计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/files/2014/05/JFE_risktaking_2006.pdf

Managerial incentives and risk-taking ☆

https://media.terry.uga.edu/documents/finance/daniel.pdf

Boards: Does one size fit all?

This paper is a survey of the literature on boards of directors, with an emphasis on research done subsequent to the Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach (2003) survey. The two questions most asked about boards are what determines their makeup and what determines their actions? These questions are fundamentally intertwined, which complicates the study of boards because makeup and actions are jointly endogenous. A focus of this survey is how the literature, theoretical as well as empirical, deals—or on occasions fails to deal—with this complication. We suggest that many studies of boards can best be interpreted as joint statements about both the director-selection process and the effect of board composition on board actions and firm performance. ( JEL G34, L25)

/pdf/the-role-of-boards-of-directors-in-corporate-governance-a-bnth5jodza.pdf

The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey

Using a comprehensive sample of nearly 7,000 firms from 1990 to 2004, this paper examines corporate board structure, its trends, and its determinants We study how board structure has evolved over time and, more importantly, we compare board structure across small and large firms in ways suggested by recent theoretical work Overall, our evidence suggests that firms structure their boards in response to the costs and benefits of the board's monitoring and advising roles Our models explain as much as 45% of the observed variation in board structure Further, small and large firms have dramatically different board structures For example, board size was falling in the 1990s for large firms, a trend that reversed at the time of mandated reforms, while board size was relatively flat over the 1990s for small and medium-sized firms

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID975983_code88433.pdf?abstractid=729935&mirid=1

The Determinants of Board Structure

On executives of financial institutions as outside directors

We investigate marginal compensation rates in mutual fund advisory contracts and find the following. Equity and foreign fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than debt and domestic fund advisors. Advisors of funds with greater turnover receive higher marginal compensation. Also, closed-end fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than open-end fund advisors. Finally, we find that marginal compensation is lower for advisors of large funds and members of large fund families. We argue that these differences in marginal compensation ref lect differences in advisor marginal product, differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance, differences in control environments, and scale economies.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2697835

Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

We examine the relation between the information content of earnings (earnings response coefficients) and board and audit committee structure for a broad sample of more than 1,200 firms during 2001. We find that earnings are more informative the greater is the independence and the activity of the full board. Moreover, firms that have separated the CEO and board Chair positions appear to have more informative earnings. We also find that audit committee characteristics influence the information content of earnings. In particular, firms that have smaller audit committees have more informative earnings. However, we find that audit committee independence incremental to the independence of the full board is unrelated to the information content of earnings.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID444241_code030930670.pdf?abstractid=444241&mirid=1&type=2

Boards of Directors, Audit Committees, and the Information Content of Earnings

On the demand for independent and active audit committees

We focus on the importance of audit committees in the contracting process. We find that the demand for independent and active audit committees increases with proxies capturing the demand for accounting certification. Specifically, the likelihood of a firm having a completely independent and active audit committee is negatively related to firm growth opportunities and managerial ownership and positively related to firm size and leverage.

Daniel Newton Deli

Papers

On executives of financial institutions as outside directors

Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

Boards of Directors, Audit Committees, and the Information Content of Earnings

On the demand for independent and active audit committees

On the Demand for Independent and Active Audit Committees