American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

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Current index to legal periodicals

▪ Abstract With tools borrowed from the economic analysis of insurance, principal-agency theory has allowed political scientists new insights into the role of information asymmetry and incentives in political relationships. It has given us a way to think formally about power as the modification of incentives to induce actions in the interests of the principal. Principal-agency theory has evolved significantly as political scientists have sought to make it more applicable to peculiarly political institutions. In congressional oversight of the bureaucracy, increasing emphasis has been placed on negotiation of administrative procedures, rather than the imposition of outcome-based incentives, as originally conceived. Awareness of the problem of credible commitment has impelled more dramatic reformulations, in which agents perform their function only when their interests conflict with those of the principal, and they are guaranteed some degree of autonomy. The ‘political master’ finds himself in the position o...

https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840

The political evolution of principal-agent models

Achieving employee adherence to organizational rules and policies is critical for successful coordination and functioning within organizations. In this article, we explore the antecedents of such rule-following behavior and present two studies of employees that compare two strategies for achieving rule and policy adherence: (1) an extrinsically oriented command-and-control model and (2) an intrinsically oriented self-regulatory model. The findings of both studies suggest that the influence of the self-regulatory strategy exceeds that of the command-and-control approach. Overall, these studies highlight the potential value of fostering employee rule following via intrinsically oriented self-regulatory mechanisms and suggest strategies for implementing such mechanisms.

Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings

1. To whom are legislators accountable? 2. Collective accountability and its discontents 3. The supply of visible votes 4. Demand for visible votes 5. Counting votes 6. Explaining voting unity 7. The individual-collective balance.

/pdf/legislative-voting-and-accountability-1op7iwz4kp.pdf

Legislative voting and accountability

To what extent is party loyalty a liability for incumbent legislators? Past research on legislative voting and elections suggests that voters punish members who are ideologically “out of step” with their districts. In seeking to move beyond the emphasis in the literature on the effects of ideological extremity on legislative vote share, we examine how partisan loyalty can adversely affect legislators' electoral fortunes. Specifically, we estimate the effects of each legislator's party unity—the tendency of a member to vote with his or her party on salient issues that divide the two major parties—on vote margin when running for reelection. Our results suggest that party loyalty on divisive votes can indeed be a liability for incumbent House members. In fact, we find that voters are not punishing elected representatives for being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too partisan.

/pdf/the-electoral-costs-of-party-loyalty-in-congress-5fr1aapx2f.pdf

The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress

In two decades of experience with state renewable portfolio standards (RPSs), the United States has observed immense growth in renewable energy markets, initially in wind energy and more recently in solar power. During this time, RPSs have experienced considerable policy reinvention and increased diversity. Here, we explain how changes in RPS policy design features relate to different market outcomes. We develop a score for measuring RPS stringency and show that a one-point increase in RPS stringency leads to increases of 0.2%, 1% and 0.3% in renewable energy, solar generation and renewable energy capacity, respectively. Other important design features include resource eligibility, planning processes, cost recovery and geographical restrictions. These findings are then reaffirmed through 42 semi-structured phone interviews with experts in the field of RPS implementation from government agencies, including public utility commissions and state energy offices, electric utilities and various renewable energy firms and associations. Renewable policy standards have been instrumental in the growth of renewable energy in US states. Through a ranking of policy stringency and interviews with industry stakeholders, researchers show the significance of stringency and other policy design features towards a standard’s effectiveness.

Empirical evaluation of the stringency and design of renewable portfolio standards

Theory: We extend research on the electoral connection "beyond" the modem Congress to the Congress of the early 1800s. Our analysis shows evidence of individual accountability in voting on the Compensation Act of 1816 and in decisions to run for reelection in the 1816 election. Hypotheses: An electoral connection should produce a marginality effect in voting on the Compensation Act (vulnerable legislators less likely to vote yea), and surplus retirements among yea voters. Methods: Logistic regressions with vote on the Compensation Act and retirement decisions as dependent variables. Independent variables are electoral safety, age, party affiliation, and (for the latter regression) vote on the Compensation Act. Results: Electorally vulnerable legislators were less likely to support the Compensation Act. Supporters of that proposal were less likely to seek reelection. Both of these findings are consistent with the existence of an electoral connection, and persist after controls for other factors such as age, party affiliation, and electoral safety.

The electoral connection in the early congress: The case of the compensation act of 1816

This work addresses the question of how, and how effectively, elected politicians can exert ex ante influence over the policy choices of regulatory agencies. In order to test the hypothesis that politicians can use choices about the agency's structure and process to influence subsequent agency decisions, I analyze two sets of decisions made by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in its hydroelectric licensing program during the 1960–90 time period. I find, among other things, that (1) some (but not all) of the tools of ex ante political control were used to effect noticeable changes in the content of FERC decisions over time; (2) among the so‐called structural controls, those that were designed to influence agency preferences appear to have exerted the most significant and lasting effects; (3) among the so‐called procedural controls, those that were designed to increase the transaction costs of making particular decisions appear to have been more effective than those that merely incre...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/468057

Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies

David B. Spence discusses the magnitude of risks assumed by actors engaged in and affected by oil and gas development. Oil and gas companies face environmental risks, health and safety risks, liability risks, and reputational risks, the management of which is central to the companies’ long-term success. Part I of this article examines the origins of corporate social responsibility (CSR), its rationale, and its growth in the business world. Part II explores some of the dimensions of reputational risk facing modern oil and gas companies, using several high profile examples. Part III explains some of the ways in which oil and gas companies use CSR initiatives to manage the reputational risk.

/pdf/corporate-social-responsibility-in-the-oil-and-gas-industry-580m4i9vo2.pdf

Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk

In recent years, there has been a noticeable shift in some of the literature on political control of the administrative agencies, away from an emphasis on agency autonomy and toward the view that politicians can and do exert significant amounts of control over agency decisions. This shift has been particularly evident in the mainstream political science journals and includes both theoretical and empirical work. I argue here that this shift in thinking may be premature, and that these recent works do not really challenge our understanding of why widespread agency autonomzy is an inherent byproduct of the delegation of policy-making authority from politicians to agencies. Much of the new theory of political control comes from positive theorists, who emphasize the ability of politicians to shape agencies' decision-making environments in ways that steer agencies' subsequent decisions toward the politicians' policy goals. Much of the new empirical work comes from quantitative empiricists whose statistical models of agency behavior find significant amounts of agency responsiveness to external political stimuli. Neither of these groups, however, demonstrate that politicians can overcome the delegation problem; rather, they model the problem away. Positive theorists do this by assuming away the importance of substantive policy foresight to politicians' efforts to influence subsequent agency decisions. Quantitative empiricists do this by choosing as their dependent variable agency implementation of established policies, rather than agency policy making itself. While both are driven to this result by their own separate methodological imperatives (and a commendable preference for scientific rigor), the result is the same. Neither group of models is sufficiently rich or generalizable to challenge the notion that agencies act with a great deal of autonomry when exercising most delegated policy-making authority. To what degree can and do elected politicians control the policy decisions of administrative agencies? If recent scholarship I wish to thank Susan Rose-Ackerman, John Aldrich, Steve Balla, William Bianco, John Brehm, Daniel Farber, and Christopher Schroeder for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would like to give special thanks to James Hamilton for his comments and suggestions throughout the preparation of this article. Portions of this analysis were presented at the 1994 and 1996 meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association. J-PART 7(1997):2: 199-219 199/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory This content downloaded from 157.55.39.200 on Thu, 01 Dec 2016 05:43:58 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Agency Policy Making and Political Control in the mainstream of political science is any indication, it would seem that the weight of opinion is shifting away from theories of agency autonomy and toward theories that emphasize previously underappreciated tools of political control. Positive theory has contributed greatly to this change, as have some recent empirical studies indicating that politicians can control agency decisions much of the time. However, if this shift in opinion is indeed occurring, there are good reasons to believe that it is premature. Upon closer inspection, it is evident that methodological choices have led many of these newer models of political control to model away key aspects of the delegation problem, particularly the critical importance of substantive policy foresight to politicians' efforts to control the content of agency decisions. Many positive theorists recognize this issue, but contend that politicians can circumvent it through the use of procedures and decisions about agency structure; for their part, many quantitative empiricists choose to study a dependent variable other than agency policy making,' one that is particularly responsive to politicians' influence. In either case, this modeling choice leads directly to overestimation of the degree to which political control occurs. COMING FULL CIRCLE ON DELEGATION In some ways, the path to this point has been circular.2 Scholars and politicians debated the dimensions of the delegation problem before the 1946 enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The simultaneous growth of the executive branch and demise of the nondelegation doctrine in the federal courts prompted concern about the concentration of policymaking authority in the hands of unelected bureaucrats. The APA was designed to democratize the agency decision-making process, in large part, because elected politicians could not or would not circumscribe agency authority at the delegation stage. Some political scientists have characterized this problem of uncontrolled delegation as abdication by Congress of its authority-indeed, its duty-to make policy decisions (Lowi 1979). Subsequent research suggested that oversight did not offer politicians an acceptable solution to the delegation problem. In the 1970s, the first positive theory analyses of the relationship between administrative agencies and elected politicians (by economists and others who used a principal-agent framework) demonstrated that information asymmetries enabled the agency to shirk its legislatively imposed duties (Niskanen 1971; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971)3 and complemented other analyses of the limits of presidential oversight and control (Neustadt 1960; Heclo 1977). In the 1980s these works sparked a debate among positive theorists and other bureaucratic politics scholars over the efficacy 'I use the term policy making to refer to agency decisions that establish policy, either through rule making or other procedures (see exhibit 2). As to the analytical utility. of this distinction between agency policy making and other agency activities, see section entitled "The Quantifiable Dependent Variable Prob-

David B. Spence

Papers

Empirical evaluation of the stringency and design of renewable portfolio standards

The electoral connection in the early congress: The case of the compensation act of 1816

Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies

Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk

Agency Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem