https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/5/110/206.full.pdf

The american psychological association.

We sought to examine the concept of authentic leadership and discuss the influences of authenticity and authentic leadership on leader and follower eudaemonic well-being, as well as examine the processes through which these influences are realized. This was accomplished in four ways. First, we provide an ontological definition of authentic leadership, rooted in two distinct yet related philosophical approaches to human well-being: hedonism and eudaemonia. Second, we develop a multi-component model of authentic leadership based on recent theoretical developments in the area of authenticity. The resulting model consists of self-awareness, unbiased processing, authentic behavior/acting and authentic relational orientation. Third, we discuss the personal antecedents (leader characteristics) of authentic leadership as well as the outcomes of authentic leadership for both leaders and followers and examine the processes linking authentic leadership to its antecedents and outcomes. Fourth, we discuss the implications of this work for authentic leadership theory and then provide some practical

Authentic leadership and eudaemonic well-being: Understanding leader-follower outcomes

Conclusions and Recommendations, are particularly interesting in view of the controversies aroused by the Warnock Report. Many of the recommendations contained here are similar to Warnock's (for example, concerning the legitimacy of AID children, the need for a licensing authority to supervise the work ofAID and IVF centres, etc), but others are at odds with the corresponding Warnock recommendations. In general, the authors place higher value on the family as an institution than did the Warnock Committee and display a much livelier awareness of the possible social dangers of the new techniques. One weakness of the book is that since its authors are approaching these topics from the standpoint of social scientists, their recommendations for legislative action which surely must be based on properly ethical considerations, not merely sociological ones seem devoid of any satisfactory rational support. For example, they concede that experimentation on human embryos is an objectionable practice, since 'the material acting as the subject of the experimentation is a human being at the beginning of its individual development' (p 178); but the practical recommendation which they make concerning this practice is disappointingly feeble:

https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/12/3/165.full.pdf

Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy

This article tests a new model for predicting which aspects of personality are best judged by the self and which are best judged by others Previous research suggests an asymmetry in the accuracy of personality judgments: Some aspects of personality are known better to the self than others and vice versa According to the self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model presented here, the self should be more accurate than others for traits low in observability (eg, neuroticism), whereas others should be more accurate than the self for traits high in evaluativeness (eg, intellect) In the present study, 165 participants provided self-ratings and were rated by 4 friends and up to 4 strangers in a round-robin design Participants then completed a battery of behavioral tests from which criterion measures were derived Consistent with SOKA model predictions, the self was the best judge of neuroticism-related traits, friends were the best judges of intellect-related traits, and people of all perspectives were equally good at judging extraversion-related traits The theoretical and practical value of articulating this asymmetry is discussed

/pdf/who-knows-what-about-a-person-the-self-other-knowledge-7ovl93ye6g.pdf

Who Knows What About a Person? The Self-Other Knowledge Asymmetry (SOKA) Model

Interest in eudaimonia (e.g., growth, meaning, authenticity, excellence) and its distinction from hedonia (e.g., pleasure, enjoyment, comfort, absence of distress) is growing rapidly, as researchers recognize that both concepts are central to the study of well-being. Yet research on these concepts faces challenges as well: findings based on different operationalizations can be quite discrepant; definitions of eudaimonia and hedonia sometimes fall into different categories of analysis (e.g. when eudaimonia is described as a way of functioning, hedonia as an experience); and the terms eudaimonia and hedonia are sometimes defined vaguely or applied to concepts that may be mere correlates. To aid in addressing these challenges, we propose the following terminology and classification for discussing conceptual and operational definitions: (1) degree of centrality—differentiating concepts that are core (i.e., definitional), close-to-core (i.e., given some attention but not central), and major correlates; (2) category of analysis—identifying which of the following categories a definition represents: (a) orientations (orientations, values, motives, and goals), (b) behaviors (behavioral content, activity characteristics), (c) experiences (subjective experiences, emotions, cognitive appraisals), (d) functioning (indices of positive psychological functioning, mental health, flourishing); and (3) level of measurement—identifying whether a definition is used for trait and/or state comparisons. The work of scholars with a program of research on eudaimonia or the distinction between eudaimonia and hedonia is reviewed and discussed within the framework of the proposed classification; several points of convergence and divergence across definitions are highlighted; and important questions and directions for future research are identified.

Eudaimonia and Its Distinction from Hedonia: Developing a Classification and Terminology for Understanding Conceptual and Operational Definitions

PART I: FUNDAMENTALS OF PRUDENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1. Taking Socrates's Question Seriously 2. Happiness, Well-Being, and the Good Life: A Primer 3. What Do We Want from a Theory of Happiness? Or how to make a mongrel concept hunt PART II: THE NATURE OF HAPPINESS 4. Hedonistic Theories of Happiness 5. Life Satisfaction Theories of Happiness 6. Emotional State Theories of Happiness 7. Happiness as Psychic Affirmation PART III: THE NATURE OF WELL-BEING 8. Well-Being and Virtue 9. Happiness, the Self, and Human Flourishing PART IV: PURSUING HAPPINESS 10. Do We Know How Happy We Are? 11. The Pursuit of Unhappiness 12. Happiness in Context: Notes on the Good Society

The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being

In this paper two philosophical issues are discussed that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we ought to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that 'happiness', as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to do: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods.

Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness

Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter for different reasons, than is widely believed.] For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival in ways that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s values.

http://manaviat.persiangig.com/document/malekian/5.pdf

Life satisfaction, ethical reflection, and the science of happiness

Modern reflection about the good life and the good society has been dominated by a spirit of liberal optimism, according to which people typically know what's good for them and make prudent choices in pursuit of their interests. As a result, people tend to do best, and pretty well at that, when given the greatest possible freedom to live as they wish. This appealing doctrine rests on a bold assumption about human psychology: namely, that people have a high degree of aptitude for securing their well-being given arbitrarily high levels of option freedom. Yet a large body of empirical research suggests that people are systematically prone to make a variety of serious errors in the pursuit of happiness. These errors are probably serious enough to place liberal optimism's psychological assumptions in doubt. If people do tend to fare best in the option-rich environments traditionally favored by liberal moderns, notably classical economists, this may not be mainly through the prudent exercise of choice. Or perhaps human beings actually benefit from certain constraints or burdens on choice.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1071822_code915869.pdf?abstractid=1071822&mirid=1&type=2

The Pursuit of Unhappiness

This paper aims to show thai widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance. "For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. 1 note several implications of these arguments. First, we may he less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block's is controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self-reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways.

Daniel M. Haybron

Papers

The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being

Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness

Life satisfaction, ethical reflection, and the science of happiness

The Pursuit of Unhappiness

Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall