Showing papers by "David Austen-Smith published in 1996"

Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Abstract: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived

Theory and evidence for counteractive lobbying

Abstract: Introduction In Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), we developed a formal model to study the pattern of lobbying and influence when two rival groups contend to affect the voting behavior of a legislator over a given pair of alternatives. Subsequently, in Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), we analyzed comparative static results derived from that model. Our analysis focused on the relationship between the decision to lobby by two groups, A and B, and the prior probability, p, that the legislator favors a particular alternative from the given pair of alternatives. The comparative statics imply that, ceteris paribus, if p is less than .5, so that the legislator is expected to vote against A's interests and in favor of B's, then: (1) the decision of A to lobby the legislator depends on p but is independent of the decision of B; (2) if A does not lobby the legislator, then neither will B; and (3) if A does lobby, then B lobbies when p is sufficiently high. We termed (3) counteractive lobbying. Intuitively the idea is that when legislators' prior positions are changeable (i.e., when p is sufficiently greater than zero or less than one), then we should observe interest groups actively lobbying to change the positions of legislators aligned against them; and under these conditions, we should also observe groups aligned with the same legislators lobbying to counter the potential influence of their rivals. We tested this prediction, along with results (1) and (2), in AustenSmith and Wright (1994) with data drawn from the lobbying efforts of organizations on Robert Bork's nomination to the United States Supreme Court. Since different legislators can be associated with different values of p-the probability of voting for or against Bork prior to any lobbying activity-our three hypotheses are cross-sectional statements about the pattern of lobbying across legislators. We emphasize that (1)-(3), along with the conditions under which they occur, are implications, not assumptions, of the model. Baumgartner and Leech (1996) contend that we specified our theoretical and empirical models incorrectly, coded our variables improperly, based

Refinements of the Heart

Abstract: The preceding chapter by Schofield develops the concept of the heart for general committee games when preferences are Euclidean Among other things, he uses it to analyse parliamentary bargaining in multiparty polities The formal defintion of the heart, H D , provided in Schofield (1993, 1995) for general preferences and a given voting rule, D,are reviewed in Section 92, and the application of the heart as a general solution concept are considered in Section 93 Two refinements (or subsets) of the heart called S D and I S D are proposed in Section 94 Section 95 concludes the chapter