Showing papers by "Daniele Conversi published in 2010"

Cultural homogenization, ethnic cleansing and genocide

Abstract: Cultural homogenization, ethnic cleansing, and genocide can be seen as part of a continuum. Throughout the modern era, states have forced their citizens to conform to common standards and cultural patterns. The goal has often been to seek congruence between ethnic and political boundaries; that is, to forge cohesive, unified communities of citizens under governmental control. Cultural homogenization is defined here as a state-led policy aimed at cultural standardization and the overlap between state and culture. As the goal is frequently to impose the culture of dominant elites on the rest of the citizenry, it consists basically of a top-down process where the state seeks to nationalize “the masses.” Modern history abounds with examples of discriminatory legislation directed against specific cultural practices and minority languages (see Fishman 1997; Romaine 2002). These have often verged on “linguistic genocide” or linguicide (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000). Cultural homogenization needs to be distinguished from homogeneity. Whereas cultural homogenization is a historically documented occurrence, homogeneity per se is an ideological construct. The idea of human homogeneity presupposes the existence of a unified, organic community and does not describe an actual phenomenon. In the eyes of many leaders, conformity and standardization meant not only functionality and efficiency, but also obedience to common laws. In the early twentieth century many governments began to see assimilation as an inadequate measure. Plans for population transfers and the physical elimination of communities were conceived. They were conjured up by “nationalizing” states, particularly in times of war. Typically, this process has been facilitated by totalitarian rule. Majoritarian democracies have also embraced assimilationist agendas, sometimes endorsing population transfers. Genocide and ethnic cleansing can be described as a form of “social engineering” and radical homogenization. This is supported by evidence that the elimination of entire communities was often accompanied by the destruction of their cultural heritage. Terms like eliminationism (see also Carmichael 2009) or eradicationism are used to encompass various forms of state-led homogenizing practices.

The limits of cultural globalisation

Abstract: The proliferation of studies on virtually every aspect of globalisation has not clarified the central terminological conundrum of the field. Globalisation studies do not share a univocal set of terms and concepts, so that the loose usage of the very term globalisation has led to polysemy and homonymy. Accordingly, ‘globalisation’ is now used to describe everything and its opposite, from the Roman Empire to WW1, from cosmopolitan behaviour to Genghis Khan’s conquests, and even the Neolithic age. The task of critical globalisation studies should thus be to re-contextualize the phenomenon and re-locate it where it belongs. In contrast, the term Americanisation has been used more sparely, therefore maintaining an autonomous conceptual strength. However, both manufactured opinion and scholarly studies tend to argue that globalisation and Americanisation are wholly distinct phenomena. Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) have adamantly defended that they are not vehicles of Americanisation and that the result of their actions in neoliberal markets is rather a form of ‘indigenization’ or ‘domestication’ through adaptation to local cultures. Similarly, much of the globalisation literature has not come to term with the unidirectional nature of globalisation in the field of culture. This article argues that both globalisation and Americanisation should be historicized, and their respective trajectories identified as beginning in distinct epochs, operating through waves of diffusion and within specific ideological frameworks, and culminating in periods of military and economic expansion. Finally, I argue that, if cultural globalisation is studied in tandem with Americanisation, it can be conceptually circumscribed and its finite nature better identified

Ideology and nationalism

Abstract: As with other sociopolitical terms, there is no universally agreed defi nition of ideology in social theory and political science and the concept remains a broadly contested one. This destiny is only partly shared by the second partner of the couple here described, nationalism. Its main pillar, the term ‘nation’, is probably too slippery and so self-referential as to defy any attempt at an ‘objective’ defi nition (Conversi 1995, see also Jackson Preece in this book). However, there is some agreement that nationalism is an ideological movement speaking in the name of a self-defi ned nation and aiming at controlling political institutions (most often the state) within a specifi c territory. Being an ideological movement, ideology plays a central role in nationalism. Furthermore, ideology and nationalism are coeval terms since their origins equally lie in the French revolution: whereas the genesis of the term ‘nationalism’ is an issue of relative contention (Hroch and Maleckova 2000), the term ‘ideology’ is usually located in Destutt de Tracy’s defi nition of it as the ‘science of ideas’ and Napoleon’s disparaging use of it to describe his adversaries (‘the ideologues’). It was the Napoleonic usage which really defi ned the term.

Homogeneity and conflict

Abstract: The political art of accommodating ethnonational demands has produced a large and respected body of literature. Social scientists often converge on a few key points, like the need to strive to accommodate ethnic diversity and avoid the negative side effects of overt assimilation. But they rarely agree on methodology. Laitin belongs theoretically to a majority position, often referred to as modernist and instrumentalist, but methodologically to a minority rationalist position, gravitating around game theory and methodological individualism. To its proponents, this approach offers a solid, rigorous, mathematically grounded method to analyze and explain ethnic conflict. Its critics wonder why they should have to learn arithmetic in order to explain the primary causes of ethnic conflict. One of the leading arguments concerns the impact of cultural homogenization on ethnic conflict. Laitin offers highly fascinating insights: from a rational-choice perspective, he demonstrates that cultural heterogeneity is not inherently conducive to violent conflict. To start with, one cannot find a statistically meaningful correlation between cultural diversity and ethnic conflict. Neither ethnic nor cultural differences can by themselves spur mass violence and civil wars. It is, rather, the contrary attempt to force homogeneity upon diverse populations that can set off civic strife and even wars, eventually leading to the break-up of countries (112). At least at low levels of wealth, as cultural homogeneity increases, so does the probability of a civil war. Therefore, cultural diversity can be a predictor of social stability. And, contrary to popular prejudice, difference can nurture harmony. However, Laitin also considers cases in which cultural/linguistic/ ethnic heterogeneity are negatively correlated to the effective provision and consumption of public goods, turning into a catalyst of conflict. By “cultural,” he implicitly means “linguistic,” but throughout the book one finds that it often also means “ethnic.” On the other hand, at the highest levels of national wealth further “homogeneity lowers the probability of a civil war onset.” Does this mean that rich countries cannot accept differences? Could they only accept cultural rather than ethnic differentiae, or the other way The Review of Politics 72 (2010), 337–383. # University of Notre Dame