Success? Failure? Something in-between? A framework for evaluating crisis management

We present a game-theoretic model to explore how uncertainty about terrorist preferences can affect optimal resource allocations for infrastructure protection. We consider a dynamic game with incomplete information, in which the defender chooses how to allocate her defensive resources, and then an attacker chooses which target to attack according to a multiattribute utility function. Our model constructs a prior distribution representing both defender uncertainty about the attacker weights on the various attributes in the attacker utility function and also defender ignorance about unobserved attributes that may be important to the attacker but have not been identified by the defender. The incorporation of unobserved attributes is a novel feature of our model and allows every target to have a positive prior probability of being attacked when the defender is sufficiently uncertain about the attacker preferences. In a dynamic environment, the defender then has an opportunity to jointly update her knowledge about both the attribute weights and unobserved attributes in a Bayesian manner, based on actual (or attempted) attacks observed in a previous period of the game. In general, defender uncertainty has a greater impact on defensive resource allocations in our model than in much of the previous work.

Target-Hardening Decisions Based on Uncertain Multiattribute Terrorist Utility

In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, one of the most damning and penetrating questions asked of political leaders and senior state officials by the media, opposition parties and other actors is: ‘why didn't they see it coming?’ The question is often rhetorical, the implication being that warning signs were clear and should have been acted upon. In this article we identify the assumptions underpinning the ‘why didn't they see it coming?’ narrative as it has been expounded in relation to the global financial crisis in the UK and US. Since 2008 commentators have routinely argued that warning signals of an impending financial crisis were ignored by political elites, treasury officials and financial regulators. Such arguments are made in hindsight and we refer to them as backward mapping perspectives. In this article we advance a counter-narrative, from a forward mapping perspective, where the focus is on placing such ‘failures' in the context of the time, without foreknowledge of the crisis that would happ...

Why didn't they See it Coming? Warning Signs, Acceptable Risks and the Global Financial Crisis:

The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium of 2015–2016 that occurred while these countries were in a heightened state of alert raise questions about indications and warning methodology as well as effectiveness of the blanket-protection deployment of security services assisted even by the military. Response and perhaps even more anticipation may require strategic rethinking in light of the predatory attacks that target the most vulnerable spots of the public space. This study looks at threat analysis in Belgium as conducted through her intelligence fusion centre Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA)​​​​​​ since its inception in 2006. With a special focus on what is known, at the time of writing, about the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, this study hopes to put into context how the system (mal)functions and will also consider the preventive measures that respond to the threat, and the international aspects which have implications far beyond Belgian borders. Therefore, a case is mad...

Indications and warning in Belgium: Brussels is not Delphi

If we can’t reliably predict the future, how can we be wise when preparing for it? Examining the UK’s ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’ of 2010, I demonstrate that though planners often rightly invoke uncertainty, they also imply a highly certain ideology about Western power and foresight. Modern ‘national security states’ describe the world as dangerously uncertain, yet fall prey to a misplaced confidence in their ability to anticipate and prevent threats. I argue that classical realism, especially that of Clausewitz and Morgenthau, is a valuable resource for handling uncertainty more reflexively. Classical realism counsels that governments should go beyond attempts to improve foresight. They should try to check against the fallibility of their assumptions, marshal their power more conservatively, insure against the likelihood of predictive failure by developing the intellectual capability to react to the unknown, and avoid misplaced confidence in their ability to bring order into chaos.

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Taking uncertainty seriously: Classical realism and national security

1. Introduction Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon 2. How to build a warning system Paul Bracken 3. Intelligence management as risk management: the case of surprise attack Uzi Arad 4. Nuclear proliferation epidemiology: uncertainty, surprise, and risk management Lewis A. Dunn 5. Precaution against terrorism Jessica Stern and Jonathan B. Wiener 6. Defense planning and risk management in the presence of deep uncertainty Paul K. Davis 7. Managing energy security risks in a changing world Coby van der Linde 8. What markets miss: political stability frameworks and country risk Preston Keat 9. The risk of failed state contagion Jeffrey Herbst 10. Conclusion: managing strategic surprise Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon.

David Gordon

Papers

Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons from Risk Management and Risk Assessment

Intelligence management as risk management: the case of surprise attack

Managing Strategic Surprise: Conclusion: managing strategic surprise

Managing Strategic Surprise: Introduction