrent que cet incitatif demeure important meme apres le controle des motifs contractuels que mettent de l'avant les travaux theoriques. Ils constatent egalement que les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices sont: i) davantage susceptibles d'avoir des conseils d'administration domines par la direction; ii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui joue simultanement le role de president du conseil; iii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui est egalement le fondateur de l'entreprise; iv) moins susceptibles d'avoir un comite de verification; et v) moins susceptibles d'avoir un bloc de titres detenus par un actionnaire exterieur. Enfin, les auteurs etablissent le fait que le cout du capital, pour les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices, enregistre des hausses appreciables lorsque ces manipulations sont rendues publiques.

/pdf/causes-and-consequences-of-earnings-manipulation-an-analysis-356ezw8q95.pdf

Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*

This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non-Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non-Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non-Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.

The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management

The question of the existence of competition among auditors has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years. More specifically, the "Big Eight" firms as a group have been accused of monopolizing the market for audits {Staff Study of the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Committee on Government Operations [1977]). However, evidence on the issue is scanty and typically anecdotal (e.g., Bernstein [1978]). The evidence of the Staff Study itself is limited to concentration statistics, with the allegations relying on what has come to be called the "concentration doctrine" (Demsetz [1973]). According to this doctrine, supplier concentration is a reliable indicator of supplier behavior and performance. In this paper, I provide evidence from a test of the hypothesis that price competition prevails throughout the market for the audits of publicly held companies, irrespective of the share of a market segment which is serviced by the Big Eight firms. The evidence is based on an examination of a sample cross-section of audit fees.

/pdf/the-pricing-of-audit-services-theory-and-evidence-3b0ygkhk9p.pdf

The pricing of audit services - theory and evidence

The question of whether an auditor should also provide management advisory services (MAS) to an audit client has been extensively debated. On the one hand, the Metcalf Committee Staff Study [1976, pp. 50-52] suggested that supplying both services can create a conflict of interests, particularly when a CPA firm recruits a client's executives and is interested in assuring their success, or when it installs a management information system and subsequently audits the reliability and accuracy of its own work. In these situations, a CPA firm acting as both auditor and consultant may be motivated not to report consulting deficiencies observed during the audit, thereby avoiding erosion of its consulting "brand name." In general, any situation which increases the probability that an auditor will not truthfully report the results of his audit investigation can be viewed as a threat to independence.1 An opposing view of potential threats to truthful reporting by auditors engaged in MAS was taken by the Cohen Commission [1978, p. 97],

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2490671.pdf

Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence

In this research, we examine the empirical relation between client characteristics and the nature and mix of labor resources used by an international CPA firm to obtain a desired level of assurance that clients' financial statements are free of material misstatement. The level of assurance is the output of an audit, while the input resources measure the effort required to produce that output, under varying client circumstances. We use disaggregated labor hours by rank within the firm (partner, manager, senior, and staff) as the measure of inputs, in order to examine how client characteristics affect both the amount and mix of labor used. To the extent that client characteristics have differential effects on the various types of labor, only disaggregated data can reveal changes in labor mix and may also provide a more powerful test (relative to tests

Dan A. Simunic

Papers

The pricing of audit services - theory and evidence

Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence

The Production of Audit Services: Evidence from a Major Public Accounting Firm

Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-country Evidence

Audit pricing, legal liability regimes, and big 4 premiums: Theory and cross-country evidence