Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

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International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

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Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

The history of international political orders is written in terms of continuity and change in domestic and international political relations. As a step toward understanding such continuity and change, we explore some ideas drawn from an institutional perspective. An institutional perspective is characterized in terms of two grand issues that divide students of international relations and other organized systems. The first issue concerns the basic logic of action by which human behavior is shaped. On the one side are those who see action as driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences. On the other side are those who see action as driven by a logic of appropriateness and a sense of identity. The second issue concerns the efficiency of history. On the one side are those who see history as efficient in the sense that it follows a course leading to a unique equilibrium dictated by exogenously determined interests, identities, and resources. On the other side are those who see history as inefficient in the sense that it follows a meandering, path-dependent course distinguished by multiple equilibria and endogenous transformations of interests, identities, and resources. We argue that the tendency of students of international political order to emphasize efficient histories and consequential bases for action leads them to underestimate the significance of rule- and identity-based action and inefficient histories. We illustrate such an institutional perspective by considering some features of the coevolution of politics and institutions, particularly the ways in which engagement in political activities affects the definition and elaboration of political identities and the development of competence in politics and the capabilities of political institutions.

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The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders

The idea of America as politically polarized--that there is an unbridgeable divide between right and left, red and blue states--has become a cliche. What commentators miss, however, is that increasing polarization in recent decades has been closely accompanied by fundamental social and economic changes--most notably, a parallel rise in income inequality. In Polarized America, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal examine the relationships of polarization, wealth disparity, immigration, and other forces, characterizing it as a dance of give and take and back and forth causality.Using NOMINATE (a quantitative procedure that, like interest group ratings, scores politicians on the basis of their roll call voting records) to measure polarization in Congress and public opinion, census data and Federal Election Commission finance records to measure polarization among the public, the authors find that polarization and income inequality fell in tandem from 1913 to 1957 and rose together dramatically from 1977 on; they trace a parallel rise in immigration beginning in the 1970s. They show that Republicans have moved right, away from redistributive policies that would reduce income inequality. Immigration, meanwhile, has facilitated the move to the right: non-citizens, a larger share of the population and disproportionately poor, cannot vote; thus there is less political pressure from the bottom for redistribution than there is from the top against it. In "the choreography of American politics" inequality feeds directly into political polarization, and polarization in turn creates policies that further increase inequality.

/pdf/polarized-america-the-dance-of-ideology-and-unequal-riches-15461pw1nr.pdf

Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches

We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this "overjustification effect" can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.

/pdf/incentives-and-prosocial-behavior-1fmfrk0247.pdf

Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure

We analyze a formal model of decision-making by a deliberative committee. There is a given binary agenda. Individuals evaluate the two alternatives on both private and common interest grounds. Each individual has two sorts of private information going into committee: (a) perfect information about their personal bias and (b) noisy information about which alternative is best with respect to a (commonly held) normative criterion. Prior to a committee vote to choose an alternative, committee members engage in deliberation, modeled as a simultaneous cheap-talk game. We explore and compare equilibrium properties under majority and unanimity voting rules, paying particular attention to the character of debate (who influences who and how) and quality of the decision in each instance. On balance, majority rule induces more information sharing and fewer decision-making errors than unanimity. Furthermore, the influence and character of deliberation per se can vary more under majority rule than under unanimity.

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Deliberation and Voting Rules

IT IS OFrEN THE CASE that an individual's decision is at least partly based on information received from another. And when the agents' payoffs depend on both the former's decision and on the latter's information, there is an incentive for the informed individual to attempt to bias the decision maker's decision in his or her favor by strategically manipulating the information transmitted. In a seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) (hereafter, C/S) study such strategic information transmission in the context of an abstract sender/receiver game. Variants of the Crawford and Sobel model have been applied widely, and as the application varies so often does the interpretation of "type." In some cases, "type" refers to a preference parameter given by Nature-as, for example, in bargaining theory (e.g., Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Matthews (1989)), whereas in other settings-for instance, legislative decision making or expert testimony -"type" refers to more or less technical information concerning how decisions map into final consequences and, as such, is acquired information (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Milgrom and Roberts (1986)). When the information has to be acquired, it is natural to suppose the acquisition is costly; for otherwise, there is no reason why such information is asymmetrically distributed. So long as the receiver can observe surely-or, at least, accurately infer-whether the sender is informed, and so long as messages are cheap-talk, there is no issue here for strategic information transmission (save whether to become informed at all). However, there are many circumstances when it is inappropri- ate to assume the receiver has such knowledge. One possibility is that a receiver may know that a sender has some relevant informa- tion, but be uncertain of the quality of this information. A second, perhaps more important, possibility is that a receiver is unable to tell whether a (potential) sender is uninformed. Inter alia, this problem constitutes the rationale for "ignorance of the law" being inadmissible as a legal defense (were it admissible, then "informed" miscreants would mimic "uninformed" transgressors); leads voters to be skeptical of politicians claiming ignorance of illegal arms deals; and makes the SEC sensitive to problems in distinguishing insider trading from legitimate good judgement. So there is an intrinsic asymmetry in that it is generally possible for, say, senders to verify possession of at least some information, but it is typically prohibitively difficult to verify any lack of knowledge

Strategic transmission of costly information

Interest groups: Money, information and influence

Legislators' beliefs, preferences, and intentions are communicated in committees and legislatures through debates, the proposal of bills and amendments, and the recording of votes. Because such information is typically distributed asymmetrically within any group of decision makers, legislators have incentives to reveal or conceal private information strategically and thus manipulate the collective decision-making process in their favor. In consequence, any committee decision may in the end reflect only the interests of a minority. We address a problem of sharing information through debate in an endogenous, agenda-setting, collective-choice process. The model is game theoretic and we find in the equilibrium to the game that at least some legislators have incentives to conceal private information. Consequently, the final committee decision can be "incoherent" by failing to reflect the preferences of all committee members fully. Additionally, we characterize the subset of legislators with any incentive to conceal data.

David Austen-Smith

Papers

Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure

Deliberation and Voting Rules

Strategic transmission of costly information

Interest groups: Money, information and influence

Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation