Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

Weak instruments arise when the instruments in linear instrumental variables (IV) regression are weakly correlated with the included endogenous variables. In generalized method of moments (GMM), more generally, weak instruments correspond to weak identification of some or all of the unknown parameters. Weak identification leads to GMM statistics with nonnormal distributions, even in large samples, so that conventional IV or GMM inferences are misleading. Fortunately, various procedures are now available for detecting and handling weak instruments in the linear IV model and, to a lesser degree, in nonlinear GMM.

A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments

/pdf/a-survey-of-weak-instruments-and-weak-identification-in-4jdhl8vv0m.pdf

This article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets. Firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle. We show the sources of small business finance, and how capital structure varies with firm size and age. The interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment. We also analyze a number of research and policy issues, review the literature, and suggest topics for future research.

/pdf/the-economics-of-small-business-finance-the-roles-of-private-3udpq27n5a.pdf

The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks and public firms and find that 32% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction on the firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market value and operating performance.

/pdf/creditor-control-rights-and-firm-investment-policy-d3u21jh78q.pdf

Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy

We provide evidence that creditors play an active role in the governance of corporations well outside of payment default states. By examining the SEC filings of all U.S. nonfinancial firms from 1996 through 2008, we document that, in any given year, between 10 percent and 20 percent of firms report being in violation of a financial covenant in a credit agreement. We show that violations are followed immediately with a decline in acquisitions and capital expenditures, a sharp reduction in leverage and shareholder payouts, and an increase in CEO turnover. The changes in the investment and financing behavior of violating firms coincide with amended credit agreements that contain stronger restrictions on firm decision-making; changes in the management of violating firms suggest that creditors also exert informal influence on corporate governance. Finally, we show that firm operating and stock price performance improve following a violation. We conclude that actions taken by creditors increase the value of theaverage violating firm.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1344302_code254274.pdf?abstractid=1344302&mirid=3

Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value

The duration of bank relationships

https://faculty.comm.virginia.edu/dcs8f/NUMBERS.PDF

What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence

We investigate the determinants of multiple-bank relationships using a new data set comprised of 1129 firms across twenty European countries. We first document large cross-country variation in the average number of bank relationships per firm, exposing a richness in the financial systems of European countries that goes beyond simply being termed "bank-dominated." We find, after controlling for firm and industry-specific characteristics, that the average number of bank relationships per firm is non-monotonically related to the fragility of a country?s banking system and negatively related to the efficiency of its bankruptcy process and enforcement of creditor rights. Moreover, we find that although concentrated banking systems reduce the number of bank relationships, public bond markets have a complementary effect and increase the average number of banks per firm. We extend our analysis to industry-level effects and also study the robustness of our results using a different data set on bank relationships in Norway. Overall, our study provides a rich set of results that should aid in sorting out theories in banking, corporate governance and financial system architecture.

David C. Smith

Papers

Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy

Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value

The duration of bank relationships

What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence

What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence