Showing papers by "David Austen-Smith published in 1984"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered a single member district, simple plurality political system with n districts, and provided minimal sufficient conditions for an equilibrium to exist in this game and the equilibrium characterized.
49 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a theoretical framework for analyzing public funding for arts markets in which both a national-level arts council and local governments are potential donors, where the arts council is assumed to allocate grants to maximize the expected number of theatres achieving an acceptable level of output, the local government is only concerned to maximize its total budget from local tax revenues.
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing public funding for arts markets in which both a national-level arts council and local governments are potential donors. While the arts council is assumed to allocate grants to maximize the expected number of theatres achieving an ‘acceptable’ level of output, the local government is only concerned to maximize its total budget from local tax revenues. Despite this objective, a rationale for local governments to give grants is derived. The total grant allocation to any institution arises as an equilibrium outcome to a game played between the arts council and the relevant local government. Theatre managements take account of this allocation process in making their output decisions. Several empirical propositions are derived.
11 citations
Journal Article•
2 citations