Computer systems cannot improve organizational performance if they aren't used. Unfortunately, resistance to end-user systems by managers and professionals is a widespread problem. To better predict, explain, and increase user acceptance, we need to better understand why people accept or reject computers. This research addresses the ability to predict peoples' computer acceptance from a measure of their intentions, and the ability to explain their intentions in terms of their attitudes, subjective norms, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and related variables. In a longitudinal study of 107 users, intentions to use a specific system, measured after a one-hour introduction to the system, were correlated 0.35 with system use 14 weeks later. The intention-usage correlation was 0.63 at the end of this time period. Perceived usefulness strongly influenced peoples' intentions, explaining more than half of the variance in intentions at the end of 14 weeks. Perceived ease of use had a small but significant effect on intentions as well, although this effect subsided over time. Attitudes only partially mediated the effects of these beliefs on intentions. Subjective norms had no effect on intentions. These results suggest the possibility of simple but powerful models of the determinants of user acceptance, with practical value for evaluating systems and guiding managerial interventions aimed at reducing the problem of underutilized computer technology.

User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical Models

抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

A hypothesized need to form and maintain strong, stable interpersonal relationships is evaluated in light of the empirical literature. The need is for frequent, nonaversive interactions within an ongoing relational bond. Consistent with the belongingness hypothesis, people form social attachments readily under most conditions and resist the dissolution of existing bonds. Belongingness appears to have multiple and strong effects on emotional patterns and on cognitive processes. Lack of attachments is linked to a variety of ill effects on health, adjustment, and well-being. Other evidence, such as that concerning satiation, substitution, and behavioral consequences, is likewise consistent with the hypothesized motivation. Several seeming counterexamples turned out not to disconfirm the hypothesis. Existing evidence supports the hypothesis that the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation.

The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation.

The present research develops and tests a theoretical extension of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) that explains perceived usefulness and usage intentions in terms of social influence and cognitive instrumental processes. The extended model, referred to as TAM2, was tested using longitudinal data collected regarding four different systems at four organizations ( N = 156), two involving voluntary usage and two involving mandatory usage. Model constructs were measured at three points in time at each organization: preimplementation, one month postimplementation, and three months postimplementation. The extended model was strongly supported for all four organizations at all three points of measurement, accounting for 40%--60% of the variance in usefulness perceptions and 34%--52% of the variance in usage intentions. Both social influence processes (subjective norm, voluntariness, and image) and cognitive instrumental processes (job relevance, output quality, result demonstrability, and perceived ease of use) significantly influenced user acceptance. These findings advance theory and contribute to the foundation for future research aimed at improving our understanding of user adoption behavior.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2634758.pdf

A Theoretical Extension of the Technology Acceptance Model: Four Longitudinal Field Studies

Co-Planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human Brain—3-Dimensional Proportional System: An Approach to Cerebral Imaging, J. Talairach, P. Tournoux. Georg Thieme Verlag, New York (1988), 122 pp., 130 figs. DM 268

We examined how the suppression of an exciting thought influences sympathetic arousal as indexed by skin conductance level (SCL). Subjects were asked to think aloud as they followed instructions to think about or not to think about various topics. Experiment 1 showed that trying not to think about sex, like thinking about sex, elevates SCL in comparison to thinking about or not thinking about less exciting topics (e.g., dancing). Experiment 2 revealed that the suppression of the thought of sex yielded SCL elevation whether or not subjects believed their think-aloud reports would be private or public, and it also revealed that the effect dissipated over the course of a few minutes. Experiment 3 found such dissipation again but showed that subsequent intrusions of the suppressed exciting thought are associated with further elevations in SCL over 30 min. Because such an association was not found when subjects were trying to think about the exciting thought, it was suggested that the suppression of exciting thoughts might be involved in the production of chronic emotional responses such as phobias and obsessive preoccupations.

/pdf/the-suppression-of-exciting-thoughts-2bjqmv86ut.pdf

The suppression of exciting thoughts.

White bears and other unwanted thoughts

Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people’s normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God’s unique mind is due, the authors suggest, to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine.

/pdf/blaming-god-for-our-pain-human-suffering-and-the-divine-mind-1f0z5iv1b2.pdf

Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind

On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information.

The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and schizophrenic auditory hallucinations. And in people without disorders, phenomena such as hypnosis, automatic writing, Ouija board spelling, water dowsing, facilitated communication, speaking in tongues, spirit possession, and trance channeling also illustrate anomalies of will - cases when actions occur without will or will occurs without action. This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology and neuroscience to explore a the- ory of apparent mental causation. According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself - not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an indication that we think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence by which the action was produced.

/pdf/precis-of-the-illusion-of-conscious-will-5bttg6u5bp.pdf

Daniel M. Wegner

Papers

The suppression of exciting thoughts.

White bears and other unwanted thoughts

Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind

On the inference of personal authorship: enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information.

Précis of The illusion of conscious will